FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1946

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE STRATEGY OF TERRITORIAL DECISIONS

By Isaiah Bowman

THERE is a profound psychological difference between a transfer of territory and a change in a trade treaty or pact of international coöperation. Territory is near and plain and evokes personal feelings and group sentiments. To a people conscious of its individuality, "how sweet the silent backward tracings." Such people endow the land itself with a mystical quality, hearing revered ancestors, the authors of past grandeurs and the doers of heroic deeds, speak from their graves in its soil. To all classes, landscape is an essential part of home. Enshrined in every national literature are the changing moods and compositions of river, mountain, plain, forest and shore. All the familiar techniques of living are involved in the complex of feeling, remembered experience and imagination surrounding place and home.

It is title to sentiments like these, and not merely to so-and-so many square miles of land, that is transferred when there is a change of boundaries and rule.

No such serious questions of sentiment or prestige are involved in writing a short-term military alliance or a commercial treaty dealing with goods and profits or a compact embodying the generalities of a world order; for these are not among the spiritual intimacies of life. The links between place and people are countless. The fact that one was born in a certain spot pursues one throughout life. The first question in most census schedules is, "Where do you live?" In common thought today, as in the earliest folklore, one's dwelling place is the center of the universe. Thus national leaders must be especially alert to territorial losses and gains, for they touch the main nerve center of popular feeling.

The dim curves of the future are more likely to be perceived

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correctly if we bring to the settlement of territorial issues a knowledge of sentiment, tradition and changing national fortunes of the past. Even so, such knowledge is inert and unproductive unless it is combined with judgments based upon a wider political sophistication than that created by mere possession of statistical data and formal historical training. In politics, action must be based on mixtures of right and wrong. The scholar says, "You must keep such-and-such facts in mind whatever you do." The busy official is tempted to ask simply, "What shall I do?" Neither is enough. Always and everywhere a decision about territory requires the examination of an existing situation respecting power. Behind that situation lies history, and ahead of it stretches the ideal of a fair solution. When a decision is to be made, three factors should be taken — past history, current situation, future ideal — and a judgment expressed jointly upon them. Such a judgment is neither more nor less than an opinion, based on experience with human nature, as to what participating leaders and nations are likely to do or may be persuaded to do in the interest of that recognized fairness which is one of the essential elements of a stable peace.

II. THE RISKS

However fair a given territorial solution may be, the seeds of trouble will generally remain. Risk can never be eliminated from territorial transfers; for the past will always be raked, in moments of potential change, to find arguments which sustain claims to the recapture of territory once held. A contemporary incident suddenly highlights an historic cause, or is made to do so. Population mixtures provide abundant opportunities for oppression; and the oppressed of yesterday, we have painfully discovered, often turns oppressor. Such mixtures are unavoidable in many border zones because national frontiers could not possibly be made to follow every ethnic and linguistic intricacy. Thus a boundary, however logically drawn, remains a thing of conflicting local hopes and fears. We have seen situations in which a man, to be secure, must have two houses, one on either side of a boundary, so that he can flee persecution wherever its source. The threat of a change in boundary or in the form of government has led hundreds of thousands to live, in a sense, on both sides of a boundary — their homes on one side and their bank accounts on the other. It is hard to improve on the child's school

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essay: "The Boundary is an imaginary line, drawn through Ireland, between the good people and the bad. If it were not for the Boundary, Uncle Joe would send us a goose for Christmas."

That there is a general lack of confidence in the territorial settlements which are made is shown by the general aversion to giving them guarantees of permanence. We suspect that we may be heading for the rocks and so leave the escape hatch open. This practically invites agitation for change from both sides concerned — or from several sides, when the interests of more than two nations are involved. Witness the general feeling in 1937 that perhaps it was right, after all, that Austria should be joined to Germany. We disliked the manner in which the change was effected, and we abhorred the agent who effected it; but some eminent men, including a few scholars, had favored the change for years; and anyway the world feared war if it acted against it. Witness, again, the still tangled skein of Palestine, where an interweaving of irrelevancy, bad judgment, personal differences, national election considerations here and in England, political whipsawing, fear, suspicion, and *realpolitik* have all but excluded morality, fairness and reason. It is a major issue, yet virtually all leaders talk on both sides of the subject, as if the answer lay only in expediency, self-interest and compromise. The United States may be faced with the question whether it will undertake to guarantee the outcome of this play of passion and special pleading.

Consider the difficulty of dealing with remote peoples in any event. To prescribe for them as to forms of government, or to take away territory here and add it there, is to suppose a careful analysis of a people, their institutions, motivations, range of political experience, depth of sound traditions, solidity of character. This may seem easy when a people is far away. Our domestic experience should warn us of our limitations. What American can predict the moods and acts of even the United States? Who knows our country region by region well enough for that?

Rival social and political systems add to the complexity of the problem. Each former political satellite of Nazi Germany is now a house divided against itself. All nations join in proclaiming "democracy" but all are passionately divided as to meanings. A "democracy" set up with Soviet support does not look like American democracy at all. The situation of many countries is like that of a certain sequoia tree in the Yosemite National Park. Two hundred feet above the ground the crown was once knocked

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off by lightning, and upon the scarred and weakened main stem a new trunk began to grow and has now reached a height of at least fifty feet. It is vigorous and symmetrical, but its survival is conditioned by the old storm-broken trunk below. If there was ever a time to "think in things, not words," as Justice Holmes advised, it is now. The trunk and roots matter most, not the lovely crown about which it is so easy to write fine words.

Territorial settlements involve all the complexities of civilization — historical fitness, population mobility, resource distributions, tax bases, divisions of agricultural fertility zones, and a thousand other considerations. Territory is not an abstraction. Unfortunately, nations can not be separated approximately. A boundary has to be here, not hereabouts.

Critics have said that the Paris Peace Conference failed because the peacemakers were preoccupied with boundaries when their minds should have been on essential economic arrangements. As a participant, I know of no such preoccupation. The economic arrangements were bad and the subsequent failure was inevitable, whatever boundaries were delimited. Not the fragmentation of Europe but the rise of economic autarchy was the root of the trouble in the 20s and 30s. The choice between economic advantage and political independence, moreover, was often made deliberately.

In many parts of Europe the feelings of two or more nationalities about the same piece of territory are irreconcilable. If there is to be peace in such cases, it must be imposed from without. Each will oppress the other if it has the opportunity. The overlapping sovereignties and remembered wrongs of the past feed the "eternal light," which burns not only to remind men of past heroisms but to light the pathway of the irredentists and would-be (in turn) oppressors. Sometimes, of course, boundary disputes are settled without bitterness. When, for example, the last boundary problem between Colombia and Venezuela reached the point of negotiation, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed that the matter be handled as between two gentlemen. Air photography had revealed advantages to both sides, because the streams ran in a way that neither supposed. In a rare spirit of give-and-take, a settlement was made. But there were few people in the district and none in the essential part of it. There were no local votes, no ideas afloat, no trends, no rival cultures. Only empty land permits of so neat a solution.

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It is a grave error to suppose that there is one right and stable solution to every territorial problem, a solution to be found, adopted and forgotten. Time and life produce their unpredictable changes. At one point in a prolonged discussion in a recent conference, a fatigued member said to another, "Words, words, words!" to which the reply was made, "Yes, words, words, words; but underneath the words are meanings, and underneath the meanings is life." He meant changing and unpredictable life. As life and time surge forward, the meanings change and the words (the political agreements) change with them, logically or by free negotiation in a few cases, by force in many others.

The dream of many simple minds is that disputed territory can be divided according to some self-contained scheme of logic or set of generally accepted moralities. This notion overlooks the truth that life which has become static is death. Moreover, scientific discovery is a perpetually unsettling factor. No sooner has jet propulsion set tongues wagging about the need for a "completely new strategy" than the atomic bomb and the proximity fuse vastly extend the range of possibilities. Every time a new weapon is introduced or a new technique devised, a new appraisal must be made of every scrap of territory we own or may desire to control internationally or otherwise. It is fundamentally wrong, in my opinion, to think that a system of world coöperation or international defense can minimize the importance of territory. Ownership and hence boundaries remain scientifically valid and of first importance in a world not yet united — in fact profoundly divided — with respect to forms of social organization and control.

History warns us of the danger of overconfidence. In 1916, when we bought the Danish West Indies, we most unwisely relinquished rights based upon discovery and exploration in Greenland, though for years Peary had hammered on aviation possibilities with the persistence of a zealot. It will soon appear whether our occupation and use of Greenland in a time of temporary Danish helplessness will give us future standing (internationally or otherwise) in this part of the front yard of the hemisphere. Our painful experience with the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific is so recent as to warn us that territorial dispositions call for the highest statesmanship we can command. The historical record of the judgments of prime ministers and parliaments, presidents and congresses, is not reassuring.

England's historic moat was crossed by enemy airplanes in

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World War I. Grave pronouncements followed: in a military sense the English Channel, it was said, had been obliterated. And in the spring of 1940 this conclusion seemed about to be confirmed. But Hitler did not invade England, and the moat had something, indeed much, to do with it. English ships with their unmatched fighting crews had control of the Narrow Seas and menaced every continental foreshore held by the enemy. The factors in what happened in the summer and autumn of 1940 were many, variable and complex, but there was one factor present in every new and swiftly evolving phase of the situation — twenty miles of salt water.

It is clear from examples dotting the pages of history that some crucial territorial arrangements have been wise and others unwise from either the long-range or the short-range point of view. Critics of the Alaska Purchase, limited in outlook, wrote "Seward's Folly." British top leaders, officially advised, let go of Helgoland. Tricky in their effects on judgment are neat distributional maps, whether of oil, or the differentials of population growth, or the production of steel, or the location of rare and critically important minerals. An examination of technical data will never supply the key to wisdom. To reach a wise decision *a political composition* is required. If it proves correct we call it statesmanship. The cynic will ask whether any decision that will be tested by human behavior in the future is more than a guess. I suggest we are more likely to guess rightly if we are thoroughly at home with the possibilities.

III. SOME COMPONENTS OF POLITICAL JUDGMENTS

Territorial settlements usually are based less on principle than on political power judgments of the moment. Probably no major peace settlement came nearer the mark of principle than the European territorial settlements of 1919. The boundary network established at that time fitted the complicated patterns of speech, folk groupings and sense of nationality more closely than ever had been the case before in modern history. But judgments upon the 1919 boundaries, and upon those now in the making, are not like the judgments of a court rendered according to an accepted code of law. Decisions in this field are not based on abstractions of social experience or generally accepted moral theories. Their nature is political. Justice cannot weigh "historical rights" blindfolded and decree consistent action.

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Negotiation has flexible limits and involves opportunistic appraisal to a high degree. If policy makers come to a conference unprepared to discuss social and political ideas which are in conflict within a given territory, they are unprepared to frame a decision respecting the transfer of such territory. The same sort of thing is true, of course, even of international conferences that deal with subjects like food, aviation and international organization. They are simple only by title; in reality, they deal with bundles of things, with overlapping and often contradictory forces and conditions. All international actions have in them a high degree of opportunism, called euphemistically "the logic of events." We proclaim principles and strive toward ideals; but events do not wait upon mature reflection. As a result, almost all broad international political decisions, whether upon territories or otherwise, are hurried, tentative and incomplete.

A new chapter in our domestic politics has been opened by our wider and more active participation in world affairs. In launching our barque upon a wider sea of responsibility we will do well to reëxamine the rigging of our national political processes. No sooner do officials take a position or make a decision than they begin to justify it, backed by the power of an official propaganda machine supported by the taxpayers, who thus pay to be told how right their government has been. The official attitude is defensive, protective and self-justifying. No one praises democracy or any other system more highly than those who are its salaried beneficiaries. In the case of territorial decisions, the scope of political dialectic is enlarged by the nature of the problems involved. As we have seen, they are characteristically gray, not white and black. As a rule there *is* something to be said on both sides. A thousand wait their turn at the public tribune for one who, looking for truth, delves quietly into the nature of a tortured situation. One thing only can be counted on — the brevity of public attention and interest. It is smart to be "on the beam" of current interest. No use talking about diplomacy as an art when the public wants to know who was responsible at Pearl Harbor.

A major factor in the political discussion of foreign problems is that many of our domestic racial groups offer support or threaten reprisals upon candidates for public office according as they promise to favor or oppose group programs for achieving some supposed benefit for distant homelands. In many local political situations such foreign groups hold the balance of

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power. We all want peace; but each group wishes its own kind of peace settlement. Besides their attachments to particular places, groups have preferences as to forms of government and social systems. Every political wind, especially at election time, brings into the arena of national debate the clamor of noisy minorities, with two loyalties, not one. War with Italy was a clean-cut affair for our government by comparison with the subsequent tangles when, in the moment of victory, the problem of Italy was transferred from the military front westward to Chicago, New Haven and New York. Then the politician began looking over his shoulder.

Group dissension over every troublesome territorial problem weakens the public resolution to support the settlement of it. And the domestic consequences of these divisions will be closely watched abroad. We have become the mainstay of international organization for peace; but foreign observers know that the national tide, now running high in the direction of accepting world responsibilities, will surely recede if we put national power — which includes American bayonets — behind programs designed merely to capture the Italian vote or the Polish vote or the Jewish vote. We should sharply challenge a course of action that weakens the determination of the American people as a whole to support the world order. Unless the majority insist that their public servants rise above these group interests we risk losing by domestic political trading what we thought we, along with the other nations of the world, had won at the San Francisco Conference.

A new map of the United States would enable us to undertake a much deeper political self-analysis. The map would show the chief centers of foreign population and their voting habits. What has been the record of the Congressmen who represent such groups? What have been the decisive preëlection issues? What were the constituents promised? We cannot say that such conflicts of opinion in our democracy cancel out, on the ground that main national decisions are made upon higher and broader plateaus of interest. The democratic line known as the "diagonal of contending varieties" has not always been extended in the right direction. Prohibition proved this, and so did the events of December 7, 1941, only five months after Congress had continued selective service with not one vote to spare. The nature of the political process is exceedingly complicated. Now one force, now

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another, one guided by a wise leader, the other unguided and uncertain, moves the finger that writes our fate upon the wall.

We cannot expect largeness of vision and disinterested points of view from groups that act on the urge of remembered wrongs "over there." We wish those wrongs settled in the light of what we see, share and dream in free America. We expect the citizen to be rooted *here* and his passions to be poured out in the national interest of America. To be sure, the two promptings often coincide. But we participate in settling territorial problems not for the purpose of favoring a given group abroad, regardless of the rights of other groups, but for the purpose of establishing the fairest and most lasting situation attainable. Czechoslovak leaders recently oriented the policies of their nation in the direction of Moscow, and I suppose this to be wise. What is the preferred orientation of the 300,000 or more American citizens of Czechoslovak blood? The present government in Poland believes itself capable of digesting the troubles that will surely beset the country if it swallows all of the territory east of the Oder. When faced with the imperatives of a practical settlement, how far shall we support the sentimental "backward tracings"?

The paradox is that if we make boundaries stable by international agreement we may confirm the injustice of an arbitrary or careless decision, while if we make them mobile we invite every minority group to agitate continuously, often in specious terms. Over-all prosperity and stability and a free life within the framework of collective responsibility are objects that can be achieved in every corner of the world only *after* they are first achieved in the round or in general terms. We cannot achieve molecular peace and justice everywhere by a stroke of the pen or by any sort of organization or wisdom that we know. The touchstones of success for a world organization are that it shall have a workable structure and that it shall generate a coöperative will to see justice *become* paramount. If we are not alert to the danger, the territorial settlements ahead of us will tend to draw attention away from other main issues. I do not assert that every detailed decision will induce a step backward toward isolationism, but I fear it may be so. There is a risk that groups may attempt to capture the victory for objects different from those that only time and sustained coöperation will achieve. If we succeed as a united people in our big job in the world, particular boundaries and individual minorities will become, we hope, less and less important.

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IV. THE STRATEGIES OF PEACE

The decision about Greenland referred to above was taken by a mind not alerted to aviation as an instrument both for keeping the peace and for making war. Without pretending that the list is complete, let us look at some of the things to which we should be alerted today. Pending territorial decisions will be made within the framework of some such composition of strategies of peace as the following.

The grand international strategy is to work for and win a peace of justice, buttressed by coöperative will and enterprise. The national aim of the United States should be to demand insistently the application of the *principle of fairness*, and to be its foremost exemplar. It is a principle understood in all languages; it is the white thread running through all systems of law. It is today's shining ideal, as it has been the ideal of sage and saint for millenniums past.

Are we up to a task set in these terms? Or will we allow trifles to steal in and monopolize our minds now that the immediate danger is past? Can the national will be sustained in the rare air of a universal humanity? We have set ourselves to perform a task of heroic proportions. The diversities of men and systems are not to be levelled by fine words or dissolved by concentrations of power appropriate for war. They are not merely differences of dress or manners, but include different systems of law rooted in profoundly different social experiences and environments, different codes of ethics, different degrees of inherent compassion, and wide and deep contradictions of purpose: élite vs. mass, colony vs. metropole, Communism vs. free-enterprise, democracy vs. totalitarianism. We have a long road ahead of us before the tentatives of our present collective will bear fruit in universal good.

There is not one strategy of peace but many strategies, and technology has recently multiplied them. It was so in war. "I know how to defeat Japan," said one top military commander in 1942. "Sink her ships!" We sank the ships, but this was only one of several routes to the heart of Japanese power. While the Charter of the United Nations is the chief instrument of our present hopes, the fact remains that territories are to be disposed of before proof can be provided that the United Nations have the will to implement the Charter. What tests of political democracy can be used to determine the will of a presently inert people?

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Whose scheme of social organization is to be adopted in the trusteed areas of the world? Tragic internal conflicts can arise among politically immature peoples if social and political experiments are inaugurated by outside powers of differing ideologies and aims.

Strategy based upon the military situation of the moment has proved disappointing. It was asserted repeatedly in the period 1939–1944 that territorial decisions must wait until the end of the war, when they could be resolved in a general settlement worked out in the calm atmosphere of peace. Events did not arrange themselves so conveniently. The successes of the Red Army had repercussions up and down the breadth of Russia and enlarged the limits of what it was practicable for Moscow to ask while contracting the limits of what it was practicable for Russia's allies to try to deny her. The Kremlin could borrow Clemenceau's words of 1919: Blood has given us the right to judge. It became the Curzon Line and nothing less! The world — including the Polish Government in London — could talk, but there stood the Soviet Armies, and they and they alone could advance into Poland. A long turning of thought followed, and the world was prepared to concede Polish claims to East Prussia, provided population transfers could be made in an "orderly and humane" manner. Danzig and the Oder frontier followed.

In all this, who has given thought to the Polish capacity for self-government? Who has reviewed judicially the twenty-year acts, servitudes and party fragmentations of the *Sejm?* What difficulties were met in welding together the three Polands which had been thrown together in 1919? Now there is a fourth "Poland" in East Prussia and a fifth "Poland" east of the Oder. Will the Polish national temperament change overnight and permit the orderly evolution of local self-government, the wise and patient building of a democratic commonwealth? One hesitates to ask these questions for fear of being accused of satire. But we can understand the Russian side of the argument, for have we not also bought with our blood bits of territory over the vast expanses of the Pacific, and do we propose, other and peaceful means failing, to buy them over again at possibly greater cost? This is not sweet peace, if you will, but rather the military strategy of the outpost; but its purpose can be peace, and a coöperative peace if we can put our grand strategy through.

The strategy of minerals — occupying one of the larger areas

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of political interest — has been gravely neglected by our higher commands. In this field we back and fill because no one who has taken the time required to study the essentials possesses the authority to formulate a policy we can stick to. Most territories have mineral possibilities. Yesterday Saudi Arabia was a land of picturesque Bedouin; today it is an oil empire. Wherever there are rare and critical minerals, useful alike in peaceful industry and in war, there we are bound to inquire who owns them and to what political design they may contribute. Is access easy? Is the government stable? Would costs be reasonable? What are the alternative sources of supply? Are substitutes likely to be developed by scientific research? If the agencies of the American Government and American business are at cross purposes, neither can take the firm position in these situations which is desirable from the viewpoint of the national interest. American business in the foreign field has too often not known when it would be deserted by its own government.

Population growths set the framework of another strategy. Bismarck's fear of the Polish mother is now shared in a wider sense by those concerned with the differentials of birth rates in the various nations of Europe. Will a possible rise in the standard of living in the Soviet Union, for example, have the expected effect of a drop in the present high birth rate there? We have been told that if Russia pays due attention to public health, she will have a population of more than 250,000,000 by 1970.[1] If the projections of the experts are realized, the balance of population will shift drastically away from western Europe to eastern Europe. Granted the accuracy of the statistical facts and the predictions based upon them, what can be done about the situation? France and Great Britain will subsidize births, whatever the government in power or its social policy. But government-assisted population growth is still in the experimental stage. Wrapped up in the experiment is a prior question: Shall an attempt be made to discriminate on a stock-selection basis, or will the worst stock inevitably be encouraged at the expense of the declining best? To breed for numbers, not quality, may be all that is possible. Thus it remains to be seen whether the policy of stimulating births spells strength or weakness for the nation practising it.

[1] "Population and Power in Postwar Europe," by Frank W. Notestein. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1944.

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Closely tied with the strategy of population numbers is the question of migration. A free movement of peoples on a non-discriminatory basis is persistently desired by allegedly overcrowded countries. The besetting fear of Australia serves as example of the other side of the argument. What shall be the choice between these opposite viewpoints? Has the United States a position in the dispute, now that its former policy of total Chinese exclusion is annulled in favor of a quota so small it does not matter? If the population pressure in China and India is so great, must the White Australia Policy be revised? There seems to be a fundamental error in the thesis that there should be a free and non-discriminatory flow of population across frontiers, and since both theory and the actual conditions on which it is based now occupy places in the field of practical politics the problem is worth fuller analysis.

The theory of a mobile population has two grand divisions. The first is *Lebensraum*, in which space and culture are merged in a mystical relation that identifies force as a beneficent agent of fate. Once the higher culture prevails, who cares how it was made to prevail? In adopting the policy of *Lebensraum*, the Nazis rested their case both upon "the changing facts of life" and upon the theory that good ends justify the use of arbitrary means. Since the thesis inexorably implies the use of force, the seeds of tragedy are broadcast from the start.

In the present situation of the world, tragically divided as it is by hates and conflicting systems of government, the forced transfer of populations holds intensified dangers. Using an elaborate machinery based upon thorough research, the German Government before and during World War II moved nearly 500,000 people out of both marginal and distant territories and settled them within the bounds of the enlarged Reich. Since then, the worsening of health conditions, means of transport and food supplies, plus other changes, have made the lot of forced emigrants even more difficult. The ideal of tolerance is gone; attainment of the goal of "orderly and humane transfer" seems almost impossible. The bank of hatred will continually receive new deposits as the fury and woe caused by brutal transfers are fully experienced. The importance of boundaries will not be minimized by this procedure, but maximized; everywhere they will be thought to separate "the good people" from "the bad people."

The second grand division of the theory of mobility supposes

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that relief from home crowding will follow emigration. Clearly, however, there would be no appreciable relief for China if seven millions of Chinese out of four hundred million were to go to Australia. The population in Australia would be doubled but the crowding in China would be lessened hardly at all. The root of the trouble is not an insufficient land base but a high birth rate. The axe must be laid to that root if practical results are to be obtained. This means universal knowledge about birth control and universal access to the means of control. Only a general rise in the standard of living seems sufficient to bring these ends in view, and only accelerated industrial development seems likely to provide a basis for a higher standard. So far as we humans can now see, these are the only solutions.

The reverse of the medal must also be kept in view. A nation which neglects to promote national unity by sound democratic processes is selling its birthright. Our objective is not a flattened-out culture and opinion based upon either force or mass habit. A country cannot neglect a sound process of unification any more than it can afford to dam up the flow of general cultural diversity. Switzerland is a useful example of the way in which wide cultural diversity may accompany unity of political purpose; but the United States is an equally good one. Our protracted negligent attitude toward world affairs led our enemies to suppose that we had lost the power of unified purpose; it turned out to be one of our strongest weapons. North of the border, "Canadianization" has long been a conscious policy to overcome the internal diversities resulting from the block settlement of immigrants to that country. The soundness of the unifying processes which have produced such good results in these and other cases is beyond question. A nation is not an inchoate mass of people, but organization and purpose and cultural development, with freedom and will to choose and with knowledge to guide the choice. These are goals difficult to attain under any circumstances. Unrestricted migration would wreck both the means and the purposes of unity in freedom.

There are, as has been suggested, other and more promising methods. What can be done for China and India, for example, is to raise the standard of living through industrialization. All the world need not, like Belgium, possess a highly concentrated industry drawing large quantities of raw materials from abroad. But every country that has people with hands has aptitudes, de-

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veloped or latent, which it can apply to raw materials, domestic and imported. It is better national policy to export a bale of goods than a man. The pyramiding of industry has limits, however; and it will be a special problem of the future to determine the best social balance between national production, importation, cheapening sources of power and population numbers. What concerns us in this connection now is that most countries have not reached the point of industrial saturation, so there is both room and time for experiment. Capital, enterprise and aptitudes, if suitably joined, will result in the surprisingly swift attainment of higher levels of living. In overcrowded countries there is a frontier in industry far more vast than any land frontier of history.

V. THE NEW RELATIONSHIPS

Among the strategies of peace and security is one we are next to try: the airing of threats to peace in the Assembly of the United Nations. The structure of organization, as finally accepted at San Francisco, provides for study of almost every conceivable major international problem. The world's confidence in the Organization may be expected to grow as such studies are impartially made and rationally interpreted. The wider the public knowledge and discussion of a problem the less likely it is that a minority group will succeed in forcing a parochial decision.

What we have seen of aggressive national policies in the territorial field during and at the close of the present war raises a question of interpretation. If the national policies of Britain with respect to the southern shores of the North Sea form a 150-year-old tradition that deserves respect, how far is similar respect due to the Soviet desires at the Dardanelles and Gibraltar, in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Baltic? While we are making up our minds on this the Soviet Union acts. It has been urged that we act ourselves in the Pacific. We can note, however, without being sanctimonious, that when we speak of territorial acquisitions in that area we include references to a trusteeship system and that the populations involved (the Philippines excepted) are too small and primitive to give the issue local human meaning.

We have to lift our eyes from the map if we are to see the new form of relationship which is being imposed upon many areas of the world, big and little, by economic evolutions twice armed with efficient and expanding technologies. That neglected garden called the Amazon, for example, exports 80 percent of its produc-

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tion and imports 90 percent of its consumption. Thus its economy is dependent upon an outside market whose constant fluctuations are entirely beyond its own control, and it will remain in this condition so long as its people find it uneconomical to work up their products industrially. In the broad sweep of economic forces the smaller countries of the world are one by one caught up. Most of the 20 Latin American states, having narrow economies, depend for economic well-being upon three or four exports. Control is not governed by "full employment," as determined domestically, or by commendable human industry and resultant high production, but by prices fixed abroad. In the absence of world-wide rationing, country by country, of the production of such key products as coffee, sugar, cacao, tea, rubber and cotton, this fluctuates greatly. The resultant stresses in Puerto Rico, Java and Ceylon and many other dependent areas are well known; in all of them, the population problem is tied to economic policy. By contrast, the riches of the earth are at the disposition of the Bahrein Islanders, in the Persian Gulf, because of the handsome royalties on their oil reserves.

Small countries require a form of special consideration, therefore, when territorial changes are in view; at least some of them do. And since none of them has confidence that international economic arrangements will take its welfare and economic viability into sufficient account, all claim a right to share in the decision of the gravest global matters in both the economic and the political field on the principle of "sovereign equality." This principle, fully deployed, means that the little will decide what the big shall do. Clearly, the full future impact of a decision as to the Silesian coal fields is not alone of Polish concern. Since Poland was not developed industrially herself, the coal of Polish Silesia was a drug on the local market until the British general strike of 1926 provided an unforeseen opportunity for sales in Scandinavia. What are the new rationalities now that Poland possesses the whole of Upper Silesia?

The net result of the economic difficulties we have reviewed, and the likely play of political forces upon them, is to throw the responsibility for equalizing economic opportunity upon general arrangements evolved in the Economic and Social Council as a counterweight to any effort of the Great Powers to solve the problem through the medium of territorial arrangements. This will seem, to the small state eager to extend its frontiers, a distant

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and uncertain place to lodge reliance for vital benefits. The permanence of new and untried governments will be made to depend, not on local effort but on the nod of the powerful and the distant. It will take unbounded faith to make stability real in such circumstances.

Statesmanship means looking ahead. It also means wise appraisals and a wise choice among alternative possibilities. It is the duty of the statesmen to identify the factors one by one and give first consideration to those which are dominant; for not all factors have equal weight, or will have later. In doing this, statesmen must ever remember that any proposal for action is half ideal — "the intrusion of the eternal into time" — and half reality. It is fallacious to suppose that we can distil, by philosophical reflection upon a people's cultural value, a policy which will justify enlarging its territorial scope, nor is it necessary for us to do so. There is abundant room for all in the present world, where science and the inventive arts have given us a fourth dimension. However limited the territorial base may be, good social organization, developed aptitudes, and national unity and freedom can raise every national group to satisfactory levels of living.

The lesson of this is that a strategy of industrial expansion must be put beside the other strategies. It may be objected that an ultimate solution may escape us if all peoples are industrialized. But are there ultimates in this world? The poet's phrase that "The end is forbidden" seems nearer the truth. There are too many unknown forces to justify self-confidence. Aptitudes vary almost as much as resources. Aptitude is a function of inherent powers, plus resources, plus education, plus energy, as conditioned by climate, biological setup, and food supply. It often is too readily supposed that where a textile loom goes, there will originate competition in exported textiles. Will China continue to buy from us if we help industrialize her? One admits that Russia is a special case, for in that country overwhelming manpower is joined to industrial power in a system of political control that may spell danger. But here, as in all other cases and with all fears, the infinite varieties of nature in time will, in my view, surprise us. In any event, since industrialization is not consummated overnight, there will be time for adjustment — in social control, in relief from felt wants, in birth rates, and especially in the opportunity to strengthen coöperative will and action.

For the rest — and that rest has its full share of uncertainty —

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we must accept a fact of life, that all experience is a risk. Looking backward to 1919, for example, we see how immature we were as a nation, or as a government, when fate put into our hands the instrument suited to a new order of planetary living, and we rejected it. Yet, speaking in the round, the men of that time did the best they could. When the best devising and the highest resolution fail, we can only try again. A tough amalgam of historical and present-day interests, differing nation by nation, has to be fused and welded upon the main stem of the world's common interest in peace. The final strategy, we repeat, is that of coöperative international action. The highest patriotism henceforth will be to insist upon objective judgments and expressions of fairness all round.

If we can make a go of this, the grand strategy, all the other strategies will fall into place. Meanwhile, however, it is our fate, as we have seen, to be obliged to settle the problems of boundaries, minerals, migration and strategic bases *before* we have been able to put coöperative action to the critical test. Thus we are always compelled to take account of the possibility that coöperative hopes and endeavors may fail. This necessary division of faith and interest tends to weaken the will to coöperate.

We find ourselves today, then, in a frontier zone of political living. Some of our friends of today may be among our enemies tomorrow. But life demands action in the present. We are obliged to reconcile the practical and the ideal. What I have tried to say is that their reconciliation, for example in the case of the territorial settlements that plague us, is almost infinitely difficult, but that it is not quite impossible. As a nation, looking up the long and steep road ahead, can we run and not be weary? Can we fulfill the pledge that we made when we wrote "We, the people" at the masthead of the Charter of the United Nations? Not if we listen to the small minds and the particularistic groups. Not if once again, as once before, we let trifles flood our minds. The struggle upon which we have embarked on the morrow of military victory is an eternal one. Weak and wrong as some of our decisions may in time prove to be, we must develop the stamina to face the consequences and try again and again and again.

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RISKS OF A BIG-POWER PEACE

By Herbert V. Evatt

WE ARE passing through a period of acute pessimism in relation to international affairs. A feeling of disillusionment prevails among our victorious armies, despite the magnificent victories they have gained over our enemies. To a great extent, of course, the feeling arises from first impressions and incomplete knowledge. But it is not confined to returning veterans and it is not without some justification. Many people in widely scattered countries are wondering whether the sacrifices of the war will be reflected in the peace.

A great part of the responsibility for this state of disillusionment must be attributed to those leaders amongst the Great Powers who have attempted, and are still attempting, to make both the writing and the execution of the peace treaties their own exclusive prerogative. Their intentions are probably of the best. No doubt they genuinely believe that the countries with a preponderance of population have the right to lay down the conditions of peace throughout the world. But in actual practice this will not work. A settlement imposed by a few cannot be expected to evoke general assent and must evoke considerable resentment. Nor can these leaders make sure of agreement, even amongst themselves.

At every stage of the war, Australia and other nations which have a clear record of active and sustained belligerency have been trying to establish the principle that it is not only just, but also essential, that all of them should participate in the peacemaking process. This war has shown, more clearly perhaps than any other in history, that peacemaking does not begin or end with a formal conference. It has its origin during the progress of hostilities, in alliances, agreements, understandings and declarations between the belligerents. It is continued in the armistice negotiations, and in the post-armistice machinery for control of enemy territory. Finally, even after the signature of a formal treaty, it can be, and has been, projected into the permanent organization for the maintenance and modification of the settlement. These stages do not always follow in strict chronological order, but each has its own distinct features.

During the war it was natural that the countries with the

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largest armed forces and the most highly developed and productive industrial machine should claim and receive a dominant rôle in the determination of war strategy. This was accepted by all countries, including Australia, despite the fact that our war effort was "total" in character and, proportionately speaking, was not exceeded by any nation; absolutely speaking, it was crucial and decisive at certain times and in certain theaters.

Within a few weeks after the outbreak of the war against Japan, Australian armed forces were placed under the operational control of General MacArthur, in the full knowledge that he would in turn be subject to directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and ultimately to President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Even in this purely military field, however, the smaller nations had an interest and could make a contribution. That was the reason why the Prime Minister of Australia, the late Mr. John Curtin, sent me to Washington early in 1942 to advocate the establishment of the Pacific War Council to enable Powers other than the major Powers to consult and coöperate in relation to the prosecution of the Pacific war. While the Council was not executive in character, some important decisions were put into final effect at or through the Council, notably President Roosevelt's decision to send vital additional aircraft and other supplies to Australia in 1942 and 1943 — a decision which helped to turn the tide, first to successful defense and then to the offensive in the Southwest Pacific. These decisions could not have been made but for Australia's representation on the Pacific War Council.

Apart from this informal Council, it was always understood by the middle and lesser Powers that once hostilities ceased and the immediate urgency for unified direction of strategy and for global logistics had passed, all the countries which had made a real contribution to the defeat of the enemy would be given an opportunity to make an equally real contribution to the making of the peace. This was expressly stated, on more than one occasion, when the limited participation of the smaller Powers on wartime bodies was being criticized and justified. It was inherent in all these wartime expedients that nothing should be done during the war which would prejudice the possibility of a peace made according to democratic procedure, *i.e.*, one in which the active belligerents would participate fully. Accordingly, Australia and New Zealand, in the Agreement of January 21, 1944, publicly announced, as one of the fundamentals of their external policy, that

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the final peace settlement should be made in respect of *all* the enemies of the United Nations only after hostilities with *all* of them had been successfully concluded.

It was with no little anxiety and concern that during the war period we had watched the gradual development of political and territorial understandings and commitments between the Great Powers, regarding which the smaller nations had either not been adequately consulted or had not been consulted at all.

The Cairo Declaration, which laid down not only general principles for the peace settlement in East Asia but also new territorial boundaries, was an example of such a commitment. The decisions made at Cairo vitally affected the future of the Pacific. Despite the vital interest they had in this matter, and their great war contributions, Australia and New Zealand were not present at those discussions and were not informed of the political decisions mentioned until they were announced by press communiqué. I am not suggesting that to strip Japan of the possessions she had acquired by force and to return them to China, and to promise Korea independence, were wrong. Much the same conclusions might very well have been reached by a general assembly of the nations participating in the war against Japan. But the fact remained that it was a pronouncement by a self-selected few and not the result of the reasoned deliberations of all those concerned.

Fearing that the Cairo procedure would be adopted when the time came to laying down the terms of surrender, Australia and New Zealand sought to guard against its repetition. The conditions of surrender and the armistice terms would plainly have a big influence on the later stages of the peace negotiations. If the terms were too specific or too lenient, it would be difficult if not impossible to introduce changes at the peace-treaty stage. The announced insistence on "unconditional surrender" was some safeguard against this danger, but even unconditional surrender might mean little more than surrender on the conditions laid down by the victorious belligerents. It seemed reasonable, therefore, to expect that all the belligerents would be made parties to the surrender agreements, not merely associated with them; and Australia and New Zealand sought "representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies," and active participation in any Armistice Commission to be set up. The object of the two Governments was to avoid premature or

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piecemeal settlements which would tend to endanger a just and enduring world peace. This is clearly stated in Article 26 of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement:

> The two Governments declare that the interim administration and ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific is of vital importance to Australia and New Zealand, and that any such disposal should be effected only with their agreement and as part of a general Pacific settlement.

Vitally interested as they were in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand really were no less concerned with the armistice arrangements in Europe, where they had made a very substantial military contribution, both in the First World War and in this war from 1939 until V-E Day. Their troops had taken a prominent part in Libya, Greece, Crete, Syria and Alamein. Indeed, their war effort extended to nearly every theater of war and to all arms of the services. In addition to their independent squadrons, Dominion air crews made up a large part of the R.A.F. The New Zealand division fought right through the Italian campaign after the Australian divisions had been compelled to leave Africa to bear the brunt of the terrible land fighting against Japan in the New Guinea jungle warfare. In Europe both countries had important stakes. Their direct interest extended to the establishment of a just and stable peace. Their soldiers had fought against dictatorship in two European wars.

But the claims advanced by the smaller nations were given scant consideration in the European armistice arrangements. The names of these countries were not even mentioned specifically in the armistice terms where the major Powers purported to act "in the interests of" all other belligerents, even though they did not have the authority so to act. A similar attempt to brush aside nations like Australia and New Zealand was made in the Japanese instrument of surrender. Indeed, it was only after they had made a strong and public protest that these nations were permitted even to sign the surrender instrument. Even when this was permitted, no care was taken to alter the key words in the instrument, which still mentioned by name only the four "major" Powers. The war histories will show how unjust and offensive this was to Australia, regard being had to comparative contributions to winning the Pacific war.

All this was bad enough in itself. A reference back, however, shows things in an even worse light. On January 1, 1942 representatives of the Allied nations at war with Germany, Italy and

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Japan met in Washington and signed a solemn declaration by which each Government pledged itself *inter alia* "not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies." This declaration was clearly broken whenever armistices were signed by the major Allied Powers without the express authority of other Allied Powers at war with that particular Axis country.

The process did not stop there. The European Advisory Commission set up in October 1943 was limited in its membership to the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Even the later addition of France left unrepresented many countries which would be affected by the European settlement and would be called upon to make it work. Besides the British Dominions, belligerents like Greece, Jugoslavia, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and Czechoslovakia were ignored. In my view, much of the trouble in the post-armistice administration in Europe would have been avoided if care had been taken to bring into the picture all the other Powers which had been active belligerents. It is quite fallacious to suppose that an addition of members to a small assembly necessarily makes agreement more difficult. San Francisco goes to prove the opposite.

After our enemies had actually surrendered it was possible both to associate the lesser belligerents with the machinery of control for the territories of the defeated Powers and to give them an appropriate voice in the shaping of the final and definitive conditions of peace. As early as January 1944, Australia and New Zealand had declared that they were vitally concerned in the interim administration of enemy territories in the Pacific, for it was even then apparent that the policies adopted by the control bodies would tend to harden into principles and would even determine many details of the peace. That is the reason why Australia and other countries have pressed for representation on the various bodies determining policy in respect to both the European and Pacific settlements. In Germany, zones of occupation have been allotted to the Great Powers, including France. Although there is some show of coördinating policy, the smaller Powers have little or no direct influence on it. In relation to Japan there is reason to hope, with the establishment of the Far Eastern Commission at Washington, that a more democratic system of control may be worked out.

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II

The preparation of the Charter of the United Nations Organization was begun before Germany had actually surrendered, even though the Organization was designed to meet situations which would arise after the cessation of hostilities. The preparatory discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, however, were limited to the Big Three. It would have been possible, and it would have been just and wise, for the smaller nations to have been actively associated with the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. They were not.

At San Francisco the middle and small nations were anxious to secure an effective voice in making and operating the new World Organization to maintain peace and security and promote human welfare. They considered that, just as with the peace treaties, the machinery for the maintenance of those treaties could be effective only if their fundamental principles were based upon the will of all the United Nations who had been active belligerents, and not three or four of them. The peoples of countries which have made sacrifices out of all proportion to their size are not willing to accept direction by any power or group of powers, however friendly, however powerful. Leadership is acceptable; domination is intolerable.

Fortunately, the Conference at San Francisco to establish the constitution of the new World Organization was open to all the United Nations concerned in the war against the Axis. World opinion would have revolted against any suggestion to the contrary. While the declaration on general security signed at Moscow on October 30, 1943, was issued by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China, it made reference to "the principle of the *sovereign equality of all peace-loving states*." On the other hand, the Dumbarton Oaks draft not only represented the proposals of the major Powers, and of them alone, but the Yalta Conference of the Big Three gave a further rigidity to the Dumbarton Oaks decisions, particularly in connection with voting on the Security Council. This big Power arrangement was treated at San Francisco as implying that each of the parties to it was bound not to support any alteration in the proposals unless they all acquiesced. To some extent this "inner group" arrangement was broken down at San Francisco. Many representatives of the Great Powers were surprised at the scope and extent of the amendments presented by nations which they had been inclined to regard as of small importance.

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They were also surprised at the steadiness and persistence with which these amendments were pressed. There is now general agreement that the Charter as eventually written was an immeasurably more democratic and liberal document than the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, as amended at Yalta. Once again it was proved that democratic ideals are advanced by democratic procedures and by the force of world opinion.

The vast power which the Dumbarton Oaks plan proposed to give to the Security Council was not balanced by the bestowal of similar power to a world Assembly which would not only be democratic in make-up but endowed with authority to check the Security Council by exercising to the full the rights of discussion, of free criticism in public, of recommendation and initiative. As a matter of fact, the Dumbarton Oaks draft restricted the Assembly's power in vital respects. A main achievement of the San Francisco Conference was to strengthen the democratic character of the new organization by enlarging the authority of the Assembly. This was only part, however, of the work done at San Francisco. An illustration of this work is provided by a summary of the proposals put forward by Australia. Nine Australian objectives publicly announced before the Conference began may be summarized as follows:

(1) To prevent the possibility of a single Great Power vetoing amendments to the Charter, providing such amendment is twice approved by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly including three permanent members of the Security Council.

(2) To exclude the "veto" of the permanent members from all arrangements relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to confine such "veto" to decisions involving the application of economic and military sanctions.

(3) To require a pledge from all members to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other members.

(4) To declare that justice and the rule of law shall be the principles guiding the action of the Security Council; and for this purpose to require the maximum employment of the Permanent Court in determining the legal aspects of international disputes.

(5) To see that the Security Council is in fact composed of "security" Powers, *i.e.*, Powers which by their past military contribution to the cause of world security have proved themselves able and willing to assume substantial security responsibilities, or which are willing, and by virtue of their geographical position in relation to regions of primary strategical importance are able, to make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

(6) To require members to pledge themselves to take action both national and international for the purpose of securing for all peoples, including their

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own, improved labor standards, economic advancement, employment for all, and social security; and as part of that pledge to take appropriate action through the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Labor Organization and, in particular, to make regular reports to the Assembly as to what they have actually done to carry out the pledge.

(7) To elevate the Economic Council into a principal organ of the World Organization and to give the Economic Council under the General Assembly specific new functions, including power to initiate action for the making of international conventions on all matters not being dealt with by other specialized agencies.

(8) To give the General Assembly a wider jurisdiction over, and a fuller share in, the general work of the Organization and in particular to vest the Assembly with power to prevent situations and disputes from becoming "frozen" in the Security Council, as occurred in the League of Nations in the notorious cases of external aggression against China, Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia.

(9) To lay down the principle that the purpose of administration of all dependent territories is the welfare and development of the native peoples of such territories, and to place a specified obligation on nations controlling particular dependent territories to report regularly to advisory bodies consisting of expert administrators.

With the enthusiastic coöperation and support of many smaller nations, but only after a strenuous fight, Australia's proposals in the end were found to have had a substantial effect on the Dumbarton Oaks draft. Australia originally proposed 38 amendments of substance. Of them, 26 were either adopted without material change or adopted in principle, or were made unnecessary by other alterations; two led to significant alterations. Besides these, six important new obligations in relation to the trusteeship of dependent peoples were suggested and included in the new chapter. The following summary of the position is, I think, a sufficient illustration of the useful improvements effected on the initiative of one only of the smaller nations:

(1) The amendment to lay down a governing principle aimed at protecting the territorial integrity and political independence of member states was adopted.

(2) The provision that peaceful settlement should proceed not arbitrarily but in conformity with the principles of justice and international law was adopted.

(3) The proposal for the inclusion of a specific provision that the only permissible intervention of the Organization in matters of domestic jurisdiction should be in the case of actual enforcement measures by the Security Council was adopted.

(4) Also adopted was the vital proposal to extend the Assembly's right of discussion and recommendation to all matters and questions within the scope

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of the Charter (which matters include the wide preamble and the statement of purposes and principles contained in the Charter).

(5) The proposal designed to prevent the freezing of disputes in the Security Council, by requiring it to report to the Assembly or the member states immediately it has ceased to deal with the dispute, was accepted.

(6) Also adopted was the amendment designed to ensure that all the special military agreements to place forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council should be made with each member or group of members by the Security Council itself.

(7) The amendment that in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, special regard should be had, first, to proven ability to contribute to international security and, second, to geographical representation was adopted.

(8) The substance of Australia's amendment specifically providing for the right of self-defense in case of inaction by the Security Council was incorporated in Senator Vandenberg's broader formula on regional arrangement, which was unanimously accepted.

(9) The Conference accepted Australia's amendments to the economic and social chapter to include the promotion of full employment and higher living standards within the purposes of the Economic Council.

(10) The Conference also accepted Australia's proposal to include a definite pledge by each member to take action to promote (*inter alia*) the objective of full employment by joint and separate action in coöperation with the Organization.

(11) Other amendments designed to enlarge the powers of the Economic and Social Council by enabling it to call conferences, to prepare conventions, to coördinate agencies, and generally to act as a coördinating economic body were adopted.

(12) In the important new chapter on Trusteeship, seven Australian amendments were adopted. These include a general declaration of trusteeship in relation to all the peoples in non-self-governing countries. In this declaration the obligations of the parent state were expressed as including: (a) just treatment of the peoples concerned; (b) their protection against abuses; (c) the promotion of constructive measures of development; (d) encouragement of research; (e) full coöperation with other international bodies; and, most important, (f) the transmission regularly to the World Organization of full statistical information relating to economic, social and educational conditions of the native peoples. As a result of this chapter, it is clear that the "parent" state is under an international obligation to promote the political and economical development of the peoples of all its non-self-governing territories, whether or not those territories have been formally placed under trusteeship.

The removal of the individual veto on constitutional amendments was not obtained by the smaller Powers: but their efforts resulted in a provision which will at any rate facilitate opportunities for special constitutional review. The smaller Powers also obtained a solemn undertaking by the five permanent members of

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the Security Council that every dispute before the Security Council would at least be given some — how much is very uncertain — preliminary discussion and consideration. This fell far short of Australia's proposal that there should be no individual Great Power veto whatsoever on any of the processes of conciliation, *i.e.*, the pacific settlement of disputes. Our proposal was lost, although it would certainly have been adopted but for the plain intimation by the Great Powers that the Charter would not be signed if the amendment were carried. I am satisfied that the retention of the veto of each permanent member upon the processes of international conciliation in the Security Council was quite unnecessary in the interests of the permanent members — apart from being indefensible in principle.

I have dealt with the Australian proposals merely to drive home the point that the operation of liberalizing the Dumbarton Oaks text and making it more democratic was performed by the cooperation of many smaller nations. Australia could not possibly have succeeded to the extent indicated above but for the resolution and steadiness of able and determined delegates from the British Commonwealth and from influential Latin American, European and Middle Eastern nations. In the light of this valuable coöperation at San Francisco, I am confident that the General Assembly of the World Organization will turn out to be its most important organ.

On the success of the United Nations Organization will depend the political shape of the world for a generation at least, and very possibly the future of modern civilization. It remains to be seen how it will work in the rough and tumble of a rapidly changing world. We cannot tell at this stage whether the veto which has been given to the Great Powers will be used with wisdom and a sense of responsibility or in a way to nullify the purposes of the Organization. By the exercise of the veto on pacific settlement, it is possible for any one of the five permanent members to throw the consideration of international disputes out of the Security Council (with its regular and orderly processes subject to the principles of law and justice) into the area of private and secret bargaining along the lines of power politics. The Munich "settlement" is an illustration of the second type of operation. Signs are not wanting that some of the major Powers will be tempted to paralyze the Security Council by the use of the right of individual veto. If the veto is abused in the way indicated, then the Assem-

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bly of the Organization, with its practically unrestricted right of discussion and initiative criticism, will, by a determined use of its powers, help to redress any unfair exercise of power and may save the world.

III

The first step in the formulation of the peace treaties for Europe was the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September. On this occasion the Great Powers again adopted a policy of excluding other active belligerents. The Council was limited to representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., China and France. Thus the procedure improvised to meet the urgent requirements of the conduct of the war was carried forward for the very different purpose of making a lasting peace settlement.

The justification advanced for this procedure was that it would be impracticable for a peace conference composed of representatives of all the active belligerents to attempt to draft the details of peace treaties, including such matters as frontiers, minority rights, transfer of populations, reparations and a host of other problems. It was argued that the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers, on whom the major responsibilities had fallen, could reach agreement rapidly and that a draft could then be presented "for acceptance" by the other United Nations. Whether such acceptance was to be "formal," whether the other active belligerents would be entitled to modify and amend the "draft" — these vital questions were left unanswered at Potsdam, showing clearly that it is dangerous for the lesser Powers to assume that their interests will be or can be protected except as a result of their separate representation and their own determined effort.

The fundamental assumptions on which the limited membership of the London Council was based were clearly disproved by the event. Quick agreement was not reached on any great issue, while even on comparatively minor problems the results were inconclusive. Press communiqués were terse, uninformative and, on occasion, actually misleading. The limited membership of the Council meetings contributed, in my judgment, to its failure. Only European settlements were under consideration; yet China, whose interest in those settlements was indirect and remote, was represented on the Council, while Greece, Jugoslavia, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, whose very life is involved in a just

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European settlement, were not represented. Italy, an ex-enemy country, was permitted to attend and state her case in relation to the Italian-Jugoslav problem, but Greece, whose gallant and prolonged resistance foreshadowed the doom of Mussolini and whose interest in the Italian settlement was direct, substantial and proximate, was left completely out of the picture. Once again it was overlooked that the major Powers are not unnaturally concerned with questions of priority and spheres of influence, whereas lesser Powers, being more detached, at least on many issues, are often able to assess the fairness and justice of a proposed settlement and its prospects of permanence.

At one stage during the London Conference the public protests of Australia and other countries against the restricted membership of the Council, and the possibility that its conclusions might be definitive for the European peace settlement, produced some little effect. Accordingly, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and India, together with Italy and Jugoslavia, were invited to attend meetings of the Council dealing with the Italian-Jugoslav frontier. The representatives of those countries which accepted this invitation were not, however, admitted to the full freedom of Council discussions; they simply stated their views, without having any exchange with the Council members. While the invitation was a step in the right direction, it fell far short of a procedure which would give an adequate opportunity for full and frank consultation around the table, with the representatives of the Five Powers, or for that effective participation in the peace settlement to which active belligerents are clearly entitled. Moreover, it is insufficient for the Council to invite views on separate and isolated matters. The problems of each peace settlement should be weighed and considered as a whole.

Admitting that a relatively small body can greatly assist in preliminary drafting, the upshot of the London proceedings made clear that one of two alternatives should be adopted. Either the active belligerents — those nations which have maintained active and sustained belligerence throughout the war — must be given the right of participation on a footing of equality at the Council table with the representatives of the Five Powers; or it should be laid down unambiguously that conclusions reached by the Council as to the terms of the peace settlements will be submitted to a conference in which all the active belligerents will take part, and at which the draft terms of settlement shall be open to full and

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free discussion and amendment. If the Council or a similar body is retained, its deliberations must at least be subject to review in the same way as the recommendations of Dumbarton Oaks were reviewed at San Francisco. Almost as important as the peace is the way it is reached. It must not only be calculated to achieve quick results, but must also commend itself to the conscience of the world as being just and democratic.

IV

There have been suggestions in one or two quarters that it is not necessary for the Dominions of the British Commonwealth to be represented separately from the United Kingdom either in the control of enemy territory or in the discussion of terms of peace. Such suggestions are based on a complete misunderstanding of the evolution of the British Commonwealth during the last 40 years and of the present international status of each of its members. There was little justification for such a misunderstanding, even in 1914. Subsequently Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and Eire became members of the League of Nations. For many years they have, by unanimous consent of all concerned, participated actively as separate members of the family of nations. They exchange ambassadors and ministers with foreign countries. They become parties to international agreements.

This is not to say that the Dominions have severed their connections with the United Kingdom. Far from it. They are still united by bonds of both kinship and kingship. Their common allegiance to the King is not a fiction but an enduring reality. However, the international status of each of them is so clear that no misunderstanding is possible, except amongst those who are quite unacquainted either with the basic Balfour Declaration of 1917 or with the facts of history. One need only add that the Dominions, which had in practice long enjoyed separate and complete control of their own external policies, conclusively demonstrated their status as separate belligerents by issuing their own declarations of war. In the case of Eire, its declared status of neutrality was recognized by all belligerents and by all neutrals.

V

Since the London meeting, and owing largely to the initiative of the lesser Powers, the necessity for making the peace treaties

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in a democratic manner has been admitted in principle by spokesmen of two, and perhaps of all three, of the Big Three. Nothing, however, has as yet been done to set up the appropriate machinery necessary to give effect to this principle. One important step forward has nevertheless been taken. The right of all belligerents in the Pacific War to take part in the formulation of post-surrender policy for Japan is now recognized; and the Far Eastern Commission has been sitting at Washington for the purpose of recommending a just policy to follow in the occupation of Japan. If this democratic experiment can be made to succeed, it may show the way for peacemaking in Europe.

Of course it is not enough merely to secure a peace settlement by a democratic procedure. It is essential that the whole international system should be imbued with the democratic principles. All governments and peoples must take just as great an interest in preventing a revival of Fascism as they did in its overthrow. The machinery has been built; but it will require altruistic and sustained effort to keep it running smoothly and efficiently. What are the steps which can be taken immediately to create confidence in the United Nations Organization as an effective instrument for the security and betterment of humankind?

In an article in the last issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, John Foster Dulles pointed out that "the rôle of the Security Council is predominantly negative" and that "it is the General Assembly which will have to plan the campaign of the United Nations against their newly proclaimed enemies" — intolerance, repression, injustice and economic want. He suggests that the goals first chosen by the Assembly should include some which will arouse popular interest and secure popular backing, such as the solution of international problems of an economic character and the development of international law for binding individuals as well as nations.

What I have said above shows that this approach of Mr. Dulles is right. The Assembly, constituted as it is on democratic lines, has a great opportunity of achieving success in the fields mentioned. The Food and Agriculture Organization, which will be one of the agencies related to the Social and Economic Council, has been successfully launched, and its work is designed to assist in a world-wide attack on poverty and malnutrition. The trial of war criminals is a new and important application of an international criminal law to individuals. In future, war crimes will

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be as much a part of the *jus gentium* applicable to all persons of all nations as the law of piracy itself.

The fact remains, of course, that at the present time the peoples of the world are primarily interested in international security. Without some assurance of a just and lasting peace, they will find it difficult to concentrate on the positive ideals of general international welfare. The atomic bomb and other rapidly developing instruments of destruction have created tremendous anxiety in the minds of all peoples.

The problems involved are urgent and difficult, but they provide special opportunities. For this reason the struggle by the lesser Powers for a democratic peace has immediate significance. It is essential that they should not relax for a moment their efforts to secure for themselves, as belligerents, an adequate voice in the making of the peace settlements. It is equally essential that they leave no stone unturned to ensure adequate and prompt action by the major Powers. If the major Powers do not unanimously and promptly shoulder the special responsibilities with which they have been entrusted in relation to security, especially in the Security Council, the lesser Powers should take the initiative in the field of security as in the field of welfare. It is erroneous to suppose that only the Security Council can take up and deal with matters affecting international security. In important respects the Assembly will have a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Security Council; and it is a jurisdiction which cannot be blocked by the individual veto of any major Power.

The objective of freedom from fear can and must be pursued by the Great Assembly of the United Nations as well as the objective of freedom from want. The important gains made by the lesser nations at San Francisco, especially in relation to the powers of the Assembly, the Economic Council and the Trusteeship System, take on new significance in the light of recent events. The future of mankind may well be determined as much by the courage, initiative, determination and democratic idealism of the lesser Powers as by the strength, leadership and responsibility of the major Powers.

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NEW TACTICS IN NAVAL WARFARE

By Bernard Brodie

IN World War II sea power reached the culmination of its influence on history. The greatest of air wars and the one which saw the most titanic battles of all time on land was also the greatest of naval wars — not alone in the magnitude of naval operations but also in the degree to which those operations contributed to final victory. It could hardly have been otherwise in a war which was truly global, in which the pooling of resources of the great Allies depended upon their ability to traverse the sea, and in which American men and materials, including aircraft, hammered and defeated the enemy in remote theaters which could be adequately serviced only by sea. Yet this unparalleled accomplishment of Allied sea power occurred in a war during which the very existence of navies was threatened.

Although the land-based airplane was the original cause of the threat, the nature of the crisis which Allied sea power met and overcame cannot be adequately described merely in terms of ship versus aircraft. The menace of the enemy airplane was intensified by the insufficiency of cargo vessels and warships. That shortage was in large part responsible also for the successes of the German U-boat arm; and that in turn also affected the issue between planes and ships. Besides, the utility of sea power must be interpreted in terms not of the ability of the warship to defend itself, but rather of the ability of navies to carry out their traditional functions. The two are of course related, but it is important to remember that the effects of enemy aircraft on our naval strategy is by no means summed up in a tabulation of ships damaged or destroyed by them. One way to preserve ships is to minimize their exposure to danger. Such a procedure may be necessary to preserve the nucleus of a fleet, but as a general rule warships cease to be worth preserving to the extent that preoccupation with their preservation results in the abandonment of their functions. Thus, the most fruitful way of discussing tactical and strategic changes, especially as they influenced our conduct of the Pacific war, is to describe the steps by which our Navy was gradually enabled to dominate the maritime struggle.

The function of sea power has traditionally been to achieve and maintain "command of the sea." This time-honored and some-

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what cryptic phrase connotes simply the ability to use the sea and to deny its use to the enemy. The test of "command" is the exclusion of enemy shipping from an area in which one's own shipping continues to operate. The uses of command are many, ranging from those which are offensive in nature (*e.g.* invasion of an enemy coast, or economic blockade) to those which are purely defensive (*e.g.* the defense of one's coasts against overseas invasion, or protection of shipping). But where it exists at all, command is always basically the same in character.

Prior to the recent war, it had become axiomatic that the first step in acquiring command in a disputed maritime area was to maintain a force there capable of dealing with the largest single force which the enemy could bring to bear. If the area in question was the key area of the war (*e.g.* the North Sea and its approaches in World War I), the force retained for the purpose of commanding it was generally the major part or perhaps the whole of the "battle fleet." This idea of concentrating the major ships into a unified battle fleet which was able to assert and maintain dominance had been developed at least as early as the Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century. It was then found that the dispersed operations of cruisers engaged in convoying shipping or throttling the commerce of the enemy could be carried on securely only behind the cover of such a concentrated force. This idea, which was basic to the whole principle of "command of the sea," was rejected as outmoded by both sides in the first year of the Pacific war. The airplane was one reason for that rejection — possibly the basic one — but it was clearly not the only one.

The strategic problems of the Pacific war were in many respects without precedent in naval history. Never before had a war been fought by two great naval powers whose main sources of strength were on opposite sides of a wide ocean — in this case far the widest ocean in the world.[1] There was thus no one area which if dominated would automatically give control of the whole. In the Atlantic, at least so far as enemy surface ships were concerned, it was enough to control the two exits of the North Sea, the waters off the coast of France, and the Strait of Gibraltar.

[1] The War of 1812 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 will at once come to mind as possible exceptions to this statement. But in the War of 1812 the United States Navy comprised scarcely more than a few frigates. These engaged in a commerce-raiding campaign which was spectacular but which hardly influenced the decision. The dominant British Navy exercised a close blockade of our coasts from bases in Canada and the West Indies. The Spanish-American War was likewise a localized war, and was fought by navies which were clearly not of the first rank.

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In the Pacific there were numerous, widely-dispersed archipelagoes to be fought over. And for at least the first year of the war neither side had the resources to assert supremacy in all the areas which might at any moment become critical.

Thus both sides divided their fleets into separate formations or "task forces," each of which was considered an independent tactical unit. The task force system provided a means of covering widely separated areas simultaneously and of rotating units of strength in those areas which were especially important but where it was impossible to maintain a fleet continuously. And at a time when enemy land-based air attack was a threat of profoundly disturbing proportions, the task force system offered a means of accomplishing desired objectives without exposing to such attack any more ships than were absolutely necessary for the execution of the mission.

The task-force principle was by no means wholly new. In World War I, as in all great naval wars, squadrons of varying size and composition were frequently detached from the fleets of both sides for independent and sometimes distant missions. What was new was a situation which could enable a senior naval officer testifying before a Congressional committee as late as the summer of 1943 to declare: "The fleet as such has ceased to exist!" By that he meant simply that the whole body of the fleet had been dissolved into the many task forces which carried out its purpose. No such thing had occurred in the First World War, when the British task forces operating far afield had reduced only temporarily and by slender margins the capital ship strength concentrated in the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow and Rosyth.

II

The Guadalcanal campaign, which Admiral Ernest J. King has characterized as the crucial naval campaign of the war, illustrates both the operation of the task-force principle and its limitations. The convoy which made the initial American landing on August 7, 1942, was covered by a very sizeable force, considering the strength then available to us. It included all the aircraft carriers (three), most of the heavy cruisers, and one of the only two modern battleships then available to us in the Pacific. But even before the debarkation was completed, the carrier group and the one battleship were withdrawn for their own security, out of fear of Japanese land-based air attack. On the same night (August 8)

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a Japanese surface force which had come down from the north destroyed one Australian and three American heavy cruisers and severely damaged a fifth heavy cruiser and two destroyers. In the severity of the blow, this loss was second only to Pearl Harbor.

The disastrous battle of Savo Island was followed by a series of engagements both in the immediate vicinity of Guadalcanal and in the general area to the east. There were the aircraft carrier engagements of the Eastern Solomons (August 23–25) and the Santa Cruz Islands (October 26), in the latter of which the *Hornet* was sunk, leaving the damaged *Enterprise* the only Allied aircraft carrier in the Pacific. (The *Wasp* had been sunk by a submarine in the previous month.) On October 11 occurred the Battle of Cape Esperance, the first of three night surface fights in which, on the whole, we gave a good deal better than we took. On the night of November 12–13 a cruiser force under Admiral Callaghan grappled with a much superior Japanese force including at least one battleship. This battleship, the *Hiei*, was disabled and on the following day was dispatched by our land-based aircraft; two enemy cruisers and four destroyers were also sunk. But the cost to us was two of our five cruisers and four destroyers sunk and the other three cruisers plus three destroyers heavily damaged. Of our entire task force only the destroyer *Fletcher* was undamaged.

Two nights later another action took place in which two of our newest battleships, the *South Dakota* and the *Washington*, participated. In this action we sank another Japanese battleship, the *Kirisima*, which capsized after five-and-a-half minutes of fire from the *Washington's* 16-inch guns. Two enemy cruisers and two destroyers were also sunk, and six other ships, including a second battleship, were damaged. The cost to us this time was relatively moderate — three destroyers sunk, one battleship, the *South Dakota*, damaged, and one destroyer damaged. The *Kirisima*, incidentally, was the last Japanese battleship definitely destroyed by us until the Battle for Leyte Gulf almost two years later.[2]

Meanwhile, activity of our land-based aircraft was almost continuous and exercised an enormous direct and indirect influence on the campaign. Our possession of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal enabled our land-based planes not only to carry

[2] The battleship *Mutu* blew up in the South China Sea during the summer of 1943. Her destruction may have been at the hands of an American submarine which was herself lost before reporting the achievement, or it may have been the result of an internal explosion.

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out attacks of their own but also to provide reconnaissance for our surface units. They could scout far to the north of the island, over waters which the Japanese had to traverse in approaching Guadalcanal, while the Japanese were denied similar reconnaissance in the direction of our own approaches. We were thus able to bring our ships to the spot when needed, and in any meeting which occurred the advantage of surprise was likely to be on our side. In that way our surface forces were enabled to exercise a continuity of influence out of all proportion to the time they actually spent in the disputed waters.

Nevertheless, real naval command was never established by either side. None of the naval actions was in itself decisive. Both sides continued to send more men and supplies into the island, though it became increasingly difficult and costly for the Japanese to do so. Even after the mid-November battles the Japanese continued to come. On November 30 occurred the Battle of Tassafaronga, a near-disaster for us. In that battle we lost the heavy cruiser *Northampton*, the fifth United Nations heavy cruiser lost in the area, and suffered extremely severe damage to two other heavy cruisers. A week later, on December 7, 1942, six Japanese destroyers escorting a large transport were met by nothing greater than a handful of motor torpedo boats, which, however, proved sufficient to rout the enemy with the loss of one destroyer.

We won the campaign at sea, and thereby made possible victory ashore, only by our superior fighting and staying power in a simple contest of attrition. It was a contest which because of our qualitative superiority (especially in the use of radar) and our immeasurably greater naval building program we were better able to afford than the enemy. The Japanese had lost more heavily than we, and those losses had been imposed upon them while they were still bleeding from their costly rebuff at Midway. They could not go on expending major ships for the defense of one remote island. We had amply proved our determination and ability to continue the contest indefinitely, if need be, and they acknowledged defeat. But the cost to us had not been light. Had we been able to begin the campaign with all the forces which we dispatched to the area before it ended (besides ships lost and damaged, we had gathered in the southwest Pacific in February 1943 seven battleships — of which three were new — five aircraft carriers, 12 cruisers, and numerous destroyers) we should

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undoubtedly have been able to win our victory more speedily and at lesser cost.

Thus, our experience was not such as to encourage a continuation of the "task force" strategy. The system had shown a weakness which could have been predicted. Any force can as a rule be beaten by a larger force, and in penetrating enemy waters with a small portion of one's total strength one is inviting the enemy to interpose just such a superior force. The only conclusion to this chain of matching big by bigger is a showdown match of maximum strength, in which one side stands ready at all times to intervene in the active theater with a force larger than the largest available to the enemy. Such a force, wherever it can be maintained, gives true command of the sea, and the achievement of command has always been visualized as the first aim of the naval offensive.

But before such a thing could be done, the United States Navy had not only to gain decisive superiority over the enemy fleet but also to acquire more reliable defenses against enemy land-based aircraft. The land-based airplane offers the side which can use it against an opposing fleet a chance to inflict heavy damage without exposing its own fleet units to danger. Throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, and in fact through most of the fighting which followed in the Solomons, our warships were usually careful not to approach hostile shores in daylight. Waters over which the enemy was able to put even a few aircraft were approached stealthily in darkness, and the area was usually quit in time to put a good safe distance behind the retreating ships before dawn. The utility of a warship which could operate effectively against the enemy only at night was not such as to inspire confidence in its ability to command vast seas.

III

Following the Guadalcanal campaign, the Japanese showed more discretion. Though we continued in 1943 to advance up the ladder of the Solomons, and also took Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians, the enemy gave us little opportunity to sink or damage any of his important ships. By the end of 1943, the Japanese had clearly withdrawn the bulk of their fleet to home waters, where it was obviously being held in reserve for some decisive opportunity, such as was not to come until the following year. The enemy meanwhile attempted to stay our progress as best he could with

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aircraft, submarines and occasional light surface forces — besides, of course, his land garrisons, which had been isolated and hence were considered expendable.

This change in policy produced a certain amount of mystification in this country. One product of the confusion was a set of extravagant theories purporting to explain Japanese "unwillingness to fight" on the basis of peculiar Oriental processes of thought which affected their naval strategy. The fact was simply that the Japanese had suffered losses which they were unable to replace, while at the same time our own Navy was undergoing an extraordinary expansion of strength. The Japanese no longer chose to fight because they knew they had become grossly inferior. The vast construction and production programs in the United States were making ships, planes and weapons available in unprecedented volume. Meanwhile, in the spring and summer of 1943, the Battle of the Atlantic had swung decisively in our favor, and later in the year the net increase of merchant ship bottoms — just as necessary as warships and planes for any real offensive — began to exceed a million gross tons monthly.

The present article does not offer opportunity for extensive discussion of the tactics which finally defeated the U-boat. It should, however, be stated that the problem was not essentially different from that which faced the Allies during the First World War, and it was in fact met by basically similar measures. Though various novel, ingenious and highly effective devices were adopted, no one of them was predominantly responsible for success. The improvements in supersonic detention devices and in depth charges (including the "hedgehog") and the use of radar did little more than offset comparable improvements in submarine and torpedo performance. The airplane, which played a very large rôle in the U-boat hunt, had been so used also in 1917–18, though of course to a substantially lesser degree. In the later stages of the war, the *Schnorkel*, an air-pipe system which permitted U-boats to charge their batteries while submerged, considerably reduced the effectiveness of patrolling aircraft. What defeated the submarine was the provision of enough patrol and escort craft, both surface and air, to make the life of the submarine unpleasant and short. It was a perfectly predictable accomplishment. The antisubmarine craft had to be properly equipped, but devising and manufacturing the equipment was a small problem compared to that of getting the ships and planes to carry it.

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In our descent upon the Gilbert Islands in November 1943, we demonstrated that a revolution had taken place in our naval strategy. For the first time in the Pacific war, we began an operation with a task force which was really an entire battle fleet, one capable of engaging and defeating the whole Japanese fleet. Moreover, the fleet remained off the shores of Tarawa and Makin, day and night, until the conquest of those islands was accomplished. But in contrast to the six-months' fight for Guadalcanal, this required only a few days. Such was to be the pattern of all our invasions thenceforth, from the Marshalls to Okinawa. Our Navy continued to speak of "task forces" spearheading our advance, but in any essential advance into enemy seas the force covering the operation was likely to be a fleet of immense proportions; and it grew steadily larger as the war continued. Toward the latter part of the war, the famed Task Force 58 became an aggregation of vessels which in cruising formation spread over an area 55 miles long and nine miles wide. The principle of *achieving and retaining decided command around any land area we invaded* definitely replaced the attrition tactics which had been so costly and so slow in winning results at Guadalcanal.

Three closely related factors were responsible for this revolution. First and most obvious was the great accretion in our ship and plane strength; second was a change in our naval thinking, marked by the evolution of a conception which combined wholly novel methods of execution with a return to the classic principles which Mahan had so brilliantly elucidated and popularized two generations earlier; and third was a tactical revolution in our aerial offense and defense comparable to the strategic revolution inherent in the return to the use of the whole fleet.

Until the series of operations which began with Tarawa, the aircraft carrier had been used in small numbers. It was viewed merely as a vessel which redeemed the airplane from the handicap of limited range, and was used as a means of making planes available to surface ships, mainly as a protection for them, whenever those ships were beyond easy reach of their own land-based aircraft. But the offensive successes of a few American carriers in February and March of 1942 at the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, Rabaul, Wake, Marcus, Lae and Salamaua awakened our naval command to the real offensive potentialities of the carrier. The result was an expanded and accelerated production program which had begun to bear fruit toward the end of 1943.

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And once we began to use carriers in large groups, it became apparent that our Navy had incorporated within itself the only truly mobile air force of any size in the world. It was an air force in which not only the aircraft themselves but also their floating bases were capable of rapid movement. It was a force which therefore enjoyed all the peculiar advantages of mobility, such as ability to concentrate and to achieve surprise. On the other hand, the enemy's ability to combine or coördinate his separate groups of land-based aircraft depended on forewarning and was determined by the fixed distances between his stationary airfields.

Moreover, our naval fighter planes operating from our carriers proved tactically superior to the best land-based planes which the Japanese were able to send against them. This advantage no doubt surprised many who had assumed that carrier planes, because of special limitations of design, must inevitably be inferior to land-based planes. But it is always a question of whose planes one is talking about. Even our Navy Hellcats and Corsairs could not have quite the margin of superiority in flying performance over the best Japanese fighters that our Mustangs and Thunderbolts were to enjoy, but they had margin enough, and they had a comparable advantage in fire power and armor.

The popular doctrine that carrier-borne air forces should not be opposed to land-based air forces had rested also on the idea that though the base of the floating air force could be sunk, a land base could at most be dealt an injury that was easily repaired. This disability was largely overcome by the very fact of concentration, which gave our roving fleets air forces large enough to keep dangerous concentrations of enemy planes away from our ships. Although we had lost the *Lexington*, the *Yorktown* and the *Hornet* to enemy air attack in a period of six months during 1942, we were not to lose another carrier to such attack for two years. During that time the fleet became constantly more audacious in its attacks. The immunity was not, however, solely a matter of increased air power. A good part of it rested upon the magnificent antiaircraft artillery which had been incorporated in the United States fleet.

The antiaircraft shield of our fleet, built from scratch within little more than two years, comprised one of the outstanding technical miracles of the war. A great many more enemy aircraft were downed by our carrier-based aircraft than by our antiaircraft guns; but the public, which was aware of this, overlooked

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the fact that those downed by our ships' guns were disproportionately important, since they were the planes which had succeeded in penetrating our fighter screen and arriving at the spot where they were most dangerous. If one compares the carrier-based aircraft to the field players in a soccer team, the antiaircraft defenses of our ships would be comparable to the goal keeper.

Some of the secrets of our antiaircraft weapons have only recently been revealed to the public. Most arresting among them is the "influence" or "variable time" fuse for our 5-inch projectiles. This fuse, operating on radar, causes the shell to be set off by the proximity of the enemy plane, thus eliminating the difficult problem of setting time fuses for swiftly moving targets. In fact, as its sponsor, Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, once put it: "With the influence fuse the enemy pilot computes your setting for you, and does a damned accurate job of it." It has been estimated that the fuse increased the effectiveness of our 5-inch guns at least five times; our modern battleships carried 20 such guns.

Along with the 5-inch guns and their miracle projectiles were developed giant machine guns of 40 mm. caliber, firing 2-pound explosive projectiles at the rate of 140 per minute for each barrel. The newer battleships carried 20 quadruple mounts of those guns, or 80 barrels, and the larger aircraft carriers had almost as many. Considerably less powerful, but nevertheless deadly, were our 20 mm. machine guns, which fired quarter-pound explosive projectiles at the cyclic rate of 460 per minute. The number of such guns on modern battleships or large aircraft carriers ranged from 40 to more than 60. And all these guns were controlled by automatic lead-computing sights or directors, some of the latter fitted with fire-control radar. Enemy planes could be shot down at blackest midnight as soon as they came within range of the guns: they would be seen by the ships' gunners only through the explosive flash which marked their destruction. The Japanese probably never fully realized how enormously our antiaircraft power was in advance of theirs. And even our destroyers, which of course carried fewer of each type of gun than the larger ships, nevertheless had enough of the three types mentioned to be potent antiaircraft ships.

The most striking single result of this great growth in aerial defensive as well as offensive strength was that our Navy had all its old freedom of movement restored to it. Since by the end of 1943 the Navy also enjoyed a decisive surface superiority over

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the Japanese fleet, its new confidence against air attack enabled it to rove about in enemy waters with all the insouciance which superior fleets had been wont to display in days long past. And it exhibited a freedom of action among enemy-held archipelagoes which many had predicted would never again characterize the movements of ships.

IV

Two months after we had taken the key points in the Gilberts a still larger American force assaulted and took Kwajalein and other atolls in the Marshalls and proceeded at once to destructive raids of Truk in the Carolines and of Saipan and other points in the Marianas. The Kwajalein attack featured another tactical revolution in the Pacific war in that it was begun with far the greatest preparatory bombardment from the sea which had ever taken place. No fewer than 13 battleships were included among the warships which turned their guns upon the soil of that one small atoll. These events of early 1944 were followed at the end of March by a still more conclusive demonstration of our new naval strength — the attack upon the Palau Islands, more than 4,000 sea miles west of Pearl Harbor. In that expedition the American Fleet had to proceed up and down the whole length of the enemy-held Carolines and against one of the strongest enemy bases in the western Pacific. The few Japanese aircraft which it met were easily repulsed. For the enemy to have attempted surface resistance with anything less than his whole strength would have been wholly useless; and the Japanese shrewdly refrained from committing their fleet.

A remarkable characteristic of these audacious moves was the almost total absence of loss or even damage to our surface units. The escort carrier *Liscome Bay*, torpedoed by an enemy submarine off Makin in November 1943, was the only medium or large combat ship lost in operations which included the taking of all the Gilberts, all the Admiralties and St. Matthias group, most of the Marshalls, landings among the Bismarck Archipelago and Dutch New Guinea and destructive attacks against bases in the Carolines, the Marianas, the Palaus, and against Rabaul and Kavieng. Even the taking of Guam and Saipan in the Marianas, which in June 1944 provoked the Japanese to their first major fleet action after the battles off Guadalcanal and which resulted in a crippling blow to them, involved no heavier cost to our fleet

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than light to moderate damage to three major warships. Such was the reward of operating concentrated fleets enjoying definitely superior surface and air strength. Following the loss of the heavy cruiser *Chicago* off Rennell Island on January 30, 1943, no American warship larger than a destroyer was to be lost to enemy air attack anywhere until the sinking on October 24, 1944, 23 months later, of the *Princeton* in the battle for Leyte Gulf.

The sinking of the *Princeton* marked, however, the termination of this happy state of affairs. For while the *Princeton* herself was not the victim of a suicide plane, the day following her loss saw the appearance in force for the first time of the *Kamikaze*. Up to then suicide attacks had been sporadic and in almost every case the consequence of a desperate bid by a doomed plane to redeem the failure of an orthodox attack. The *Kamikaze*, on the contrary, were systematically organized groups which began their missions with the deliberate intention of crashing their planes upon the decks and superstructure of our ships. In their first appearance this gruesome corps achieved the sinking of one escort carrier and one destroyer.

The losses to the *Kamikaze* off Leyte were not too menacing in themselves, but the significance of the new threat was not lost upon our fleet commanders. It requires neither a good plane nor a particularly skillful pilot to crash a plane on a ship. Antiaircraft fire which merely disables the plane is of no value in fending off suicide attacks unless the pilot is killed a sufficient distance from the ship, or the damage to the plane is of such character as to prevent it from being steered. Most depressing of all was the realization that there could be no new and specific way of dealing with *Kamikaze*. Fighter plane screens and antiaircraft defenses were the only thing that could be used, and they were already being used to the hilt. Carrier groups could be altered to incorporate a larger proportion of fighter planes, but it was not possible in a short time to alter substantially the character of the antiaircraft defenses, even if such alteration were physically possible.

Events over a ten-day period in Lingayen Gulf, while ships of the Seventh Fleet were engaged in covering the landings on Luzon, seemed to confirm our fears. Heavily armored ships were, to be sure, relatively immune to important structural damage from this type of attack, though injury to the men and implements swarming over the decks and superstructure could nevertheless be serious. But aircraft carriers, with their unarmored

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flight decks and scores of stationary planes filled with gasoline, provided an ideal target; and smaller ships like destroyers were also dangerously vulnerable. The Navy became seriously alarmed at the extent of damage, and for a time insisted upon the utmost secrecy concerning the successes of the *Kamikaze*.

Finally came the Okinawa campaign, when over a two-months' period some 30 American warships were sunk and 223 damaged. The ships sunk included none larger than destroyers, but 12 of that type were lost. Sixty-seven other destroyers were damaged, as were ten battleships, eight large carriers, two light carriers, and three escort carriers. The casualties in men — 4,907 killed and missing, 4,824 wounded — comprised about one-seventh of the Navy's total for the entire war. About 80 percent of this total of loss and damage resulted from hits by Japanese suicide planes.

Yet the net result of this battle was a defeat for the *Kamikaze*. Heavy as was the damage inflicted upon our fleet, it did not begin to compensate for the more than 4,000 Japanese planes destroyed during the assault. None of our major ships was sunk, and there was no question as to which side could better absorb the blows inflicted upon it. The *Kamikaze* assault at Okinawa was the last great challenge to our fleet by the Japanese. Their recognition of its failure no doubt helped to make certain their surrender within a very few months.

V

Okinawa was, however, a salutary reminder to our fleet that tactical problems are never solved conclusively. Although the defenses of the American fleet against enemy air attacks were on the whole remarkably successful during the war just ended, that fact argues nothing for a possible future war, in which the enemy may enjoy far greater resources and technical aptitude than the Japanese.

Present technical trends indicate that the defense of ships against air attack will become increasingly difficult. Aircraft speeds are already close to the barrier of "compressibility" represented by the speed of sound, and according to some reports have actually burst through that barrier. Rocket-accelerated, radio-controlled, glider bombs (not to be confused with V-1) used against Allied ships by German planes, which managed thereby to attack from outside the range of our smaller antiaircraft guns, will certainly develop in efficiency and reliability. It would be an

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open question whether antiaircraft defenses could keep pace with such developments even if we were assured that progress on those defenses would be pursued with all possible vigor. Do we have that assurance?

The United States Navy proved during World War II that it had the resiliency to overcome a menace of scarcely imagined magnitude. The few who, like "Billy" Mitchell, had been able to comprehend it had drawn conclusions which were proved erroneous. But the Navy's achievement cannot discount the fact that on the day of the Pearl Harbor attack our warships, big and little, were virtually naked in respect to antiaircraft defenses. The achievement lay mostly in redeeming past errors of omission. And while those omissions may have been due in part to lack of funds, ultimate responsibility must nevertheless be found within the Navy itself.

Strategic and tactical doctrines which have been conclusively validated in the war just ended must nevertheless be reviewed constantly to see if they remain valid. The public can and must assist in this process. One way to do so is to examine critically any effort of the military to freeze armaments at high quantitative levels. For there is nothing more deadening to technical progress in a navy than to keep in active or reserve commission a number of ships far exceeding any possible current needs. The writer is not here concerned with how much money and manpower is expended but rather with how efficiently money and manpower are utilized.

In that respect the atomic bomb merely accentuates the necessity for flexibility in tactical conceptions, a necessity already sufficiently underscored by progress in other weapons. But it does a great deal more. The atomic bomb introduces the possibility that in another general war the utility of navies will be decided ashore rather than at sea. A nation which has had its entire economy destroyed may be able to put a fleet to scant use.

The experiments with the atomic bomb now being planned by our Navy will therefore have little relevance to the basic issue. The traditional concepts of military security which this country has developed over the past fifty years — in which the Navy was correctly avowed to be our "first line of defense" — must be reconsidered. And the Navy's indubitably superb accomplishment in the greatest of all naval wars will not facilitate its taking the lead in revaluing its own place in the national security.

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THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE

By Louis R. Franck

THE French people have now chosen the 586 members of the Assembly which is to draft a new constitution for France. The form of that constitution will in large part settle the course and fate of French representative democracy and will foreshadow, in turn, the trend of events in many other European countries.

Representative democracy has never worked smoothly in France. This new constitution will be the fourteenth since the French Revolution. Each constitution reflected the public opinion then prevailing, and although economic and social problems grew in importance during the nineteenth century, and were the paramount issues in 1848, the chief conflicts of that century centered around the fight between authority and liberty — around the questions of political and civil freedoms, a more liberal enfranchisement, and relationships between the State and the Church.

Under the Constitution of 1875 France experienced a magnificent colonial expansion, steadily improved living standards and industrial equipment, acquired a leadership in letters and arts, knew the glory and exhaustion of the First World War — in which, at Verdun, she played the rôle that England took during the blitz — and met, finally, the disaster of 1940. From 1870 to 1940, 106 different Cabinets governed the country, with an average life of eight months each; only eight Cabinets lasted more than two years, only ten more than one year. There were 31 that did not last three months. It may be noted that this ministerial instability was not a phenomenon of the postwar period; President MacMahon had presided over ten Cabinets, Grévy over twelve, Carnot over ten. The situation did become worse after 1919, however. President Doumergue cheerfully solved 15 political crises, and President Lebrun, with less cheerfulness and more austerity, struggled with 17. President Roosevelt pointed out to General de Gaulle that it had sometimes been difficult for him to remember who was head of the French Government. What was really new after the First World War, however, was that instability was no longer accepted as a natural element of the political

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game, of concern only to professional politicians. The foreign and domestic responsibilities of the government had grown far greater, and the country became conscious that political instability was jeopardizing the future. Examples of other forms of government were at hand in Russia, Italy and Germany, and the wisdom of retaining a representative democracy which seemed to work so badly came into serious question.

This political disorder was the most spectacular aspect of the spiritual, moral and social crisis which undermined French society in the years between the wars. The crisis was primarily the result of a maladjustment between the various élites and the political framework, taking the term "élites" to mean groups of men whose technical and moral qualifications are respected by large segments of the population. Certain hierarchies had been deprived of their former influence, but their places had not yet been taken by representatives of the new moral values; important political groups refused to accept political responsibilities; and other groups of highly trained personnel claimed a behind-the-scenes political power which exerted a demoralizing influence on the whole structure of representative democracy.

The collapse of the landed aristocracy and the downfall of the ruling classes trained under Louis Philippe and Napoleon III had been followed, at the beginning of this century, by the collapse of two other traditional French hierarchies. The Army emerged from the Dreyfus affair as a reactionary class, weakened in prestige and under constant attacks from the Left; and following the merciless fight led by the Radicals against religious congregations, the Catholic Church was no longer a political power. These events had a tremendous impact on French political psychology and, for a long time, destroyed the principle of an accepted authority. The struggle against these two hierarchies was the dominant theme of French spiritual and intellectual life for twenty years; after Ernest Renan, it was Anatole France, Ferdinand Buisson, Jean Jaurès against Brunetière, Albert de Mun, Barrès and the traditionalists. The magnificent debate on "Church, Democracy and Modern Education" in which Jaurès opposed Barrès in 1910 is one of the landmarks of French political thinking. The Socialists and the Left in general were looking for a new élite; the Radicals hoped to find it in their local political machines; the Socialists sought it among skilled workers and technicians, intellectuals and public school teachers. In 1924, the

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formation of the *Cartel des Gauches* was the triumph of what Albert Thibaudet called "La République des Professeurs;" in 1936 the formation of the Popular Front was a victory of labor and of the anti-Fascist university professors.

The parallel rise of modern capitalism and of the Socialist and Communist Parties had an important bearing on representative democracy. Socialists and Communists firmly believed in the class struggle and in its Marxist implications: as long as those parties could not identify the interests of the labor class with the national interest, they remained aloof from the government and thus condemned their own élites to permanent opposition. In 1924, Léon Blum had refused to accept political responsibilities with Herriot; he accepted them in 1936, but at that time the Communists, although in the majority, refused executive positions and exercised power without responsibilities. Rising capitalism simultaneously had a corrupting influence on representative democracy — on deputies and senators during the Panama, Rochette, Oustric and Stavisky scandals, on their political machines, on the press. One of the most discouraging features of French politics in the thirties was the way big businessmen, true leaders of their own élite, cynically boasted of subsidizing both conservative and Socialist papers.

The economic legacy of the First World War — reparations, war debts, tariffs and quota, budgetary deficits and devaluations — confronted Parliament with gigantic tasks. It could not cope with them. Parliamentary procedures gradually yielded to government by qualified experts, that is to say, to a bureaucracy — and the bureaucracy never balanced its extraordinary power by any increase in its sense of political responsibility. Meanwhile, the Parliament delegated its functions to the executive branch, which governed through decree-laws, without discussion. Through the high bureaucracy, pressure groups came to dominate the government; the Banque de France and the Comité des Forges dictated the economic and financial policy of the 1934–1935 governments, and the Federation of Governmental Employees and the General Labor Confederation similarly inspired the left-wing governments of 1933 and 1936–1937.

It is abundantly clear that prewar France suffered primarily from a lack of adjustment between its élites and the pattern of its politics. The political professionals, sure that they "knew the ropes," too easily accepted the scandals which weakened France;

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big businessmen and experts distrusted Parliament on account of its left-wing tendencies and its social legislation; bureaucrats scorned it from the eminence of their own technical skill. Some trade union leaders were reconciled with the government and were members of its committees; but some were Communists who still considered the government the personification of their bourgeois enemies, and some were die-hard syndicalists trained in the teachings of George Sorel and both opposed to "reformism" and to the Stalinist discipline. French public opinion held no common views as to the ultimate mission of these different élites. The Radical-Socialists, afraid of the rebirth of dead hierarchies, had a negative attitude. One of their intellectual leaders, Alain, denounced the permanent "plot" of the élite against the masses; their feeling was that any attempt at long-term projects, at greatness, implied a threat against the common man and civil liberties.[1] This tendency toward an equalitarian provincialism was curiously compensated by ambitious aspirations in the international field; the Radical-Socialists were the best supporters of the League of Nations, which satisfied *in abstracto* their rational ideals. Their influence had a destructive effect on democracy, but their positive contribution to the defense of the individual and the fundamental liberties was real.

A positive attitude toward the élite was of course to be found in the managerial circles of big business and among the upper bureaucracy which, as we have seen, claimed a political power which often transcended their actual abilities. It was found also in the circles connected with the General Labor Confederation, which rightly considered union leadership an excellent training for higher responsibilities. The moderate and reformist labor leaders conceived of the unions as the nucleus of a new ruling class within a liberal political framework; Communist organizers, trained in the Bolshevik tradition, had more faith in authority from above.

In the early period of the Third Republic, the demand for a revision of the constitution had come from the left wing. Radicals like Clemenceau attacked the Senate, some members of which could not be removed and which was the guardian of the decaying élite made up of the Catholic hierarchy, the landed aristocracy,

[1] In an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS for July 1941, Julien Benda has also shown how certain groups of Socialists and Radicals (including Alain) were indeed pacifists at any price and might have preferred servitude to war. Such groups were small, although they may have been quite influential among some young intellectuals. One of the outstanding results of four years of German occupation has certainly been to save many French intellectuals from too much sophistication.

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the Army and the old monarchist and imperial bureaucracies. They demanded drastic constitutional changes. But these republicans came to perceive that they could achieve their own ideals within the existing framework; they succeeded in democratizing the Senate, in strengthening the Chamber and in submitting the executive branch to the relentless and sometimes tyrannic control of the local political machines and of the parliamentary committees. The government's power of dissolving the Chamber, misused by President MacMahon, was practically abolished; at the beginning of the present century, the Chamber of Deputies emerged as the most powerful organ of French democracy.

Following the First World War the attitudes were reversed. The right wing asked for a revision of the Constitution; President Doumergue, André Tardieu, reactionary leagues, spokesmen of the managerial élite described above, stressed the shortcomings of the French system and urged a strengthening of the executive. But at that time, 1934–1936, the Left looked upon any attempt to change the constitution as an effort of the Right to perpetuate its own power: Radical-Socialists fighting in the name of civil liberties and anticlericalism, Socialists and Communists fighting on the ground of class opposition, joined hands to defeat the so-called Fascist plots. Issues of political technics were overshadowed by personal hatreds and group antagonisms.

II

On October 21, 1945, about 96 percent of the French voters declared in favor of a new constitution. Speaking at Brest on July 21, General de Gaulle had said: "Such a Constitution should lend itself to broad and profound reforms which are needed in this new era in the administrative, economic, social, moral and imperial domains. But at the same time it should favor continuity of effort within the government and effective execution of new laws without which a great modern nation cannot exist."

At the end of July, an important debate took place in the Consultative Assembly on the plans prepared by General de Gaulle for the national elections. The government's initial plan had provided that, in addition to electing the members of a new Assembly, the French voters would answer two questions: (1) Will the Assembly be a Constituent Assembly? (2) Does the electoral body approve the government's plan for the administration of public offices until the constitution is applied?

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This plan provided that during the seven months' period in which the new Assembly was to draft the Constitution, the government, whose President would be elected by the Assembly, would simply *consult* the Assembly on such matters as the establishment of a budget, the ratification of treaties, social and economic reforms, etc., and would not be responsible to it.

Objections were made to the governmental draft on three main grounds: that the procedure constituted a "double referendum," that it abolished ministerial responsibility, and that it suspended the prewar bicameral system. M. Marcel Plaisant, former Senator of the Cher and Reporter of the Committee on State Reforms, declared bluntly that the referendum would be a half-veiled plebiscite, and added: "Our Committee has opposed a draft which implied the total abolition of ministerial responsibility, the suppression of any parliamentary control over governmental actions and a seven-months' period of political immunity during which the Government would be free to act and dispose without any discussion." MM. Laurent Bonnevay and Labrousse, dignified veterans of the old struggles for civil liberties, protested the trend toward a single and sovereign Assembly. The 1875 constitution was still valid, they said; to it, and to the Senate (despite its social backwardness), France owes most of her political and civil liberties. And they pointed out that individual, electoral and municipal freedoms, freedoms of the press, of association, of assembly, of trade union organization had all been upheld by the Senate and by the great fighters of times gone by: Jules Ferry, Challemel-Lacour, Léon Bourgeois, Waldeck-Rousseau, Clemenceau; while in 1924, the Senate even saved the Communists from an indictment for conspiring against the safety of the state.

The plan was defeated by a vote of the Consultative Assembly and a compromise suggested by the Socialist Party was adopted. The Assembly was unanimous in demanding a greater degree of ministerial responsibility during the interim period; but the plea of moderates and Radical-Socialists in favor of the Senate was also turned down by 196 votes to 91.

These debates, which always remained on a high level, clarified the opposite tendencies of two generations. The defenders of the prewar bicameral system emphasize that man as a moral person has certain fundamental rights, and insist that somewhere in the government there must exist a body or procedure to protect the individual against an all-powerful assembly or an all-powerful

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bureaucracy — a Supreme Court, a rule of law built on a Bill of Rights, or a careful, slow but vigilant Senate. The majority of the Assembly, including most Resistance leaders, agree that these individual rights must be protected; indeed, they are mentioned in the preamble of the platform of the National Council of Resistance. But they reject what they look upon as a negative attitude which places main emphasis on protection of the individual. The question of civil liberties, they contend, no longer embodies the real issues of government; emphasis must now be laid on economic rights and social achievements. The issue no longer lies between the individual and the collectivity, but between the roads that the collectivity will take toward constructive revolution: leadership by a strong Assembly or leadership by a strong executive.

The elections of October 21, 1945, took place in an orderly and dignified fashion. This is in itself a fact of great significance: here was the most important of the liberated countries returning wholeheartedly and in full independence to complete legality. The results of the elections to the Assembly in Metropolitan France were as follows: Communists 142, *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (Christian Democrats) 140, Socialists 133, Moderates 48, Independents and Miscellaneous 40, Radical-Socialists 19. What conclusions as to the future of French democracy may be drawn from these results?

A fact of prime importance is that about two-thirds of the members of the Constituent Assembly will be newcomers to political life. This is of course partly due to the political purge which followed liberation and to the fact that most deputies and senators who had voted for Pétain in July 1940 rightly became ineligible. The new members of the Assembly will obviously be much more free from routine and local commitments than their predecessors; as "Pertinax" has pointed out, they will also be somewhat inexperienced. But young blood now circulates in the French body politic.

The occupational affiliations of the new Assembly also indicate a sharp break with the past. The leading occupations represented are white collar and other workers, with professors and teachers next. Lawyers now are only the third most numerous group; then come businessmen, newspapermen and farmers. While legal talents are obviously necessary in the difficult work of drafting a constitution, the Assembly should benefit much from the presence

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of many workers and professors who will emphasize and defend the principles of civil liberties and representative democracy.

Another important factor is that three powerful parties now muster about 80 percent of all members.[2] The multiplicity of parties has been the plague of French politics and furnished one of the most powerful weapons of reactionary elements in their campaign against the representative system. The French party was much more the political expression of individual ideas and aspirations than, as among Anglo-Saxons, a tool for common social achievement. When a few members of a party changed their views on principles or strategy, secession seemed honest and necessary. The idea that there might be a right, a center and a left *inside* a party, that two different or opposite parties might have a fairly similar program, that the right-wing of a party might be much closer to the right-wing of another party than to the left-wing of its own party — all these assumptions, which are quite familiar to Americans, never were the rule in France. The new Catholic party, or *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, will obviously have a right, a center and a left, and so will the Socialists. Even the Communists, who are now ready to accept governmental responsibility, are bound to present nuances of opinion, and Communist ministers may not satisfy all the wishes of their rank and file. It will be the task of French political leaders to keep all these nuances disciplined within these few parties and turned, once for all, toward common social achievements. The important fact is that, for the time being, a discipline seems to have been achieved. Will it be maintained in the future? This is the real problem.

The collapse of the Radical-Socialist Party symbolizes the general desire in France for something new. The Party had advised its followers to answer "no" to the question regarding the change of constitution, and thereby contributed to its own downfall. It was in any case too deeply involved in many unpleasant aspects of prewar French politics to be saved even by the noble leadership of Edouard Herriot. The Radical-Socialists were on principle too much opposed to any élite to be willingly accepted by a country which is in search of new values and of spiritual greatness. But we must remember that, by its very nega-

[2] While the official returns still mention 18 different parties, ten parties do not include more than six members each. The most important right-wing group has only 26 members, less than 5 percent of the Assembly.

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tions, Radicalism was also the traditional defender of human values and of the rights of men. Its virtual extinction as a party has created a gap which will not be easily filled.

The emergence of a powerful Catholic liberal party, the MRP, has been said to be the striking feature of the elections. Some analysis of the regional composition of the party is necessary if its nature and possible influence is to be understood. Roughly, about two-thirds of the MRP representatives can be ranged in seven well-defined regional groups, namely, Paris and suburbs, northern France, Brittany, Normandy, Alsace-Lorraine, the large urban settlements of Lyon, Marseille and Sainte-Etienne and a few scattered districts like Hérault, Marne, Indre-et-Loire, Haute-Savoie, Tarn. In all these regions the MRP has practically replaced the prewar conservatives. In Paris and its suburbs, for instance, only two avowedly right-wing candidates were elected, as compared with 17 MRP; in Nord and Pas-de-Calais, only one right-wing, as contrasted to 12 MRP; in Brittany, the bulwark of the French right-wing, five conservatives were elected and 16 MRP.

Since most of the reactionary deputies and senators had upheld Vichy, or at least voted for Pétain in July 1940, their disappearance from French political life is a welcome gain. But it must be realized that those who would have voted for these right-wing candidates are precisely the ones who now have voted for the MRP. This may have two meanings. It may indicate that conservative but patriotic electors, emerging from the ordeal of German occupation, have reëxamined their political convictions and are now reconciled to the progressive social teachings of the Christian Democrats. Or it may mean that the old prewar reaction has momentarily wrapped itself in the lofty cloak of the MRP, or has accepted the new party as a lesser evil, feeling it would be easier to adjust to a system of nationalization sponsored by MRP than to what is advocated by the Communists. Quite probably the new party will include both young, energetic and progressive elements from the Catholic Resistance and reactionary die-hards striving to save big business and to minimize the impact of nationalizations. The question whether the new party is leftist is really a futile one. What is "the Left"? If we stress the social connotations of the term, then the MRP will quite probably be leftist in its majority. If we stress the question of Church and State, the answer is probably the opposite, especially if the

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principles of the lay state remain obligatory for a left-wing program. But yet again, this principle may not be a fundamental one in postwar French "leftism."

Before the war, the French Socialist Party ceased to be strictly a labor party; it represented many farmers and governmental employees. The strong ties now built up between the Party and the rising governmental bureaucracy, the emergence of many Socialists in important executive positions — as prefects, regional commissioners, technical and economic advisers in Paris and the provinces — is bound to accentuate the Party's loyalty to the government. In any event, the great and interesting new fact is the friendly attitude of the Socialist Party toward the Catholic liberals of the MRP. This may imply the end of aggressive anti-clericalism; it certainly indicates that the Socialists recognize the courage and patriotism displayed during the German occupation by so many young elements of the Catholic group.

The victorious rise of the Communist Party seems to offer another instance of the French thirst for some kind of well-integrated organization. The Communists are both an army and a church. If they bitterly attack the trusts and big business forces, they have nonetheless a healthy respect for the machine age and technical efficiency. If they have opposed the food and wage policies of the government, if they have vehemently denounced some of its ministers, they have at the same time accepted responsibility as Cabinet members and have filled technical positions with real competence. The high regard for technical ability shown by the Communists, and their sense of social coöperation toward common aims, may cause them to make a definite contribution in French politics.

III

Such are the basic political forces which, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, will strive to draw up a constitution for the Fourth Republic. What are their chances of success? What are their handicaps? Is it possible to foresee the broad features of the new constitution or at least to express a few hopes as to what the constitution could be? And, finally, what would be the future of representative democracy in France within the constitutional framework? These are the great problems to which the writer will attempt to sketch some answers.

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First of all, the rebirth of a true patriotism and a common aspiration for French greatness are hopeful factors. In the words of the first article of its platform, the National Council of Resistance decided to remain united after liberation "to restore France to her power, her greatness and universal mission." Marcel Cachin, the old Communist leader, recently stated: "The Communists will take their place in the front ranks of all republicans in the gigantic undertaking of the nation's moral and material reconstruction which will arouse the ardor of all Frenchmen worthy of that name."[3] Combined with this strong patriotism there is a vivid awareness of the ordeal through which France has passed; all are in the mood for compromises which would prevent its recurrence.

A second hopeful factor is that all parties seem in agreement as to the basic characteristics of the future French economic and social system. There will be debates on the methods and extent of state control over economic activities; but the fundamental principles themselves have been accepted by a very large majority of the Assembly, on the basis of the program of the National Council of Resistance. This community of views is new and important. Ten or twelve years ago, as we have noted, the left wing was bitterly opposed to the constitutional amendments suggested by the late President Doumergue and André Tardieu: Doumergue amounted to a "Fascist," and Tardieu was either an "adventurer" or a "condottiere," with a background which did not entitle him to teach political honesty. Now it seems quite possible that the new constitution will be fairly close to the drafts prepared at that time and branded as "Fascist" by the Left. Twelve years ago, to the neo-socialists who wanted "order, authority, nation," M. Léon Blum had cried in an historical meeting, "I am terrified." M. Blum's present program is pretty close to that neo-socialist platform. What does this mean? Simply that the social and psychological setting of these prewar attempts has changed; political hatreds and antagonisms between leading politicians which poisoned the air in the middle thirties have disappeared. The approach to a new constitution may be therefore much more technical and much less emotional.

[3] This resurgence of patriotism is symbolized by a universal desire for a sizeable army. There are conflicting views as to how this army should be organized. Treasury officials, for budgetary reasons, and regular Army officers, on account of their *esprit de caste*, seem to favor a small professional army; while the Socialists and Communists incline toward a popular mass army. But there is no divergence of opinion as to the necessity of an army, and of army expenditures.

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Finally, there is a universal desire to rebuild France around a new "élite," a new aristocracy. The very idea of greatness implies an aristocracy as the necessary tool. But what kind of élite? Here, of course, the point of view varies. To the Communists, "élite" obviously means the leaders of the Communist Party and of the Communist unions; but also, as pointed out above — and here, perhaps, is a new field of harmony — any disinterested competency devoted to the public interest and not subservient to the "trusts." To the Socialists, in addition to the élite of the party and the unions, the term connotes the high state officials with liberal leanings, and the professors, intellectuals and professional men. To the Christian Democrats of the MRP the "élite" is composed of the leaders of Church organizations, of Christian unions and also — just as for the conservatives — the managerial élite of business, the moderate governmental bureaucracy, and eventually of the Army and the academies and learned societies.

Of course there are points of tension and potential conflict. Coöperation between the MRP and the left-wing groups may raise the old issue of relationship between the Church and the State, in particular the question of state subsidies to the private schools. Even if leaders as liberal and open-minded as Léon Blum are ready to compromise on the issue, the Socialist committees and plenary congresses will probably take a very strong stand against any change in the pre-Vichy principles of disestablishment.[4] It is to be hoped that by common accord the problem will not become a constitutional one, and that the discussions which are bound to arise will be held later on in the ordinary course of legislative debates.

This Constituent Assembly is also legislative. It will reflect all the disturbances which may arise in consequence of the hardships of this winter. Cold and hunger may become the worst enemies of the future constitution. This is a major factor in potential discord.

Relationships between the Socialists and the Communists are still stormy. Communist Party influence presses constantly on the rank and file of the Socialists and on the Socialist unions; both parties, in fact, have the same political clientele, or rather, there is among the followers of both parties a fluid group which may easily shift from one to the other. While we have constantly

[4] Very harsh polemics took place before the October 21 elections between MM. Francisque Gay, one of the leaders of the MRP, and Albert Bayet, son-in-law of the famous historian Aulard, an old-guard of anti-clerical liberalism.

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stressed the new atmosphere of coöperation and mutual give-and-take which has appeared so signally in French political life since 1944, animosity between Socialists and Communists is still noticeable. It came into the open when Léon Blum began championing the western European grouping or "bloc," and his views were immediately branded as anti-Russian by the Communists. M. Blum holds that France may choose England and Russia; to the Communists, the choice is England or Russia.

Further difficulties in the colonies — in Indo-China, for example — may arouse serious controversies between the Communists and other groups, and on this issue the Socialists may side with the Communists. All problems of foreign policy can impinge on the smooth process of constitutional discussions, and sharp divergences on foreign alignments between the Communists and the other groups may stiffen the general attitudes and turn any technical controversy into an explosive emotional issue.

Finally, there will be the general opposition of viewpoints between the defenders of the "élites" — whatever they are — and the defenders of the common man, of the masses; in France, too, the philosophy of Hamilton is now opposed to the philosophy of Jefferson. The young resistance groups which so boldly kept the flame of French spirit alive studied the political reconstruction of France. In 1943 and early in 1944 several drafts for new constitutions were published underground: we must admit that many of our young reformers were very much on the side of Hamilton, that they did not seem greatly concerned with the common man and with bills of rights. The leitmotiv of all plans was the strengthening of the executive. One of the most drastic frankly advocated a presidential régime. According to this plan, the President would be the Chief of State and the Chief of the Government; he would be elected through indirect suffrage; he would introduce constitutional amendments and new laws; he would have a veto power over the legislation and the right to dissolve the assemblies; he would appoint all civil and military officers, including the members of a supreme court; and ministers would be responsible only to him. Scorn for the old political parties was common to all these groups, at least one of which frankly labelled all political parties "parasitic institutions" and favored their abolition.

These plans are typical of the *sociétés de pensée* which will remain the glory of occupied France, and they disclose the clear-cut convictions of a new élite. But let us also admit, as the

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Communists pointed out, that in its justifiable emphasis on the strengthening of the executive branch, this aristocracy was not fully aware of the needs and aspirations of the masses. There was also perhaps the subconscious assumption that this élite itself would be the executive. (The assumption is human enough. The adherents of planned economy, for example, are usually recruited among those who think they would direct the planning and not among those who would be directed by it.) Their prophecy of the decline of political parties was to be thoroughly discounted by the events which followed liberation: if these reformers are to play a great rôle — and it is quite likely that they will — they will play it within the political parties, not outside them. In fact, many of them have been elected to the new Assembly on different political tickets.

Is it possible to find a common denominator to all these contrasting aspirations, and a constitutional modus vivendi which would pave the way to France's greatness and also safeguard "all that to free men is dear" within the framework of representative democracy? Such a synthesis can be sketched only in very broad outline.[5] Its main elements might be: (1) A strengthening of the executive, balanced by the elaboration of a bill of civil and social rights as part of the constitution. (2) The preservation of the bicameral system, with emphasis in the upper Chamber not on representation according to professional activities but on the various élites as such. (3) The strengthening of the control of the legislature over the bureaucracy.

Let us comment very briefly on each point:

(1) In the writer's opinion, strengthening the executive must not mean the adoption of a presidential régime. If it were possible to transplant to France the presidential system as it works in the United States, with its full background of federalist thinking and political and judicial tradition, the matter would certainly be worth considering. But such a transposition is utterly impossible. In fact, it is worth noting that most French publicists and politicians who praise the American system (and there have been quite a few of them in the past two years) praise chiefly the wartime powers of the President and are usually fairly ignorant of the constitutional limitations of the presidential functions, as Pierre

[5] The constitution will quite probably deal at length with a further integration of the French Empire with metropolitan France on some kind of federative basis. Following the recommendations of the Brazzaville Conference in February 1944, liberal and farsighted trends are to be expected in this field.

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Cot very clearly pointed out before the Consultative Assembly. In France, moreover, the "presidential system" does not carry the connotations of Lincoln, Wilson or Roosevelt, but the connotation of Bonaparte; that is unfortunate, but it is a fact.

Strengthening the executive should mean stabilizing it. There might be a Chief of State and a Chief of Government with a Cabinet responsible to the Parliament; but dissolution of the lower Chamber should become automatic at a certain stage. André Philip recently suggested that automatic dissolution of the Chamber should take place on the third reversal of the Cabinet. Besides, the Chief of Government should perhaps have a veto power over the Parliament — a veto that could be overridden after further deliberations and under certain majority rules. While the government and the parliament would both have the initiative of introducing new legislation, the government alone could propose expenditures.

Such measures would undoubtedly strengthen the executive branch; in fact, they are the core of the reforms suggested in the middle thirties which raised a great uproar among the Left. But many members of the Assembly think that this reënforcement of the executive should be balanced by the promulgation of a new bill of civil and social rights, as a written part of the constitution. The generous humanism and the legal talent of the French can be trusted to make sure that this bill of rights is drafted in a comprehensive yet workable form. Socialists like André Philip have stressed its necessity. The right to individual freedom should be stressed, along with rights of free speech, free press, free exercise of religion, and so on. Among the rights of labor, special emphasis should be put on the right to strike, to bargain collectively and, above all, the right of all workers and producers to choose their own representatives without coercion and governmental interference. If France is to remain a democracy, true representation must exist at every stage. The lack of freedom for the workers and producers to choose their own representatives has characterized the Fascist and other dictatorial régimes much more than has compulsory unionization or a single union.

(2) Like many French people, General de Gaulle is reported to favor the bicameral system. The MRP is said to favor an advisory and technical second chamber composed of representatives of the departments and municipalities, overseas territories, the professions and family associations. It is no secret that many

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members of the managerial groups, even members of the trade unions, would favor an advisory professional assembly. But would an advisory assembly have power and responsibilities? And, if so, is it not to be feared that, in this assembly, representatives of private professional interests would, because of their skill and by their very nature, soon become the prevailing element? Would their eventual conspiracy against the average consumer be watched and denounced by representatives of local political bodies and family associations? Would they truly defend the national interest?

The necessity of rebuilding a French aristocracy might well lead to the constitutional creation of some kind of *Chambre des Élites* as the upper chamber of the Parliament.[6] It would not be simply a professional chamber and would not be merely advisory; it would have clear powers. This chamber would include elder, highly respected statesmen like MM. Marin, Herriot, Bonnevay, Jeanneney, Léon Blum, who would be selected by the lower chamber; representatives of the different sections of the *Institut de France*, elected by these sections; representatives of the French universities and institutions of higher learning; representatives of the welfare institutions and family associations; representatives of the so-called *Grands Corps de l'État*, namely, the *Cour de Cassation*, the *Conseil d'État*, the higher financial bodies, the state engineers, the Army and Navy, the diplomatic service, the bar; and also, of course, it would include representatives of the different trade associations, labor unions, farmers' associations, etc. These latter professional representatives should not constitute the majority of this upper chamber, but their technical skills and competency would contribute usefully to it. All these members should be selected by their respective groups and unions on the basis of free elections. The government could be reversed only by the lower chamber and, as mentioned above, such reversal would be followed by automatic dissolution after the second or third adverse vote. But both chambers would have the right to initiate legislation.

(3) Provisions for the control of the bureaucracy by the Parliament are essential. Rightly or wrongly, France is entering an era of state control of economic activities; a tremendous growth

[6] The idea was advocated before the war by M. Bernard Lavergne in his "Gouvernement des Démocraties Modernes." It is easy to recognize here the influence of Renan and his "L'Avenir de la Science."

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of the governmental bureaucracy will follow the program of nationalization and economic planning. The managerial élite will emerge with enormous powers: this is the most conspicuous aspect of the revolution of the "élites." Let us welcome this élite; but let us avoid creating a new Leviathan.

It seems to the writer that the main difficulty in economic and social planning is to determine the objective of the planning. There can be planning for autarchy and self-sufficiency, or planning for war; there can be planning for full employment, or planning for welfare, for a better standard of life, for the good society. It is difficult to accept the dictum that the governmental bureaucracy must determine the goal. The bureaucracy must perhaps be left free to arrange and adjust the technics of planning, but the question of the goal must be decided by the Parliament. This responsibility of Parliament should be written in the constitution. In a democratic society, power implies responsibility, and the rise of bureaucratic power implies the growth of bureaucratic responsibility. It might be advisable to generalize the practice of parliamentary hearings; in prewar France, by long-standing practice, the minister alone was responsible before the Parliament for all deeds of his administration. Such a centralization of responsibilities may not be compatible with the planning age. To make sure that the new élite does not become an oligarchy, this élite might be made directly responsible to *ad hoc* parliamentary committees.

Such are some of the difficult problems to be solved in the coming months by General de Gaulle and the new Constituent Assembly. Obviously, their final adjustment will require much skill and leadership, much compromise and concession. Let us repeat that never before have the opportunities been so great. Within the new constitutional framework, the future of French representative democracy is at stake. There the rights and duties of the new élites and those of the masses may still be peacefully adjusted, so that, reconciled with herself, France can follow her course of true spiritual leadership.

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AMERICA AT WAR

The Triumph of the Machine

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THE Second World War was a war of mass, but not, like the First, of massed manpower; it was a war of massed machines. In view of this, American production and construction, which reached Wellsian proportions, can be said to have been directly responsible for the victory over Germany and Japan. Such a statement, though true in a strictly military sense, is of course only part of the story. This article, summarizing the record of American industrial production and analyzing the merits and defects of certain of the weapons which it turned out, purports to tell only that part. It deliberately leaves out of account the spiritual imponderables which determine how, and how successfully, material power is used. It does not discuss the political factors responsible for the fact that we fought the Axis nations with powerful allies and not alone, and it makes no attempt to describe the brave and great accomplishments of those allies. Instead, it concentrates on the physical aspects of our own war effort. They need to be stressed, for perhaps the chief military lesson of the ordeal through which we have just passed is that although size of armies is an important element in modern warfare, as the Russian campaigns showed, wars today are not won by "big battalions" but by big industries.

Our industrial potential was the greatest advantage which we possessed over our enemies in the Second World War. We possessed no such overwhelming advantage in training for combat, in will-to-fight, in leadership, in tactics and in the quality of our equipment; indeed, the enemy was often on a par with us, or superior to us, in these respects. But we could build an airfield or a pipeline in a fraction of the time the enemy needed; and we could turn out ten tanks to his one. Our armies were not the largest; but together the United States Army, Navy and Air Force undeniably formed the mightiest fighting force ever assembled in history. Our factories and shipyards, operating with our industrial management, skilled workers, factory superintendents, foremen, cost-accountants and efficiency experts — in short, American capital and labor, united in a free-enterprise system — gave that fighting

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force the sinews of its strength. If ever the United States forgets that industrial "know-how" is essential to victory in modern war, it will be on the way to becoming a second-class Power.

To say this is not to disparage the fighting men who gave their blood for victory. As General of the Army George C. Marshall rightly emphasized in his last report as Chief of Staff, "technology does not eliminate the need for men in war." Man is still master of the machine. Leadership, too, is of basic importance. Furthermore, of course, the quality of the equipment must be high, or its quantity will not avail. But the fact remains that quantity — the mass quantity of American production lines — overwhelmed the enemy in this war. Previous articles in this series have had to concentrate so much upon the operational history of the war that our prodigies of production, supply and construction were, in the main, overlooked. These will now be briefly recounted, and an attempt will also be made to compare a few of the weapons we produced with those of the enemy.

II

"By any standards," the Mead investigating committee of the United States Senate has reported, "the war production task has been a huge success. . . . . The failures have been in the confusion, the delay, and the waste of effort, matériel, and money. More could have been done, and it could have been done sooner and at much less cost. But this is the counsel of perfection and it is the wisdom of hindsight."

What were some of the practical accomplishments of American factories?

Before 1939, it was an accepted truism that wars are fought with the navies in existence at the moment the conflict begins. Not so on this occasion. During this war, the United States built an incomparably larger navy than was possessed by any nation before it began. This fleet, bigger than all the other fleets of the world combined, isolated Japan.

The Navy's "pipeline," or floating-base system of supply, permitted a continuity of naval operations which five or six years earlier was unimaginable. The Fleet's service forces — humble toilers of the sea — serviced the combatant ships so well that the field of fleet operations can now be considered global; the Navy is tied to its base no longer. Before the war, the maximum practicable limit of fleet operations was considered to be 1,500 to 2,500

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miles from base. During the war, our ships thought nothing of remaining away from our most advanced permanent bases, Pearl Harbor or the West Coast, for months and even years on end. The modern fleet in wartime rarely casts anchor. It is refueled, reprovisioned, reammunitioned at sea; it gets mail and movies at sea; new planes from ferry carriers are flown aboard the fleet carriers; new pilots, spare parts, engines — all of the thousand and one items a fleet needs — are brought by the ships of the service forces to the fleet's operating area and transferred at sea. At an advance base in some island atoll, mobile floating drydocks, floating machine shops, barracks ships, water-distilling ships, supply ships, tankers and a score of other types repair and service damaged vessels and give the fleet a "breather" between operations. The logistical achievements of the naval war in the Pacific defy all comparisons.

American shipyards and factories produced this service force — the 829,000 tons of it built in Navy yards and the 2,813,000 tons turned out for the Navy by the Maritime Commission. The development of the process of supply had to be matched by a comparable development of skill in seamanship; it takes a good seaman, indeed, to bring his ship alongside a broad-beamed tanker in a heavy sea and fuel while underway. Good seamen are made by experience, and many were the ships damaged in such operations while green officers learned the A.B.C.'s of blue water. But ship repair and maintenance facilities, at advanced bases and back on the West Coast, though gorged with large numbers of ships damaged by *Kamikaze* pilots, were always equal to the task. The American Fleet became the most seagoing fleet in the world, though a great many of the Americans who manned it had never before known salt water. This result could not have been attained, however, without the support of a gigantic industry. A vast industrial establishment is now a *sine qua non* of modern sea power.

The production of the amphibious fleet of almost 80,000 landing craft and boats forms another epic. Our ability to land and supply great forces over open beaches confounded both the Germans and the Japanese. The craft involved, many of them of "Buck Rogers" design, offered peculiar production problems. They were surmounted with a rapidity which amazed the enemy.

Other examples of the indispensability of American industry to the armed services are the special antisubmarine vessels and

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equipment which were produced at top speed in order to meet the submarine menace. The number of destroyers, destroyer-escorts and patrol vessels of many types which was built is almost incredible. They were equipped with all sorts of amazing new devices, like the antisubmarine rocket launcher called the "hedgehog."

A basic factor not only in the victory on the seas but also in the world-wide victory on land was obviously the bridge of ships produced for the American Merchant Marine. We were able to build ships far faster than the submarines could sink them, even at the height of the U-boat campaign. The total number of Maritime Commission ships built was 5,425, totaling 53,239,000 tons. The millions of tons of special naval combat and auxiliary and amphibious shipping were additional to this figure. Millions of man-hours also went into the work of converting and repairing ships. There has been nothing in history even remotely approximating this shipbuilding achievement.

Perhaps even more impressive was the record of American aircraft construction. When President Roosevelt in early 1942 called for 60,000 planes, many government officials and observers (including this writer) thought he was making a propaganda gesture and that the goal was excessive, if not impossible of attainment. Yet the nation proceeded to produce 296,601 military and special purpose planes, many of them of new design, and incorporated in its production schedule thousands of modifications and changes each year. In other words, the American factory combined flexibility with mass production. Air power, of course, was absolutely indispensable. Without air superiority, the startling victories of the past two years would have been impossible.

The record of the production of weapons for the ground armies was only slightly less impressive than were the shipbuilding and aircraft construction programs. Almost 87,000 tanks, 2,434,553 trucks, 17,400,000 rifles, carbines and sidearms, 315,000 pieces of field artillery and mortars and 4,200,000 tons of artillery shells gave our ground forces the superiority in mobility and fire power which, as General Marshall rightly pointed out, played such a major rôle in our triumph. With them should be mentioned a staggering variety and number of other items, running all the way from 51,000,000 pairs of shoes to 1,412,506 sulfadiazine tablets. In our ground battles we sometimes enjoyed only a slight superiority in numbers (particularly in the early days in North Africa,

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in the campaigns in Sicily and Italy, and in some of the battles in western Europe), but due to our tremendous production of ammunition and weapons our superiority in fire power was sometimes immense. And the jeep and the two-and-a-half ton truck, as well as the other automotive vehicles, born in Detroit, were the basis of our strategic as well as our tactical land mobility.

Here, then, are three clear-cut ingredients of victory: tremendous superiority at sea and in the air, and on land a superiority in fire power (sometimes slight, but generally marked) and in mobility. The superiority at sea enabled us to project our strength across the oceans, to outflank the enemy, to choose our places for attack, and to land where the enemy was weak. Once our superiority in the air was established, it aided us immeasurably in all combat operations on land and sea, and correspondingly hampered the enemy. It protected our industrial installations and those of our Allies; and it enabled us to project our striking power into the heart of the enemy's country, reducing his industrial output and hence his fire power and mobility. External and internal blockade by sea power and air power were extremely important in weakening the Axis nations. Our massed artillery fire was a product of the factories of America; and our ability to replace matériel losses quickly intensified our hitting power.

The 1944 report of the War Production Board tells the story:

> In 1944 a flood of munitions poured from our forges and foundries, mills, factories, and ordnance plants to a height and at a speed that could hardly fail to inundate those who lay in its path. The stream had been growing rapidly in power from year to year, coming close to flood level in 1943 and rising still higher in 1944. The 1944 munitions record in terms of number of weapons is even more spectacular than the $61,300,000,000 value of the year's output: 96,359 planes, including 16,048 heavy bombers; 30,889 ships; 17,565 tanks; 595,330 Army Service Force trucks; 3,284 heavy field guns and howitzers; and 7,454 light ones; 152,000 Army aircraft rocket launchers and 215,177 of the 2.36-inch bazookas; 1,416,774 short tons of ground artillery ammunition; and much more besides. . . .
>
> A country that, despite manpower shortages, material pinches, the tremendous production engineering problems presented by skyrocketing military requirements, and other difficulties, could produce in 1944 $199,001,000,000 in goods and services, was an invincible opponent.

III

If we are to understand the lessons of this war correctly, and be guided by them in framing our postwar standards of national defense, the advantages conferred upon us by mass production

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must be emphasized again and again. These advantages should not blind us to the fact that though we excelled in quantity, we by no means always excelled in quality. The Japanese, with what has been characterized somewhat too scornfully as their "five-and-ten-cent store industry," were not often ahead of us in quality of equipment; but in some weapons the Germans had a distinct superiority.

The claim that our men were better equipped than any ever before sent into battle is, generally speaking, perfectly true; but it is true because of the quantities of equipment with which they were supplied rather than because all the items were of high quality. Some articles were better qualitatively as well as in more profuse supply. Our automotive equipment, heavy bombers, radar (though not all of it), aircraft carriers and landing craft were much better than the enemy's. Our proximity fuse — one of the war's greatest developments — our antiaircraft fire control director and our radar "gun sight" licked the buzz bombs and wrought frightful attrition in the Japanese Air Force. Our recoilless guns and the Garand rifle were excellent. But the enemy had qualitative advantages in many categories.

At the start, the Japanese jungle equipment, the Zero fighter, and notably the Japanese torpedoes and mines, were superior in very many respects to comparable items of American equipment. During the course of the war we overtook Japan's lead in most if not all of these categories; but even at the end some models of Japanese torpedoes carried heavier charges than ours, and the others were just about as heavy and as accurate as our own. In the last months, the Japanese introduced some heavy mortars and heavy rockets which our troops viewed with considerable respect. And at the war's end the Japanese possessed the three largest submarines in the world — one of 5,700 tons and two of 3,800 tons each. The biggest of these had three decks, three planes, a hydraulically operated catapult, a crew of 200 men and capacity for 1,000 tons of supplies. Though inferior in some respects to American submarines, these ships had adequate radar and radio, were painted with radar-repellant paint, and were equipped with the German *Schnorkel*, or air intake and exhaust tubes, which enabled them to cruise submerged at periscope depth more or less indefinitely. We had no submarine of corresponding size or utility.

The Germans possessed a clear-cut technical lead in many

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categories right down to the end of the war. Some of them were as follows:

(1) Rockets. Some of the German antiaircraft shells were rocket-propelled and controlled by radar or radio (thus resembling our proximity fuse), and some were designed to weaken the effectiveness of our aircraft radar. The Germans had a definite laboratory lead in the development of missiles of many types — controlled and guided, target-seeking, and free. This lead was being narrowed at the war's end. Nevertheless, they had under development a transatlantic rocket that would be capable of making the crossing in about 17 minutes, and new forms of V1 and V2, some of them piloted models, were in the experimental stage. Antiaircraft rockets, airborne rockets and many other types considerably in advance of our thinking in this field were also under development. The German bazooka was better than ours.

(2) Aerodynamics and aircraft propulsion and armament. The Germans had progressed further in experimental work on the problem of compressibility than we had, and had developed a new wing form. New wind tunnels with far greater velocities than any we possessed were in use or under construction. In jet propulsion, the Germans were technologically several years ahead of us. Some of their newest aircraft armament was equal to, or superior to, our operational equipment.

(3) Artillery. The improved German 88 mm. gun was probably the best three-purpose gun (antitank, antiaircraft and field artillery piece) developed during the war. Many new types of artillery, including very huge mortars and long-range field guns, were under development or construction. Some of them had rocket-assisted shells. Among these were a 380 mm. howitzer and rocket "guns" with smooth-bore barrels, 400 feet long, intended for the bombardment of London. A new 120 mm. antitank gun was likewise in development. The Germans were also working on a 32-inch siege gun, with a barrel 141 feet long, which fired an eight-and-a-quarter ton projectile.

(4) Infrared rays. The Germans were well advanced in the use of infrared for photography, and for tank and aircraft detection.

(5) Tanks. The Germans made no attempt to build an all-purpose tank, as we did, but developed many different types. Ours had some advantages over German models, but generally

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speaking, German tank development was well ahead of our own.

(6) Torpedoes. The German electric, acoustic and "spider" torpedo — the latter controlled by a long, thin, trailing wire — were superior to ours.

(7) Marine engineering. The Germans had developed engines using far higher pressures and temperatures than ours, although these were not yet satisfactory. They were also experimenting with chemical engines.

(8) Submarines. The Germans had designed submarines with new hull forms and new types of engine, as, for example, those which operated on the principle of hydrogen peroxide propulsion used in rockets. These vessels had the extraordinary underwater speed of 18 knots, and new ones being designed had underwater speeds up to 21 and 25 knots. They could remain submerged at periscope depth indefinitely, breathing through the *Schnorkel*, which added only a slight feather of foam to the wake left by the periscope. Armed with improved instruments and torpedoes, these new submarines would have been a major menace had the war continued. The Germans also used, with some success, a considerable number of ingenious midget submarines, man-controlled torpedoes and motor boats. They clearly were ahead of us in the development of submarines, despite our continued assertions to the contrary.

(9) Mines. The German land and sea mines were more advanced than our own. The "oyster" or pressure mine, used in Cherbourg harbor, was a particularly crafty one.

(10) Machine guns and machine pistols. In weight, flexibility, cyclic rate of fire and general utility, the German machine guns and sub-machine guns had many advantages over ours. German powder gave off less smoke — a fact noted in General George C. Marshall's report; and German use of flash-hiders made the positions of their weapons difficult to spot.

This list of qualitative advantages of the Germans in weapons and equipment could be extended. For instance, the enemy's combat clothing was in many respects superior to ours; however, that point should not be labored, for the quality of some items of our clothing was better.

The foregoing should not be taken as lessening the importance of the rôle played by American mass production. Nor does it indicate that there is anything wrong with American inventors, except that there are not enough of them. There is a considerably

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higher proportion of scientists to practical engineers in England, for example, than in this country; we have emphasized engineering development and production at the expense of the laboratory, and our wartime policy toward scientific education has put us still further behind. Nor, again, was there anything basically wrong with American design. The German Army, however, had a more flexible system for the development of new weapons and for correcting the faults of equipment disclosed in the test of battle. Too often, the enemy beat us to the battlefield with weapons and ideas.

It may be argued that our success in producing the first atomic bomb shows that the United States Army is farsighted and quick to adapt and to learn. But the history of the atomic bomb illustrates precisely the main point that this article is attempting to make. For the "secret" of the atomic bomb — a secret we still possess — is the secret of mass production and industrial "know-how," the secret that underlay our progress toward victory throughout. We hold no monopoly in the theory of atomic fission; indeed, the Germans were at one time well ahead of us in nuclear physics. Many of the key physicists and scientists in our experiments were of foreign birth, many of them German. The real secret of our success with the atomic bomb is simply the skill and efficiency of American industry. There is scarcely a branch of that industry which did not contribute to making the bomb. Machines never before built, never before even dreamed of, new chemical processes, carbon of a purity never heretofore refined, are part of the secret. All the industrial and manufacturing talent of America contributed. The real secret of the atomic bomb is not a formula of physics but the unwritten summary of the total industrial experience of Americans.

There is an important lesson in this. We must remember that for a time Germany was ahead of us in the development of the atomic bomb, as she was in many other branches of military science, and that we overtook her lead in this and in some other fields (notably that of radar) largely because of our greater industrial resources and production know-how. Those factors, plus the initiative and ingenuity of American scientists and engineers, gave us the bomb first. It is worth noting that many of our outstanding developments in the field of military equipment were not the product of the vision of the Army and Navy, but of the Office of Scientific Research and Development — of civilian

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scientists and engineers, working with American industry under general government supervision.

IV

General Marshall shows in his last report that the battle deaths of the United States Army per month of conflict in this war — a monthly average of 4,576 — were greater than in any of our previous wars (although losses in the Civil War were far greater in proportion to population). Our toll of about a million killed, wounded and missing was nevertheless considerably lighter than most civilian and military leaders had dared expect in a conflict of such scope. The official breakdown of the casualty lists as of October 1, 1945, is as follows:

	Dead	*Wounded*	*Missing*	*POW's*	*Totals*
Army.....	206,622	571,664	22,552	121,638	922,476
Navy.....	34,322	24,569	9,443	1,721	70,055
Marine Corps.	19,744	55,462	835	865	76,906
Coast Guard..	808	213	95	—o—	1,116
			Grand Total		1,070,553

As General Marshall points out, and as all observers have reiterated, the mass of weapons and equipment which we were able to produce and to send overseas, not only to our own forces but to our Allies, spared us far heavier casualties. Some of the statistics of this victory of supply are here summarized, from official sources:

CARGO SHIPPED BY THE ARMY

December 1941 — August 1945

Theater	*Tons*
American (Atlantic).....	4,559,542
Mediterranean.....	27,703,582
European.....	45,300,680
American (Pacific).....	6,892,300
Middle Pacific.....	17,614,954
Western Pacific.....	18,357,484
Asiatic.....	6,367,805
Total.....	126,796,347

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PASSENGERS EMBARKED FOR OVERSEAS THEATERS

Theater	*Totals*
American (North Atlantic)	40,767
Latin American	166,134
Mediterranean	1,071,642
European	3,344,063
American (Pacific)	245,745
Middle Pacific	1,097,838
Western Pacific	1,073,673
Asiatic	253,492
Total	7,293,354

In addition to these amounts, almost a million short tons of supplies were sent overseas to maintain the six Marine divisions and ancillary units which did such great work in the Pacific. And the Navy shipped millions of tons — a number as yet uncalculated — from our coasts to provision the fleet. The sum total, dwarfing our accomplishments in the First World War, represents a prodigious achievement. We produced the goods and we distributed them — by train, ship, plane, truck, muleback, pipeline, shank's mare. We sent them over most of the known world and often into terrain hitherto scarcely charted — across the oceans, down the great rivers, over the plains of Europe, above the rearing crags of the Himalayas, through the jungles of New Guinea and Africa.

Construction kept pace with production and transportation. Army engineers and Seabees, transportation-corps troops and dock "wallopers," turned the earth, built new railroads, carved roads out of mountains, opened passages where none was before. American machinery, used with American mechanical aptitude and optimism, built in a few days airfields of a sort which our enemies took months to complete. We made ports where the open seas had lapped for centuries, cleared out blocked harbors, constructed roads through jungles. Construction, as well as production, changed military strategy. The two together were responsible, for example, for the Burma campaign, an overland invasion, supplied by air from India, which defied all previous military rules and made an amphibious invasion superfluous.

Here, from J. A. Krug's final WPB report, is an indication of what we sent to our Allies:

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In a little over four years the United States transferred under lend-lease goods valued at more than $37,000,000,000 besides rendering some $4,500,000,000 of service to our Allies. Shipments included almost $21,000,000,000 of ships and munitions, over $2,000,000,000 of petroleum products, more than $8,500,000,000 of industrial materials and products, and $6,000,000,000 of foods and other agricultural products.

Impressive as these figures are, they do not fully measure the problems involved in supplying such amounts. Foreign demand was primarily for materials and components needed to supplement domestic production of the Allied nations, and the emphasis was on specialty items which caused disproportionate impacts on United States production capacity. Thus Soviet steel requirements were primarily for alloys and the more difficult carbon shapes. . . . U.S.S.R. and United Kingdom requests . . . were for tools and machinery of a particularly elaborate and complex nature, and often quite different in design from what our factories were accustomed to produce. Electrical equipment . . . had to be built in accordance with European standards; machine tools and various instruments had to be designed for metric measurements. . . .

And so, by the grace of God, by the courage of the men of the United Nations, and by American industrial know-how, the war was won. The material power which turned the scales was that of big industries, not of big battalions. And — a final point — the unparalleled American production machine which sent that power to the firing lines, those manned by our own men and those manned by our Allies, was based on a free-enterprise system.

The experience reveals our strength and our weakness. Political know-how is, obviously, a primary component of our safety; our government's first task must be to try to achieve a working international agreement to maintain peace. This survey, however, does not attempt even to broach that part of the subject. In view of the uncertainties that nevertheless cloud the future, we clearly must emphasize fundamental scientific research and applied development far more than we have done in the past. This time we had quantity but not always quality; we must make sure that henceforth our weapons will be the best, as well as the most abundant. The keystone of our material power is our mass production skill. Facing the uncertain world of tomorrow, we would be stupid indeed if we frittered away this birthright.

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HOW TO DEAL WITH JAPAN

By Hu Lin

CHINESE opinion on the problem of preventing renewed Japanese aggression cannot be divorced from the basic Chinese attitude toward human relations. The traditional Chinese view is that the world is a family and "all within the four seas are brothers." Each member of a family has his own virtues and vices; each should cultivate his virtues and eradicate his vices; and all should learn to forgive and tolerate one another, so that the family may live in peace. The Chinese believe that this principle is applicable to international relations, and that the application of it is mandatory in view of the speed at which the world is contracting. All must learn to live with one another peacefully as good neighbors.

China and Japan are neighbors. For nearly two thousand years, Chinese culture spread to Japan and exercised an influence over the Japanese people. But this special relationship underwent a great change in the last hundred years. After the middle of the nineteenth century, when the influence of western science and technology began to permeate the Far East, Japan made phenomenal progress in methods of modern industry and warfare while China's progress was much retarded due to her immense territory and backward communications. At the same time Japan attempted to carry out the so-called continental policy, which aimed at the conquest of the whole of China and eventually of the entire world. For several decades before 1931 China's leaders were aware that China could not escape a life-and-death struggle with Japan; and the Chinese had to study the Japanese mind, and the nature of the Japanese threat, more realistically than did any other people.

In keeping with traditional Chinese philosophy, however, they now wish to destroy only Japan's aggressive ambitions, not to annihilate the Japanese as a nation or as a people. China hopes that the two nations may live together as good neighbors, each a member in the great family of nations, each contributing its share in the development of world civilization. Will this hope be realized? Will the Japanese people, whose treacheries and atrocities have darkened the pages of modern history, repent and reform? My answer is yes.

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The two preconditions for the realization of this objective can easily be formulated. The militaristic nature of the Japanese state structure must be eradicated. And the Japanese pattern of thinking must be changed. Two equally plain warnings, sometimes disregarded, must be emphasized. The task will take a long time; and it cannot successfully be performed by military occupation alone. In my opinion, the present policies of the United States forces in Japan are unquestionably necessary and generally sound. But it is a mistake to look upon them as more than temporary arrangements. We must have a long-range program in dealing with Japan. A prolonged military occupation can create only resentment and hatred. Force alone will not change Japan's social and political structure or reëducate the Japanese people; as Mencius put it, "to use force to conquer a people is not to win the hearts of a people." What methods will bring the Japanese people truly to become aware of the mistakes and crimes they have committed?

II

First let us review the background of Japan's present social and political structure. Centuries of geographical and mental isolation made the Japanese outlook narrow and small. Japan actually absorbed only the superficial aspects of Chinese and western cultures. Her feudal institutions exist to the present day. The people are divided into rigid classes: the royal family, the aristocrats, the warriors, the commoners. There is no social or political equality. The foundation of modern Japan was laid during the Meiji Restoration which began in 1868. But the program was imposed from above; it never constituted a genuine political and social reform. The authority of the royal family was increased; and the noble and warrior classes became the actual ruling classes, controlling practically all political, economic and military power. The famous Meiji Restoration brought the oppressed masses of the Japanese people no blessings. They became a paradoxical mixture of modern industrialism and medieval feudalism — an explosive and dangerous combination.

Military expansion followed in due course. Korea was overrun, and there were easy victories, first over China and then over Russia, in 1895 and in 1905. The Japanese militarists were now more powerfully in the saddle than ever. After the unification of Germany, the system of military training in Japan was mod-

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eled after the German; Bismarck and Wilhelm II became Japanese idols.

The Meiji period saw one further development of particular significance: the rise of the Japanese modern financial oligarchy. This was not a middle-class movement in the western sense. The *Zaibatsu*, like the militarists, came from the old aristocratic class. There were occasional conflicts between warriors and financiers, but for the most part they coöperated closely in exploiting the Japanese people and in pushing the program of expansion abroad. The first modern industries in Japan were mostly war industries. The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War brought the famous Mitsui and the Mitsubishi combines into prominence. And the new members of the *Zaibatsu*, such as Gizke Aikawa and others, who controlled practically all the enterprises in Manchuria, supported the militarists unconditionally.

Political parties were organized during the Meiji period, but we must note once again that the movement was one from above. The founders of the parties, Taisuke Itagaki, Hirobumi Ito and Taro Katsura, came from the old aristocratic class. Ito was always dependent upon the military, and Katsura, once Minister of War, was himself a militarist. These men never understood the meaning of democracy. Parliamentary institutions were a sham. Bribery and fraud were common practices in elections, and members of the parliament often sold themselves to militarists: the railway scandals are a well-known case in point. The financial oligarchy controlled the parliament; the military controlled the financiers; the people were voiceless. No Japanese cabinet could be formed without the consent of the Army and the Navy. The Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy had to be, respectively, a general and an admiral on active duty; and although they were members of the cabinet, they were independent of cabinet control and enjoyed direct access to the Mikado.

In 1931, after the outbreak of the Manchurian "incident," a Japanese friend told me that Premier Takeshi Inukai had said: "The group of Japanese militarists in Manchuria is like a horse running amuck. The Japanese Government cannot control it. We have had to adopt a hands-off policy. There are only two conditions under which the militarists will stop. Either they will eventually become exhausted and stop of their own accord, or they will be annihilated by stronger forces." I was then Editor of *Ta Kung Pao* in Tientsin and published what Premier Inukai

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had said. When this news reached Tokyo, Inukai was greatly worried. He was assassinated in 1932. Inukai, an old politician, did not dare to criticize openly the militarists, much less did he dare to check them. There were too few great political leaders in Japan, and too many powerful militarists. After the assassination of Premier Yuko Hamaguchi, leader of the *Minseito*, in 1930, the political parties virtually evaporated.

The Japanese people enjoyed no freedom of thought and speech. Education was completely controlled by the state. Newspapers and periodicals, presumably organs of public opinion, were merely appendages of the Japanese military. The *Asahi*, which was supposed to represent liberalism, supported the Japanese policy of war and aggression after having been warned several times by the militarists. The *Mainichi*, the powerful organ of the financial oligarchy, was always notoriously reactionary and imperialistic. The *Yomiuri*, whose latest publisher was a man closely connected with the special service and police, was superpatriotic and ultra-nationalistic. The newspapers in Japan must be held guilty of the crime of promoting war as a national policy.

The so-called Meiji Restoration warns us, in short, how superficial a reformation sponsored from above can be in Japan. It solidified the governmental powers in Japan in the hands of the royal family, the military cliques, and the financial houses, with the military wielding decisive control. The masses of the Japanese people, lacking political knowledge, knowing no freedom, became the slaves of the financial oligarchy on the one hand and the terroristic agents of the gigantic war machine on the other. Through the Ex-Service Men's Association, a fanatically patriotic organization found in all villages and towns throughout the country, the militarists held the Japanese population, body and soul, under absolute control.

The final instrument for the coercion of the people was the institution of the Mikado. The legend of the divinity of the Emperor is, of course, of comparatively recent growth. Before the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 the Japanese were genuinely interested in western ideas and institutions, and the theory of popular sovereignty was not considered dangerous. Constitutional lawyers at that time did not claim that the position of the Mikado was sacred or inviolable. The concept of his divinity, as a person, was not fully developed. Professor Tatsukichi Minobe, the leader of the Anglo-American school of legal and political philosophy in

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Japan, who taught in the Tokyo Imperial University from 1900 to 1935, maintained throughout his teaching career the theory that, as an institution, the Mikado was merely a "constitutional organ" or a "fictional organ having certain legal functions." This doctrine, however, met with violent opposition from the militarists, and Professor Minobe was compelled to resign from the House of Peers and retire from teaching. (On October 14 of this year the Associated Press reported from Tokyo that Professor Minobe has not changed his opinion, and that he maintains that the "divinity" of the Mikado is a myth manufactured by the militarists.)

Professor Katshiko Kakehi, the leader of the German school of legal and political philosophy in Japan, was the academic spokesman for the new conception of the Mikado's rôle. In political behavior, he asserted, there are the "small self" and the "great self," the former being the individual, the latter the state. In Japan, he maintained, the Mikado was the state, and as such was sacred and inviolable. The militarists found the doctrine useful. The divinity of the Mikado and the creed of Shintoism were synchronized into one state religion, which became the ideological basis of war and aggression. Increasing poverty and misery among the Japanese people around 1920 brought widespread interest in the doctrines of Communism and Socialism. To check the spread of radicalism, the reactionary Japanese militarists and the royal family started the movement of Nipponism. This was the capstone of the fantastic and terrible state structure. Nipponism held, quite simply, that Japan was the center of the universe, and that the Mikado, as a divinity, was ordained to rule over all.

To sum up: the Meiji "reform" from above altered the Japanese feudal structure almost not at all, but it enabled the feudal elements to control the powerful new industrial forces for their own selfish and medieval ends. Over a period of about forty years, the Japanese had ceased to admire western ideas and institutions and had come to hate them. The result was an insane attempt to conquer the whole of Asia as a first step in the conquest of the world. This aberration was not primarily due to the nature of the Japanese people as a whole, but to the disequilibrium in the Japanese social and economic structure, plus a deliberate inculcation of fantastic and vicious ideas in Japanese minds.

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III

What reforms, then, are needed to reorganize Japanese society and reëducate the Japanese people? First, the present political and legal system in Japan, of which the Mikado is the center, should be thoroughly destroyed. The United Nations have declared that the Japanese people must decide for themselves whether they wish to retain the Emperor. The Mikado as an institution should, on principle, be abolished. But if the Japanese people wish to keep the Mikado, his rôle should in any event be limited to that of nominal head of the Japanese state. He should possess neither political nor military power. The present Japanese constitution should be basically revised, in keeping with the principles of constitutional democracy.

Public opinion pays too much attention to the existence of the Emperor as a person and too little attention to the problem of political and constitutional reform. As far as I know, Hirohito himself was opposed to the Manchurian adventure in 1931. He expressed regrets in person to General Chiang Tso-ping, then Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo. Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, who was present at the audience, requested General Chiang not to make public the imperial expression of regrets, fearing that the militarists might harm even the Emperor.

The special powers of the Japanese Army and the Navy should be destroyed, and the conscription system abolished. Formerly, Japanese living abroad or on business trips in foreign countries were obliged to give secret reports to the Japanese Government on conditions as they found them. Japanese fishermen had to make surveys of naval establishments and harbor installations in the territorial waters of foreign countries. Geisha girls were generally trained as spies. Such ramifications of military power as these must be brought to light and obliterated.

We must be skeptical of individuals who take control of Japanese affairs. Two such individuals deserve special attention now. Newspapers have recently reported that Hirohito might resign and that his brother, Prince Chichibu, might become regent. If this report is true it must be considered a dangerous imperial plot — not because the abdication of the present Mikado is undesirable in itself, but because Prince Chichibu would be no less militaristic than Hirohito, and probably more so. All members of the imperial family received military education. Prince Chichibu

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is a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy, his brother, Prince Takamatsu, is a graduate of the Japanese Naval Academy. Prince Chichibu, in particular, has been closely associated with the young officers, and is himself the leader of the notorious militant Cherry Club. He has been opposed to a policy of peace, and to all proposals to lessen the importance of the Mikado. He was partly responsible for the paradoxical policy of imperialism abroad and socialism at home in the early thirties. His treacherous character is well known to the Chinese; but, surprisingly, many American and British newspapers are ignorant of his record.

It is even more surprising that the United States does not fully understand Prince Fumimaro Konoye. He is a member of the oldest and most aristocratic family; and he is an opportunist and thoroughly unreliable. In his youth he believed in Marxism. Later he became a protégé of Prince Saionji, last of the Genro, and was made the President of the House of Peers. In 1937 he became Premier and coöperated wholeheartedly with the militarists in the invasion of China. Now he presents himself as a liberal and talks about democracy; and even General MacArthur seems to have been deceived by him. The Chinese are of the opinion that Prince Konoye shared the responsibility of war with the militarists and should be prosecuted as a major war criminal.

The economic system in Japan should be entirely revised. General MacArthur has made a sound beginning, in the investigations of individual and corporate finances. The disclosures should be pressed relentlessly, and should include investigation of the property of the royal family, about which neither Cabinet nor Diet could ask a question, the property of the military leaders, and the resources of the financial houses and the large banking institutions. Partial or total confiscation may be justified. Thorough examinations should also be made of Japanese industrial and banking assets in formerly occupied territories, and of gold, silver, art objects and other valuables, which officers of the Army and Navy have looted in occupied territories.

All the heavy industries in Japan, especially armament industries, must be destroyed. But this does not mean, in my opinion, that the Japanese people cannot earn a livelihood. The Chinese would not oppose any Japanese effort to establish reciprocal trade relations. Trade with China would, of course, be subject to Chinese regulations — that is to say, China will never allow the revival of Japanese trade in China if it is used to create spheres

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of political or military influence. (Premier Kijuro Shidehara said recently that the Sino-Japanese War started because the Chinese refused to coöperate with the Japanese economically. The disclaimer of responsibility is nonsense; all students of international affairs know that Japan's economic activities in China were backed by political and military force, and were never purely commercial in nature.)

Economic and social questions are entwined, and social reforms are essential before the Japanese economy can be soundly based. The redistribution of land holdings is a primary necessity. Class distinctions and feudal systems must go, the position of women must be raised — in short, there must be democratic institutions, political and economic. Once the Japanese have abandoned the ambition to expand militarily, the population problem may be more manageable. The Japanese Government has constantly tried to increase the birth rate, at the same time using "over-population" as an excuse for territorial expansion. As long as such policies are followed, the problem of over-population is of course insoluble.

Educational reform is the basic problem. How can the Japanese mind be opened and the doctrine of Nipponism be superseded by the facts and viewpoints of the modern world? As a people the Japanese are not generous or chivalrous; they are rather cruel and cowardly. They may be first-rate imitators; they are not original and creative. Their character is as unstable as the cherry blossom, their national flower, which begins to fade as soon as it blooms. But fortunately they take readily to education. Schooling in Japan has been quite universal, and the percentage of literacy is very high.

This offers a good point of attack. A new liberal educational system should be introduced. Japanese textbooks, movies and radio should be strictly supervised by the Allies, so that the Japanese people may not be misled by the military again. The Japanese people can also be reached through their newspapers, which are widely read; and, as has been suggested above, it would be salutary if some journalists and newspaper proprietors were held partially responsible for the war. I have visited many countries, but have never found one in which newspapers were so effectively controlled by the government as was the Japanese press by the Japanese militarists. In my opinion, the Japanese people have no profound faith in Shintoism as such. Given access to liberal educa-

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tion, uninfluenced by the military, I think they would shake off the spirit of Shinto. Indeed, if given a chance, they may be found surprisingly receptive to the spirit of democracy and peace.

Let us remind ourselves that this will take a long time. But let us also, in fairness, remember that the Japanese people have certain fine qualities. They are patient and hard-working. They have great organizational power. And they are willing to be educated. Properly guided, they can change their ideas and improve their livelihood. But we cannot guide them toward peace and international coöperation by force alone. We must, of course, expose the crimes the Japanese ruling classes have committed, all the atrocities and barbarities — the killing of civilians; burning of cities, selling of opium, the plundering and the raping — so that the Japanese people may learn the real facts about the war. We should demand that Japanese newspapers publish the truth about these crimes. We must prosecute war criminals — I would include Prince Konoye and General Kuniaki Koiso, who are still at large; and some members of the *Zaibatsu* are also top war criminals. Furthermore, we have to expose the crimes of those who have already died — of General Giichi Tanaka, for instance, author of the notorious "Tanaka Memorial," the basic document of the Japanese policy of war and aggression. But in addition to these stern measures, presumably to be taken under military rule, there is important work to be done by educators. I include newspapermen of the United Nations among the teachers, for I strongly believe that Japanese newspapers, which were a powerful instrument of war, could be an effective instrument of peace. And it is my belief that, when the Japanese people know all the facts about the war, they will be ashamed of their nation's actions and will repent.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that in my opinion the task of reforming the Japanese social and political system and reëducating the Japanese people should be undertaken by the principal United Nations jointly. General MacArthur, whose military successes have won universal admiration, should remain as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the chain of command under him should be preserved intact. The principal United Nations, however, should jointly formulate broad policies. I believe that a United Nations Council should be established, that it should have the power of making and executing policy, and that it should sit in Tokyo, not in Washington.

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OUR ARMED FORCES: MERGER OR COÖRDINATION?

By George Fielding Eliot

ON THE threshold of the atomic era, old values seem discounted by the terrifying phantoms of the future. There is a tendency to say that all that is old is bad *because* it is old, that only what is new is useful, that atomic fission changes everything. Yet basic human values, founded on the response of human beings to the hopes and fears of life, have not changed. The policies of nations will be made and carried out by human beings, will succeed or fail because of human powers or human weaknesses, in the atomic era as in the dawn of history. The military policy of the United States cannot be considered apart from these human values, then, as though it presented only mathematical or mechanical problems, to be measured and dealt with solely in terms of numbers, weights and distances.

It is now being urged that to gain the strength and alertness required to meet the terrific exigencies of the future we must merge our service departments into a single Department of the Armed Forces, under a single Secretary assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This idea of unification is, in general, supported by the Army (including the Army Air Forces) and is opposed by the Navy. Several plans have been presented to accomplish unification. The one which currently finds the most favor in Army circles provides for a separate air force, and would have the three Chiefs of Staff of the three services form the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the over-all direction of a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, who would be the principal military adviser and executive of the Secretary. In this plan there would be one Under Secretary, who would be the chief civil assistant to the Secretary, and Assistant Secretaries who would have specialized functions in such matters as scientific research, supply, etc.[1] Variants of this scheme would place Assistant Secretaries at the head of each of the three services.

Underlying these proposals for a merger is the generally accepted idea that unity of command in the field is the key to military success, as this war has proven. Underlying them also is a feeling on the part of many senior officers, especially in the Army,

[1] *Cf. Army and Navy Register*, November 3, 1945, for a full report on this plan.

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that Congress should each year be presented with a combined budget for the armed forces which would give a rounded picture of the needs of national security, on the theory that otherwise appropriations will be pared down in the same lamentable way that happened after other wars, and that once again our military power will fall below the danger point. There is also a very strong demand, which has considerable popular support, for the establishment of a separate air force, to be coequal with the Army and Navy under whatever form of organization may be adopted.

Service opinion tends to divide itself somewhat along the following lines: There can be a single department, as is being proposed, with subdivisions for Army, Navy and Air. The situation can be left as it is, with two departments. Or there can be three separate departments.

The Navy does not like the single-department idea. Its views were cogently expressed as follows by Fleet Admiral Nimitz: "Unification can have one of two effects on the Navy. Either it will retain a sufficient degree of autonomy and prestige to enable it to discharge its mission effectively, in which case it might as well remain a separate service as it now is; or it will not do so, in which case it may sink to a secondary status and the nation may lose the command of the sea which is essential to national security." The Navy is not enthusiastic for the three-department idea because many naval officers do not favor a separate air force; but this feeling would probably be altered if effective steps were taken to see to it that the Navy did not lose control over its own naval aviation.

The Army Air Forces do not like the present two-department arrangement because it subordinates the air arm to the War Department and the Army General Staff, which in the past has been dominated by ground officers. They want equal status with ground and sea forces, and they think the unification plan is the best way to get it. Most Army air officers would, however, welcome a separate air force on whatever terms it might be offered, provided it gave them the freedom of action which they think necessary to develop American air power.

The Army Ground Forces do not like the three-department idea because they fear that under it they would get only the leavings of the other two services at the budgetary dinner table. They think that the unified department gives them their best chance of staying strongly in the picture and assures them a

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status of equality with the others and a voice in over-all policies.

We should not misunderstand this diversity of service opinion and we should not attribute it to mere jealousy. Every officer of every service is anxious that the United States should remain strong and secure, and is firmly convinced that the contribution to be made to that strength and security by his particular service must not be weakened. And every one of them who has had any experience in budgetary matters knows that there is going to be a good deal of paring, and wants to be in a position to defend the service to which he is devoted when the paring begins.

The opponents of a unified department do not oppose the *principle* of unity. They recognize the need for unity of command in the field, but they point out that we had that in this war without unification of the two departments in Washington. They recognize the need for a unified military policy, but they are of the opinion that it can best be achieved through the instrument of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which worked successfully in this war. They recognize the advisability of coördinating the service budgets, and balancing and adjusting the claims and needs of the various services, but they think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do this also, working under the direction of their respective Secretaries — who themselves, under such a coördination plan, would be members of a permanently organized Security Council. They think that no service need fear subordination of its interests as long as it has a Secretary of Cabinet rank, with direct access to the President, and as long as its Chief of Staff has an equal voice with his colleagues and is not in a position of subordination to any other military officer.

These two approaches to the problem may be called the plan for obtaining unity of purpose and effort by merger and the plan for obtaining it by coördination. The essential difference between them is that the former provides for one-man control and decision below the level of the President. Under a system of coördination, such one-man decisions as become necessary have to be made by the President. Were the services merged, they would be made by the Secretary of the Armed Forces, or by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the nature of the particular decision. The advocates of coördination point out that in practice the Joint Chiefs of Staff have almost invariably been able to come to an agreement, and that the few cases where reference to the President has been necessary have involved his deci-

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sion anyway. The advocates of merger say that agreement in the Joint Chiefs of Staff may not come so readily when the pressures of war are removed.

Everyone agrees that: 1, unity of command in the field is essential; 2, to make unified command work there must be a great deal of inter-service training and inter-service education of officers; 3, there must be a unified military policy for the security of this country, and it must be kept in balance with our foreign policy; 4, the future may bring many changes not now easily foreseen, both in military techniques and in political conditions in the world; 5, there must be improved means of keeping the armed services abreast of scientific and technical developments; 6, in principle the services should be coequal in authority and prestige, whether within a unified department or not.

Almost everyone agrees that: 1, there should be a separate Air Force, which should not, however, have jurisdiction over naval aviation or over the aviation which is peculiar to the work of the ground forces; 2, there must be some way of coördinating the budgets of the armed forces. The disagreement is, therefore, not one as to objectives but as to means. It leads back to the basic question: Shall there be one-man over-all control at any level below that of the Commander-in-Chief, the President?

The considered opinion of this writer is that there should not, and that the advocates of coördination are right. This view is based on the experience of other countries which have tried out various forms of coördination and unification, as well as on the experience of the United States.

II

The British have never had unification. Their system is one of coördination, with three coequal services. The government receives its advice on military policy from the Committee of Imperial Defense, of which the Prime Minister is permanent chairman, and which includes the Foreign Secretary, the Secretaries of the Service Departments, and other members of the Cabinet. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is organized as a subcommittee of the C.I.D. The membership of the C.I.D. is kept flexible so that anyone whose advice is necessary may be called to sit with it. It operates through a series of subcommittees, specializing in a vast variety of subjects. This system was brought into being after the South African war, as a result of the deliberations of a

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civilian commission headed by Lord Esher, which was originally concerned only with a proposed reorganization of the War Office. Lord Esher's commission came to the view that the reorganization of the War Office could not be separately considered from the over-all problem of imperial defense, and that there must be some continuing agency which considered defense problems in the light of foreign policy and of domestic needs and resources. The Committee of Imperial Defense was the result.

In time of war, the Committee of Imperial Defense becomes the War Cabinet, with the Chiefs of Staff as its military advisers. Each Chief of Staff, it should be noted, is charged with the dual responsibility of advising his own Secretary on subjects relating to his own service, and — with his colleagues — of giving collective advice to the government on military policy.[2] This system has worked very well, and has given Great Britain a far better system of command and a clearer grasp of military policy than that country had previously enjoyed. Even cursory comparison of the manner in which the British conducted the two wars of this century with the shocking conditions of the Crimean and South African wars makes this abundantly clear. The element of one-man decision in over-all policy questions does not exist except as such decisions may be made by the Prime Minister.

It should be pointed out, however, that there were serious British military failures in World War I, which were attributable not to faulty military policy but to failures in command. It was lack of unity of command in the field, rather than faulty planning in London, which resulted, for example, in the Dardanelles catastrophe. The same lack on the inter-Allied level resulted in bloody setbacks on the western front, and not until this fault was corrected did the Allies begin to win victories there. In World War II, the British were still reluctant fully to implement the principle of unity of command in the field, and some of their initial difficulties in the Middle East may be traced to this.

In Germany, unification has been tried twice: once briefly and unimportantly under the Weimar Republic, and once by the device of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (*Oberkommando Wehrmacht*) under Hitler, from 1938 to 1945. The High Command was almost completely dominated by the army generals. The results were that though important victories on land were gained,

[2] *Cf.* Sir H. L. Ismay's "The Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May 1939.

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Nazi Germany failed at sea and failed in the development of strategic air power. It may be said that this proves little because Germany failed at sea in the last war, when there was no unified command and when the Navy, like the Army, was directly responsible to the Emperor. But that is merely to point out that neither unified nor divided administration could overcome the basic defect of the German military policy — the complete and traditional domination of the Army. What the German experience does suggest is that it is dangerous for one service to attain dominance over the others, and dangerous to permit a form of organization where that may be possible.

Prior to and during World War I, separation of the French Army and Navy was complete, whether under the Bourbons, the Empires or the Republics. From 1920 onward, however, the history of French policy in this respect is one of confusion. So many different attempts were made at unification and coördination that it is useless to recite them in detail. For the most part they centered around the struggle for control of the air force, but underlying them was the determination of the General Staff of the Army to get control of the whole defense system. Fundamental changes were made in 1920, 1928, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1936 and 1938. The lesson here relates not so much to the question of unification *vs.* coördination as to the perils of inter-service rivalries when not firmly checked by the civil power. In the end, the Army had its way. In 1936 the post of Minister of National Defense was established and was assumed by M. Daladier, who also remained Minister of War. In 1938 the post of Chief of Staff of National Defense was created, and this went to General Gamelin, who also retained his place as Chief of Staff of the Army. The results are written across the most disastrous page of French military history. The Army staff was, traditionally, concerned chiefly with the defense of the continental frontiers of metropolitan France. There was no air force worth speaking of, and the Navy was hardly consulted as to policy. Had naval and air officers had coequal status in the making of over-all plans, there would surely have been some arrangement to fall back on the African empire in case of disaster at home. But the Army's dominant position was such that when it failed everything was regarded as lost. As to the effect of all this on the conduct of war, it is only necessary to compare the quality of French military leadership in World War I with that of World War II.

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The U.S.S.R., like the United States, had a single Department of War during the earlier years of its existence, but, again like the United States, a separate Navy Department was created as soon as the Navy became really important. This was in 1937. The U.S.S.R. has never had a separate air force — probably because the development of strategic air power has never been seriously attempted. The sole function of the airplane in Soviet military thought is to give direct tactical support to the ground forces. Despite the comparatively new Navy Department, there is no question that in Russia, as in Germany and France, the Army has been the dominant service. This is traditional, and probably inescapable in view of geographical considerations. But it does not help naval development. Both under the Tsars in World War I and under the Soviets in World War II, the Russian Navy was employed merely as an auxiliary force on the seaward flanks of the Army. The U.S.S.R. has a Supreme Council for Defense which includes the Commander-in-Chief, the People's Commissar for Defense, the People's Commissar for the Navy, the commanding general of the Army Air Force and others. The first two positions named are held by Stalin.

The Japanese have always had separate Ministries for Army and Navy. However, as the Japanese constitution provides that the Minister of War must always be a general and the Minister of the Navy an admiral, and that both these ministers and the chiefs of staff have direct access to the Emperor without going through the Prime Minister, there is little in Japanese practice which can afford us any useful lessons — save the example of the vital need of preserving civilian control of the armed services under all conditions. Japan has never had a separate air force.

The experience of Canada with a single Minister of National Defense is of considerable interest. In 1923 the three existing Departments (the Department of Militia and Defense, the Department of the Naval Service, and the Air Board) were consolidated into a single Department of National Defense. The Minister was to receive military advice from the three Chiefs of Staff, acting in coördination. No super-Chief of Staff was created. The same principle of individual and collective responsibility for the Chiefs of Staff was adopted as is in force in Great Britain. The structure of command was maintained intact in each branch. The governing reason behind this change was economy, on the assumption that Canada could not afford three departments. But

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when war came, it was found necessary to reëstablish the old system. A Minister of National Defense for Air was appointed in May 1940, and a Minister of National Defense for the Naval Services two months later, "in order to give greater scope for independent action in the three branches of the armed forces."

Finally, it should be observed that every major foreign country has created, whatever the organization of its armed forces, some administrative machinery for coördinating its military and foreign policies. In some cases — notably in Germany and Italy — this machinery has largely depended, at least in recent years, on the position of an individual and his relationships to the several departments concerned. In other cases it depended on a formally constituted committee or council.

III

What conclusions are to be drawn from this survey of foreign experience? First, it is clear that each service — army, navy, air — develops most successfully under its own autonomous organization. Where the army became dominant — as in Germany, France and Russia — the navy became secondary and accomplished little or nothing. Nor did any of these Powers create a real strategic air force. Second, some form of coördination between the services is essential, and must be such as to preserve the autonomy of the services while insuring civil control; and it must provide for that joint training and education which is essential to coöperation and to unity of command in the field. Third, military and foreign policy must be kept in balance.

Our own experience in this war seems to confirm these conclusions. When the war began, we had (as we still have) two service departments and two armed services. The Navy had its own naval aviation, over which it had complete control. The bulk of our air power was in the Army Air Forces, which had a semi-autonomous position within the structure of the War Department and the Army. There were two provisions for coördination: (1) There was an unofficial arrangement called the War Council, by which the Secretaries of State, War and Navy consulted at fairly regular intervals, and met with the President, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations at irregular times when the President called them together. The Commanding General of the Army Air Forces also attended these latter meet-

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ings on some occasions. (2) There was a Joint Board, composed of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and some subordinate officers (including air officers) of each department. This board was supposed to compose inter-service differences. It was assisted by a Joint Planning Committee, which was concerned chiefly with joint war plans.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt brought into existence the Joint Chiefs of Staff, committing to them the heavy responsibility of acting, in effect, as the United States High Command for the military conduct of the war. In addition to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also included the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces and the Chief of Staff to the President, the latter a new appointment. Their joint authority was entirely derived from the war powers of the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as such, had no legal standing; the office was not the creature of any statute, but simply the temporary decision of the executive. In fact, it started to function without even an executive order in writing. Like Topsy, it was not born, it just "growed."

Later, when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill decided to integrate the war effort and resources of the United States and the British Commonwealth, the Combined Chiefs of Staff came into being. The American and British Joint Chiefs of Staff created a mechanism through which they worked together, with delegates of the British Joint Chiefs permanently stationed in Washington. The success with which this system functioned has been a constant source of astonishment to the orthodox mind. Napoleon's scornful comment on the Aulic Council — "You cannot make successful war with a committee" — has been accepted as axiomatic for more than a century. Now war has been successfully made by a committee, and an inter-allied committee at that, with its two main parts separated by 3,000 miles of ocean. The committee system of high command has decisively defeated two one-man control systems, concentrating first against one and then against the other.

The total and global wars of today make demands on knowledge and ability that are just too vast for one-man decisions. It follows, as the night the day, that the task of maintaining the security of this nation against the recurrence of total and global war is likewise too vast in its demands on knowledge and ability. No one man can have enough experience, specialized knowledge

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and wisdom to warrant building our military establishment on the basis of his single judgment.

This is not to say, of course, that no one man can be qualified to be President of the United States. In a sense, of course, that too could be argued: if you were to write down the qualifications and experience which the ideal President should have, they would certainly be beyond anything that could be found in any individual. Under our system of government, we take the best we can get, or the best that the political lottery brings to the surface for our choice. But we surround the executive power with a system of constitutional checks and balances, as precautions against the inevitable uncertainties involved in entrusting any human being with the vast powers of the Presidency. We do not extend the one-man idea any farther than we have to, and where we must use it we guard it carefully.

We should be particularly careful not to extend it too far in matters concerning the military services. The principle of subordination of the military to the civil power is implicit in all our military legislation. That is why we have civilian Secretaries as the immediate superiors of our highest military officers. It is only through these Secretaries that our Chiefs of Staff should normally have contact with the President. The instrument of Joint Chiefs of Staff has proven its value. If it is to be invested by statute with certain collective responsibilities, in addition to the individual responsibilities which are laid upon each Chief of Staff regarding his own service, it is clear that its relation to the President should be through a civilian medium. Each Chief of Staff stands in a well-determined relation to his own Secretary. Obviously the civilian authority to which the Joint Chiefs are collectively responsible must be, so to speak, Joint Secretaries. Thus, unless there is to be only one Secretary, the formal organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the establishment of their collective responsibility immediately makes necessary the corresponding organization of the Secretaries as an established body immediately advisory to the President.

Since it is essential that military and foreign policy be kept in constant balance, it seems inevitable that the Secretary of State should be associated with the service Secretaries in this advisory body. From such a line of reasoning have evolved various suggestions — including that made recently by Ferdinand Eberstadt in his report to Secretary Forrestal — for the creation of a National

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Security Council, to consist of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, plus a Secretary of Air (if we are to have a separate air force). The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be immediately subordinate to this Council, in their collective capacity.

The President himself should act as Chairman of this Council. He should be present at its meetings as often as possible. In his absence, the Vice-President (when we have one) should preside, for it is vital to our security that the Vice-President should at all times be fully informed on matters of foreign and military policy. It may be said that the Secretaries themselves would not have the time to attend meetings of the Council. But the work of the Council would surely be the most important of their duties. They are at present sadly overburdened men, for there has as yet been little realization of the need to free them from administrative detail so as to enable them to give thought to the broad decisions of policy. This can be remedied by making the Under Secretary in each department a true executive officer, and transferring to him much of the burden of detail which now rests upon the Secretary. In some cases this will require statutory changes; thus in the War Department, the Under Secretary now has certain statutory duties in relation to supply and procurement which should be transferred to an Assistant Secretary in order to free the Under Secretary for executive functions.

The central necessity is that the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be established by law as permanent, functioning agencies of government with clearly defined responsibilities. They should be organized for that purpose, and provided with the necessary machinery to do their work. They should meet daily, or at least three times a week. Their collective responsibility as a body should be closely linked with their individual responsibilities in their respective offices; and their collective responsibility should lie wholly in the advisory and policy-making fields and should not extend to administration and execution of policy.

Three agencies are clearly needed to enable the National Security Council to function effectively: 1, a secretariat; 2, a central intelligence agency; 3, a central research and development agency. The secretariat is essential to give continuity to the Council's work. The executive secretary should be selected with great care, and should be considered a permanent official, despite changes in administrations. In addition to its obvious duties, the

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secretariat should be charged with maintaining close touch with the various committees of Congress which are interested in the work of the Council. Liaison officers of the secretariat should be detained to work with these Committees and to circulate to them the memoranda and other papers necessary to keep them currently in touch with all aspects of policy. The secretariat should also have a well-organized public relations division. Another of its duties would be to work closely with the Bureau of the Budget in coördinating the three service budgets.

The Council's decisions must be based on the most accurate information which can be obtained; its members must not only be closely in touch with activities of other departments of the government, but must also know what is going on in foreign countries. For this purpose, a central intelligence agency is required. During the war, such an agency was created — the Office of Strategic Services — which was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The research and analysis branches of this organization have now been transferred to the State Department, at least temporarily. But it seems almost axiomatic that no one department should have charge of the sources of information on which the policy of all departments is based; inevitably there would be a tendency to color or withhold information which did not suit the preconceptions of the department concerned. If policy is formulated by consultation and coördination among several departments, then each should have equal access to essential information, and the same information should reach the President undiluted by departmental idiosyncrasies. The central intelligence agency, under the proposed system, should be directly subordinate to the National Security Council. The specialized intelligence activities conducted by each department within its proper sphere of interest should of course be continued; the results should be made available to the central intelligence agency, to be correlated and evaluated.

Nothing can be more important in this world of atomic energy and rockets than the promotion of scientific research and development, closely geared to the agencies responsible for national security. To fall behind in this respect, even for a day, might be disastrous. It is clear that each department concerned with the national security must carry on its specialized research. No restrictions can be placed on the air force, for example, in working out means by which this country can be protected against

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attacks through the stratosphere. But there must be some coordinating authority which can prevent duplication of effort and waste of time, and which can see that progress made by one service becomes automatically available to the others. Moreover, progress by civilian research agencies must promptly become available to the armed forces. A central research and development agency under the immediate authority of the National Security Council seems a good means of accomplishing these ends. Its responsibilities would have to be established by law.

Considerations of space prevent discussion of the relationships between the National Security Council and the domestic departments of the government, or with the agencies having to do with industrial mobilization. This is nevertheless a vital part of the picture. The Eberstadt report suggests a National Security Resources Board, consisting of various Cabinet members and heads of agencies under an appointed chairman who would also be a member of the National Security Council. The direct link between this body and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for coördinated planning, would be a Military Munitions Board composed of Under or Assistant Secretaries from each service department.

IV

The approach outlined above offers the following advantages: 1, organized interlocking of military and foreign policy; 2, maintenance of the principle of coequal military services; 3, policy decisions derived from the coördinated advice of all who are properly concerned with them, rather than from the decisions of one individual; 4, preservation of the principle of the subordination of the military to the civil power; 5, full opportunity for each Secretary and each Chief of Staff to make his opinion heard, and full freedom of action in carrying out policies after they have been agreed upon; 6, every department concerned knowing at all times what the over-all policy is, rather than (as used to be the case) proceeding on its own assumption as to policy — the assumptions all too frequently varying.

Even if experience proves that the advocates of merger are right, nothing can be lost by trying coördination first. For the clearly defined policy-making agency (which we have here called the National Security Council) is needed whatever way our armed forces may be organized. Since that is the case, it may be unwise to force unification upon the Navy now, in the present

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atmosphere of bitter controversy; and it would be equally unwise to allow the present controversy to continue. The method of co-ordination could be tried out for a stated period, say two, three or perhaps five years. Its advocates would have their chance to prove their case, and if they failed to do so, then unification would plainly be in order.

To put final decisions in the hands of one man seems an easy way out of all difficulties involving differences of opinion. It has been said that the easy way in business is monopoly; in politics, dictatorship; in international affairs, imperialism. But these are ways which are foreign to our fundamental conceptions of human relationships; we have struggled against them at home and abroad. One responsible writer has argued, for example, that "Even within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, there is no central authority below the President to *compel* compromise or agreement if the Army and Navy happen to have a major difference of opinion. In wartime, when the nation was fighting for its existence, the services were under heavy obligation to compose their differences. In peacetime no such compulsion exists." But this overlooks the fact that the crucial question is the *nature* of the responsibility laid upon each Chief of Staff by law, and upon each Secretary. An officer whose mandate from the people, expressed in the law defining the duties of his office, extends only to his service, will of course fight for that service tooth and nail. But if his mandate charges him with individual responsibility for his own service, but also with a share in a collective responsibility for advising on questions of broad military policy, he is under "a heavy obligation to compose differences" which he cannot ignore, and which the sense of duty which traditionally inspires our senior officers will prevent him from ignoring.

Former Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, testifying in favor of unification, told a Congressional committee: "I strongly favor a policy that will end debate, division and dispersion." But it is possible to agree that dispersion of effort must be ended, without agreeing that debate and division must be ended. There will always be divisions of opinion, and those divisions, at the level of Chiefs of Staff and Cabinet officers, should and must be debated — and debated very carefully, even at great length, if need be. The power to compel agreement and to end debate can be more dangerous than exhaustive discussion, for there is always the danger that the power may be exercised arbitrarily, or on

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partisan considerations. The principle involved in making long-range policy decisions is entirely different from that involved in the decisions of a commander in the field. Deliberation becomes more valuable and more necessary, the farther one rises toward the levels at which policy is formulated. During the war, for example, sometimes 18 months to two years elapsed between the making of broad strategic decisions by the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff and their execution against the enemy. The peacetime decisions on the principles of our military policy need deliberation rather than snap judgment. There is little in common between such decisions and the military commands which must be given at the approach of danger. It is within the adopted policies themselves that we must look for the machinery and devices necessary to meet such contingencies.

The principle of unity of command must, of course, be implemented to the fullest degree. In time of peace, we may adopt various methods to strengthen this principle: 1, by joint training programs, decided upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 2, by exchange of officers among the service schools of each service, with special reference to the higher levels of military education; 3, by appointing a single commander to be responsible for every outlying base; 4, by continuing and expanding the work of the Army and Navy Staff College, which might be called the Armed Services Staff College; 5, by taking every opportunity to have officers of one service spend some time with one of the other services; 6, by impressing upon all persons in the military services, at every phase of their training, the interdependence of the three services and the fact that modern war cannot be successfully waged except by integrated action by land, sea and air.

One last word about the unseeable future. It is, of course, entirely possible that the whole nature of war as we know it may be drastically altered within our own lifetimes. There is neither space nor need to go into conjecture here. But these possibilities, which affect also our hope of preventing war, only reëmphasize the need for maintaining a flexible military policy and for finding a security machinery which can be adapted to meet any future exigency. It is submitted that the consultative system will be more flexible and adaptable than a system of centralized control, because it will be less dependent on individual prejudices and preconceptions and less vulnerable to the fixed idea of a single individual.

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CANADA'S NEW STATURE

By Lionel Gelber

IN THAT momentous redistribution of world power now taking place, Canada must be classed with those nations which have gained rather than lost in stature. Her increased importance exemplifies the shift toward a system of international affairs founded on centers of authority removed from western and central Europe. For Canada has undergone a far-reaching diplomatic revolution. In some respects this is admitted and proclaimed by her leaders; in other respects it is concealed. Canada is one of the few countries among the United Nations in which the prewar helmsmen of the ship of state are still at their posts. They are in fact steering a new course, but since they are loath to confess that their seamanship ever was at fault, they prefer to describe it merely as accelerated progress along the old one. They can put it in such terms because external affairs are seldom major issues in Canadian politics and neither politicians nor officials have been judged in Canada, as elsewhere among the democracies, on their prewar records.

But the evidence of Canada's new position in the world is unmistakable. When lend-lease is suspended, General de Gaulle, Premier T. V. Soong and Lord Keynes do not fail to include Ottawa in their North American quest; the headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization are established in Montreal; the first conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations meets in Canada under a Canadian chairman; Canada is the largest contributor of supplies and third largest contributor of money to UNRRA; and when the atom is split she emerges as a partner with the United States and the United Kingdom in that historic enterprise. All these are signs of a break with a past characterized between the wars by her futile boast at Geneva that Canadians lived "in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials." They are in striking contrast with the steady attempt of her spokesmen to pull rather than sharpen the teeth of the Covenant; with the ambiguities of their policy over the rape of Manchuria; with the repudiation of their own Canadian representative when he proposed oil sanctions against Italy in 1935; with the soothing language employed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, in face of the plain

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facts and wiser counsels after his visit to Hitler in 1937; with the hope of isolation through appeasement which Ottawa cherished during the era of Munich.

September 10, 1939, the day Canada declared war on Germany, was the turning-point. Acting formally a week later than the United Kingdom (just as she acted before either Britain or the United States after Pearl Harbor) she did so to show that she entered the conflict of her own accord. But she waited no longer. Gone were the fine-spun theories of those who might have played into the hands of the enemy with their parochial concept of Canada as a nation owing no duty to herself or others outside North America. The people of Canada, standing in 1939 where they stood in 1914, took command. And then after Dunkirk from 1940 to 1941 when, against the German onslaught, the nations of the British Commonwealth held the fort almost alone, Canada was literally one of Britain's principal allies. How Canada and the rest sustained Churchill's Britain at that juncture was overshadowed subsequently by the attack on Russia and the United States. But the presence before and after Dunkirk of Canadian troops in the United Kingdom and the quick shipment from Canada of men, arms and foodstuffs helped steel the British to resist and reinforced, at its supreme crisis, the cause of humanity. For when Britain most needed allies, if freedom were to survive, Canada, as an ally of Britain, was second to none.

While mobilizing raw material and industrial resources on a huge scale, Canada raised and equipped in large numbers armed forces of her own. Not even another quarrel between English-speaking and French-speaking elements over conscription could substantially hamper a maximum effort. Out of a population of less than 12,000,000 people, 1,031,000 were enrolled in one or other of the three Services. The main protector of the North Atlantic convoy route, Canada became third among the United Nations in naval power. Every man in the Royal Canadian Air Force, in the Royal Canadian Navy and, before December 1944, in the Canadian Army overseas, was a volunteer. The contribution of Canada toward the conquest of Italy and northwestern Europe was a notable one. She was fourth in air power herself and a host of her sons also served with the Royal Air Force. From the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, established on Canadian soil and run mostly by Canadians, flowed a stream of graduates to her own and other air forces. At the crucial, early phase

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of the war Canada, in the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, was the airdrome of democracy.

Meanwhile, from a semi-agricultural country devoted to primary raw material industries she converted herself almost overnight into an arsenal of manufactured war supplies. At El Alamein it was the timely arrival of mechanized transport from Canada which enabled Montgomery and the British Eighth Army to carry the day. Among the top-flight Anglo-American coördinating agencies, Canada is a member of the Combined Production, Raw Materials and Food Boards. The world's second greatest exporter during the war, she now may see her exports halved. But having once exhibited her productive capacity, she will never be content to sink back to prewar levels.

The export of her war supplies was financed in a number of ways. A decade ago Canadians would have scoffed if told that they could transfer a billion dollars' worth of goods as an outright gift to another country. In 1942, when the United Kingdom's ability to pay had fallen behind her need for supplies, that was done. Canada did more. On May 20, 1943, her Mutual Aid Act was passed. Under it, during the next two years, 2.360 billion dollars of further supplies were allocated on grounds of strategic need to Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, Australia, New Zealand and India, while 1.892 billion dollars in other kinds of financial accommodation were also provided. To Britain alone Canada furnished per capita as much as the American program gave everyone. Mutual Aid being her own variation of lend-lease, Canada could have received but did not ask for reciprocal assistance; she herself, dispensing rather than consuming help of that sort, drew no lend-lease at all from the United States. She paid for her own American imports by the manufacture of war material and equipment — exports to the United States amounting in 1944 to 1.444 billion dollars, imports from the United States amounting to 1.447 billion dollars. And after lend-lease came to a halt, Canada was the only Power besides the United States which could cushion some of the shock by means of fresh arrangements with Britain and others.

To what does all this add up? On the stage of world affairs, Canada since 1939 has been playing a very much bigger part. From the period of Dunkirk, when Canadian forces and supplies helped Britain to weather the worst of the German storm, it was plain that Canada's rôle was no longer that of a minor

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Power; under the impact of war she had risen to a new stature. Her relatively small population and lack of colonial possessions prevent her from being a major or super Power. But her natural wealth, the capacity of her people, the strength she has exerted and the potentialities she has displayed show that she is not a minor one. Henceforth in world politics she must figure as a Middle Power.

Equally clear, before the start of the Moscow-Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam sequence, was the fact that while the initiative in the realm of political security must be that of the Great Powers, Canada would almost be one of them when Europe had to be fed and rehabilitated, world trade revived and better standards of life furthered everywhere. In the committees that plan the economic future of mankind she must occupy a seat as near the top as her economic weight in each case decrees. The Government of Canada adopted this view of functional representation in July 1943, and took over the general Middle Power idea on the eve of the San Francisco Conference. And, having accepted the Charter of the United Nations more wholeheartedly than she subscribed to the Covenant of the League, Canada is more prepared to live up to it.

II

Her spokesmen have had to act upon the full logic of her own altered situation in a changing world. But they less willingly concede what their new policies also imply in terms of the facts of power everywhere else. Since Versailles all peoples have learned, if we have learned anything, that between national sovereignties the 1919 premise of formal equality contains within itself the seeds of its own dissolution: that it may pass from paralysis to anarchy and from anarchy to subjugation by those totalitarian régimes which deny any sort of equality, individual or national, to others. For right without might proved impotent. Peace by power is therefore being tried. And it is the paradox of peace by power that while under it there is technical inequality in the direction of international affairs, it offers more actual equality for large and small alike in safety and survival, through a less abstract approach to security. What the Middle Power idea does, in brief, is to adopt the conclusions of realism and extend them. Since major Powers are differentiated by their greater functions from the rest, the Middle Powers ask that they be

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distinguished from the lesser ones by the same criteria. A voice in decisions should correspond with strength in enforcement. If responsibility must lie where power dwells, a useful synthesis of power and responsibility ought to be achieved at an intermediate level of international activity.

That, at all events, was the meaning of the debate at the San Francisco Conference over the allotment in the United Nations Organization of the rotating nonpermanent seats on the Security Council. As between small and Middle Powers, the latter felt that they should have preferential treatment. This was quite apart from the dispute over the Great Power veto, against which Dr. Evatt of Australia led the attack, or over the question of amending the Charter in which the compromise adopted owed much to Canadian efforts. Canada won her point. Article 23 which enumerates the five permanent members of the Security Council also grants special representation to the Middle Powers: "The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be nonpermanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution." The stipulation is a noteworthy one.

But what if Canada were not on the Security Council when it was reaching an enforcement decision which would involve her considerable manpower and her even more considerable industrial and natural resources? Backed in particular by the Netherlands, Canada also elicited on this "no vote, no fight" issue some right to a prior hearing. "When the Security Council has decided to use force," states Article 44, "it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces . . . invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces." That is to say, an unrepresented member may discuss at the Council table how its forces are to be used; but it may not refuse their use. As it happens, however, a Middle Power has more chance under Article 23 than a small Power of being a nonpermanent Member of the Security Council with a full vote on all matters when any such contingency occurs. The validity of Canada's Middle Power concept is thus recognized; at the same time the efficient operation of

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the Security Council under Great Power control is preserved.

The war could not be won nor can the peace be enforced without the lead of the Great Powers. But Canada contributed importantly to the military victory, and she has uttered a protest against being deprived of a commensurate share in the designing of a new world settlement which she will have to help defend. Having played her part in the subjugation of Italy, she reminded the Council of Foreign Ministers when it met in London that she would have views to express on the draft treaty as a whole. And later during September 1945, the Canadian Prime Minister told Parliament at Ottawa that in the great decisions in the general peacemaking Canada should have "effective participation." This claim, a plea for reason and justice, presupposes a world in which the rivalries of Great Powers, and the struggle for power itself, can be modified. In the hierarchy of power a Middle Power may manage to extort more privileges than small Powers; within it, nevertheless, there are handicaps under which it, too, may labor — disabilities which might recede but may not vanish short of a metamorphosis in the very nature of politics, national as well as international, in the spirit of man himself.[1] For the structure of peace, realism argues, depends on the security of the Great Powers; the security of the Great Powers, universalism retorts, depends on the structure of peace. And if between these extremes there is some middle ground, none may be better suited to find it than a Middle Power.

III

What will be the effect of Canada's new stature on her relations with Britain? At the time of Confederation (1867) it was suggested that she be named not the Dominion but the Kingdom of Canada. That title would help to banish confusion now. In loyalty to the Crown, in organic ties, in mode of government, as an equal partner of the British Commonwealth of Nations, she remains a Dominion. But she is more than that. For a Dominion is regarded as a comparatively minor Power with a modest task to perform. Canada's task in recent years has been far from modest. In 1931 the Statute of Westminster was drawn up to put Britain and the Dominions on the same level in law. But before its enactment a celebrated Report of the 1926 Imperial Confer-

[1] *Cf.* Lionel M. Gelber, "Peace by Power." New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, p. 10, 67–69, 143.

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ence announced that, while they were equal in status, they were not universally equal in function. In other words, despite their legal equality, Britain and the Dominions could not pretend to operate on the same plane in general world politics. And what the 1939 war did in Canada's case was to narrow the functional gap between her and Britain; it brought Canada forward as a champion in her own right of the liberties of mankind.

Yet her support of a more centralized direction of Commonwealth policies, as urged at intervals for half a century, has been deemed impracticable. In 1945 the San Francisco Conference again indicated that, while consultation between Commonwealth Governments is eminently proper, the likelihood that they will speak on all international affairs with "a single voice" becomes more rather than less remote. Canada submitted no views of her own when the Council of Foreign Ministers first discussed the question of Trieste and the Italo-Jugoslav boundaries, but other Commonwealth countries were in disagreement. Yet it is significant that at the end of September 1945, when alarm deepened at arbitrary proceedings in the London Council, they all stood together in demanding that they be allowed to present their ideas at preliminary rather than concluding stages in the peacemaking. On details, and as regional interests require, each Commonwealth country may go its own way; on broad principles it is quite as natural for them to gravitate toward the same outlook. Certainly the increased functions of Canada in world politics are those not only of a Middle Power but of a Britannic Power of middle rank. And in a body as flexible as the British Commonwealth, just as current policies need not be unanimous, there is no reason why the relative positions of the partners must be stationary. For while the senior partner, Britain, may not be as powerful economically as she once was, a junior one such as Canada may be less junior than formerly. Their free association persists.

In advocating a Middle Power classification, Canada has encountered sympathy inside and outside the Commonwealth. Dr. Evatt of Australia, whose resistance to Big Five domination serves small as well as intermediate countries, went to San Francisco with a similar concept; Field Marshal Smuts of South Africa expressed understanding of Canada's attitude at the prior Commonwealth meeting in London. And that the others concur may signalize the resumption of a creative process. In hammering out Commonwealth relationships, Canada has been the chief modern

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innovator. Over the years, through pressure mainly from her, self-governing Commonwealth members attained independent control of their external as well as their internal affairs: a blend of liberty with unity under a common allegiance which is the central feature of the Commonwealth. For though the Middle Power idea reflects added vigor overseas, it entails no impairment of Commonwealth bonds. And while it constitutes an affirmation of growing national power, yet that affirmation is made by Canada within the historic framework of the larger British grouping to which she belongs and in accordance with the latest, the most fundamental, of world trends.

The British Commonwealth, then, contains not one but a number of Powers varying in size and rank. And if within the Big Three the United Kingdom is weaker than the others, the Commonwealth partnership in which she is first among equals should strengthen her hand. As a power factor in diplomacy, this is reinsurance that should not be minimized. Britain as a Great Power did much to sustain the civilization of the west as Canada visualized her stake in it — the world order for which she twice fought. And if the maintenance of Britain as a Great Power was a national interest of Canada's to be vindicated in war, it is one she would not wish to have cast heedlessly aside in the making of peace.

IV

What about her relations with the United States? Canada's diplomatic transformation is bound to be affected by the even more profound one which her great neighbor has experienced. After 1919 a partially isolationist Canada was often said at Geneva to be an unacknowledged mouthpiece of the United States; the danger of cross-purposes between herself and the United States while the latter was withdrawn from world affairs and the other English-speaking peoples were not had to be avoided. All that has changed. Washington today is more likely to stride ahead than lag behind. And as the Americanizing influence of the radio, movies, mass-circulation journals, best-seller books and postwar travel are more potent in Canada than ever, the Canadian public, if it looks on world affairs more and more through American spectacles, will do so within a new and broader American perspective.

As a partner of the British Commonwealth and as a close neigh-

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bor of the United States, Canada may on occasions still mediate between branches, Pacific or Atlantic, of the English-speaking peoples. Her insistence at the Imperial Conference of 1921 that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be dropped is probably but the best-known instance of a cardinal maxim of her foreign policy. Yet before she could take that line she had to iron out serious differences with the United States. As a matter of fact it was when Britain yielded to Theodore Roosevelt over the Alaskan boundary, so as to preserve this century's nascent Anglo-American friendship, that Canadians, in resolving on control of their own foreign relations, went far to formulate a contemporary principle of the Commonwealth.[2] Politically, their connection with the British Commonwealth underpins their national independence against an incessant economic and cultural pressure from the south. Diplomatically, their capacity as a Middle Power is enhanced by being more at home with Americans and British than either of them are with each other. But London and Washington do not need Ottawa to keep them in constant touch. Within their triune coöperation Canada acts less as an honest broker and more, because of her intrinsic importance, as a principal.

A dramatic illustration of that was furnished by the advent of the atomic bomb. The uranium employed to make the bomb came from the Arctic pitchblende deposits of Canada's Great Bear Lake; some of her scientists worked on this problem as on the radio bomb; she shared much of the fateful secret with the United States and Britain; together with them she first discussed its future disposition. Would others covet the territory where the precious ore is mined? The only threat uttered was that of an irresponsible American newspaper. A more authentic reflection of American policy with its settled, collaborative bent is the proposed development of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence seaway and hydroelectric scheme. Following Dunkirk, the United States and Canada established a Permanent Joint Board of Defense. To exploit the economic resources of the entire far northern region they also have a Canadian-American Planning Project. Canada's traditional military liaison with Britain has thus evolved into a strategy which can either be dual or triple, and to top it off there is the joint technique of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[2] *Cf.* Lionel M. Gelber, "The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship." New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 162–66.

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Before the annihilating efficacy of rocket projectiles or of a single atomic bomb was revealed, those who predicted a clash between Russia and the United States scanned their globes and prophesied that the air battles of the future would rage in Canadian skies. But if the politics of Bedlam are dispelled and peace reigns as the ultimate realism, Canada's central position should bring her profit rather than loss. In a saner, more harmonious order she could be at the heart of the world's airways. Across her northland run the Great Circle air routes (the northwest route to Alaska and beyond, as well as the course over the North Atlantic to Britain), the shortest that exist from the United States to Europe and Asia. Direct services from Europe to Asia and Asia to Europe may also cut across her skies; and her own civil aviation will expand by leaps and bounds. Canada has become a Middle Power in the economic realm even more than in the diplomatic sphere. But it is geography which has capped the process — which, in the age of air transport, puts Canada at the air center of global communications between the leading Powers of Europe, America and Asia.

Does Canada also have a special interest in Latin America? At the inter-American meeting in the spring of 1945, Chile proposed that Canada be invited to join the Pan American Union. This step would require an amendment to its constitution so that states other than republics might belong. But the United States Government has always been diffident about Canada's entry into the Union.

Some Canadians, English-speaking as well as French-speaking, would like Canada to join. But what advantage could she derive from it? Does Canada wish to be committed by a regional pact, besides the universal San Francisco Charter, to the defense of Latin American Republics or have them thus committed to her defense? Until Pearl Harbor they stood aloof from the struggle in which Canada had risked her national existence; as a safeguard of general peace or as a factor in her own security the value of this particular combination has yet to be demonstrated.

There would, moreover, be a touch of irony in Canada's entry into the Pan American Union if she adhered thereby to a regional organization which now operates through a permanent secretariat — that is, through a fixed, centralized mechanism of consultation such as Canada herself has done most to oppose in intra-Commonwealth relations. Nor should she join the Pan

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American Union if she is to be brought in as a tacit makeweight for the others against the American colossus of the north. To be a champion of Latin Americans in summer storms of no concern to her might do harm to a vital Canadian interest — her friendship with the United States. On the other hand, she could not, as a matter of pride, permit herself to be little more within the Pan American Union than Washington's unresisting rubber-stamp. Independence in foreign policy is not upheld by gratuitously mortgaging it. With Middle Power Canada enjoying a higher rank and exercising a new breadth of movement in world politics as a whole, it would be odd if she were to revolve unnecessarily within an orbit determined either by the United States or by the nations of the southern hemisphere.

It is permissible to wonder whether, among the more ardent Canadian proponents of the Pan American Union, there are not some who are fleeing from their now discredited prewar isolationism to a postwar, hemispheric semi-isolationism. Even in mileage Canada is nearer to Europe than to South America. So remote a mass of land — unless the poorest geopolitics were to obscure the richest history — can never match that to which the sea and air give better access. From the Anglo-Russian or Franco-Russian alliances, for whose regional aims she has twice sacrificed so much, Canada abstains; under what compulsion of major policy, simple geography or common ideas should she discriminate regionally in favor of a Pan American security pact? In the domain of culture, investment and trade, Canada has a growing interest in Latin America. She has no special interest there which she does not or will not have elsewhere. Her relationship with Latin America is wholly unlike her partnership in the British Commonwealth and her entente with the United States.

V

But be that as it may, the Canadian people, after so rapid an advance abroad, must now accustom themselves to a less casual treatment of external affairs in their public life at home. Until of late English-speaking Canada has been a curiously provincial society; much of the prewar isolationism manifested by its statesmen, officials and professors was merely their own provincial mentality projected on a larger world stage. French-speaking Canada, many of whose sons were wont to admire the political theories of Mussolini, Salazar, Franco and Pétain, has had a

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worse insularity to overcome. As limitations such as these have diminished, however, the mind of the nation seems to have kept pace with its bigger responsibilities.

To discharge them more democratically the machinery for the conduct of foreign policy will be improved. The Prime Ministers of Canada, alone among the chief executives of nations of her size and stature, have always retained the External Affairs portfolio themselves. They may have done that, and wished to soft-pedal constant discussion, out of fear of divergencies between French-speaking, English-speaking and other elements; nevertheless Canada, which pioneered equality of status in the Commonwealth and sponsored the Middle Power concept, has been more backward in this respect than Australia. The appointment of a separate Minister for External Affairs now having been promised, it may not be too long delayed. There is need of a Cabinet Minister who, divesting himself from the rest of the nation's business, can concentrate on this paramount sphere; who, in place of subordinate officials or even in place of the Prime Minister himself, can be relied on always to represent Canada at Commonwealth and international gatherings or carry out other missions abroad. The country lacks a member of the government who will expound foreign policies at frequent intervals to the people outside Parliament, as well as their representatives within. And since emphasis is neither put on questions of foreign policy at elections nor reward offered for exploring them in Parliament, ambitious young politicians have had scant incentive to master them.

It being thus taken for granted that Canada's diplomacy is, as it were, secretly conducted, foreign policy becomes a mystery of bureaucrats. No Prime Minister could guide Canada through six years of a vast war effort, with its domestic strains and stresses, and at the same time devote himself unremittingly to the study of complex issues elsewhere. The scope and influence of External Affairs officials has, as a result, increased enormously in the fashioning of Canada's expanding foreign policies and over other related aspects of government. Ottawa, moreover, is a small capital city, cut off, more than Washington used to be, from the larger, vital centers of the nation. And this in turn accentuates the natural tendency for an élite from a few departments and agencies to carve out a close, interlocking official world with values set and reputations created by standards of its own.

The drastic revision of government policy to which, since 1939,

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they have had to adapt themselves gives an air of paradox to the exceptional rôle of some of Canada's diplomatists. The seniors among them were selected or approved by the late Dr. Oscar Skelton, formerly Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, and it has never been intimated that they were apt to resist his pronounced North American continentalism or run counter to those social resentments against Britain and the British to which a coterie of intellectuals in Ottawa and on university faculties has been prone. One test of judgment for appointed as for elected officials is the advice they tendered during the years of semi-isolation and quasi-appeasement. About that more will be known if Parliament directs that Canada, like Britain and the United States, shall publish her diplomatic documents on the origins of the war. Meanwhile, the impression that a subtle uniformity of personnel, and therefore of views, has been imposed over the years is strengthened by the fact that there is never a report of differences of opinion in the Department of External Affairs on matters of principle and high policy, such as have so often and so wholesomely been ventilated in the American State Department and the British Foreign Office. On the rare occasions when specifically Canadian external policies are in the news, a number of Ottawa correspondents and radio commentators tend, more than their London and Washington brethren, to echo rather than examine. And for all these reasons the positive function of Middle Power Canada in world affairs has yet to be subjected to that endless scrutiny by Parliament and public opinion which is an essential of full representative government in a democracy as vigorous as hers.

But defects in machinery can be adjusted. The will of the Canadian people has initiated Canada's diplomatic revolution and their energies must see it through. Geographically, Canada is near the crossroads of the Big Five, a circumstance which can be put to good account; diplomatically, no country apart from these five exercises more weight than she within the victorious coalition. Middle Power Canada surprised herself and others by what she could do in war. In peace she should be able to do proportionately at least as much.

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RUSSIAN NAVAL AIMS

By Robert J. Kerner

THE Soviet Union is the "Heartland" of the dreams of geopoliticians — the land from which the "Superpower" will emerge to rule the world. They assumed that the Heartland could subdue and organize Europe, Asia and the whole of Africa by the use of land power, while nations not directly attacked looked benevolently on. Then it would build a navy for the conquest of the rest of the world.

The Haushofer school of geopoliticians inspired a German attempt at world conquest which was to be accomplished through Germany's alliance with, or conquest of, the Heartland. Soviet Russia did not fall into the trap of such an alliance, which would have made her a German vassal; and the Nazis were unable to conquer her. The Nazi alliances with Italy and Japan, important as they were, were insufficient to produce the desired results, and the German effort ended in catastrophe.

Must we, sooner or later, expect another bid for world hegemony from the Heartland? It is said that if the victorious Powers will not or cannot organize the world for peace on a mutually satisfactory basis, the logic of the situation makes this inevitable. Prophets of gloom point at Russia, and in particular scrutinize every item of news and every rumor having to do with the Red Navy. An effort at unimpassioned analysis of Russian naval policy seems most desirable.

As their songs and their literature suggest, the Russian people were originally a river folk. Rivers were their first highways, and a knowledge of the rôle which rivers have played in their history is necessary for an understanding of how and why the Russians expanded over one-sixth of the land surface of the globe. Descending these rivers or portaging from one river system to another, the Russian people reached the five seas: the White, the Baltic, the Black, the Caspian and the Pacific. The urge to the sea became almost a national fixation. Access to open water meant in Russian eyes national independence. And in fact, had Russia remained landlocked, as she was in the fifteenth century, she would indeed have become a vassal state.

Peter the Great, the father of the Russian Navy, once said "the future of Russia lies at the mouths of the Neva, the Don and

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the Amur." Through childish exploits on rivers and lakes, he conceived the idea of building a Russian navy. This he began to do at Voronezh, and he sailed the first Russian fleet down the Don to seize Azov at its mouth from the Turks. He foresaw the need of canals to link up the various river systems, and himself completed the construction of some of them. These — the White Sea-Baltic Canal, for example — were projected from the point of view of naval power as well as of commerce. Peter the Great made his advance against the Swedes along this route; he eventually acquired a solid footing for Russia on the shore of the Baltic, and built St. Petersburg at the mouth of the Neva. In the reign of Catherine II, Russia acquired territorial access down the Don and the Dnieper to the Black Sea; and under Alexander II access to the Pacific was obtained down the Amur.

Russia possessed an abundance of wood, flax and naval stores, which meant that in the age of wooden ships and sail, extending into the middle of the nineteenth century, she might have possessed a relatively large navy, had it not been for her technological backwardness. With Dutch, British and American technical assistance, she did develop her navy somewhat, especially under Catherine II; but when steam and ironclads were introduced she fell far behind the other major Powers in naval strength.

In the Peace of Paris in 1856, after the Crimean war, Britain insisted on the neutralization of the Black Sea, and from then until 1871 Russia was not allowed to have warships, naval bases or arsenals there. Even when this disability had been removed, the Turkish Straits remained closed by international agreement, and the best ships then in the Russian Navy could not be used outside of the Black Sea. The Battle of Tsushima, in the Russo-Japanese War, demonstrated the seriousness of this restriction, and showed how feeble and insufficient Russian naval power was. In 1914, the tonnage of the Russian Navy in the Baltic and Black Seas was 390,000, with 346,000 tons in process of construction. It will be remembered that, on the eve of the First World War, the Minister of the Navy said in one of the secret conferences on the Straits that Russia would not have a Black Sea fleet superior to that of the Turks until 1916; the fact was cited as a reason for avoiding war against Turkey. During the First World War the effective tonnage of Russia's Navy mounted to 540,000; but she still was last, or eighth, in naval strength among the Great Powers, ranking after Italy and Austria-Hungary.

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During the period of revolution and Allied intervention which concluded Russia's participation in the First World War, the Russian Navy virtually disappeared as a factor in world sea power. Some ships were destroyed and others were taken to foreign ports by the intervening forces. At the Naval Conference of Rome, in 1924, the Soviet delegate demanded 490,000 tons for the U.S.S.R., noting that this figure was 50,000 tons less than the former Russian fleet. He agreed, however, to reduce the total to 280,000 tons under the following stipulations: (1) that the Council of the League of Nations be replaced in the draft of the international agreement by another organization; (2) that the Bosporus and the Dardanelles be closed in accordance with the proposal which Russia made at the Lausanne Conference; (3) that vessels of war belonging to non-riparian states of the Baltic be forbidden access to the Baltic by the Sound and the Belt; (4) that the Straits of Korea be disarmed; (5) that the vessels of war then retained at Bizerta as a result of the intervention be restored to the Soviet Union. The demand for the closure of the Baltic and the Black Seas to non-riparian powers and for the disarming of the Straits of Korea was a product of the disappearance of Russian naval strength and the defenselessness of Russian shores.

The Soviet Union began to rebuild its commercial and naval tonnage almost from scratch during the three five-year plans which dated from 1928. First of all a modern shipbuilding industry had to be created. During the first Five-Year Plan, construction of transports and merchant ships was stressed. The second Five-Year Plan placed emphasis on the building of submarines and the modernization of old Tsarist warships. Before this plan was finished, Japan in 1932 had ensconced herself on the south bank of the Amur in north Manchuria, thus endangering Russia's only real access by rail and river to the Pacific; and in 1934 Japan denounced the 1922 Naval Treaty of Washington. In 1935 Germany unilaterally abrogated the naval limitations of the Treaty of Versailles and made a naval agreement with Britain which put the other continental Powers at a disadvantage. In 1936 Germany and Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, ostensibly directed against the Third International but actually at Soviet Russia, and, in the last analysis, against the rest of the world.

Although Russia adhered in 1937 to the main principles of the Washington Naval Conference, the two Powers most dangerous to her — Japan and Germany — began a program of unlimited

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naval building which was bound to have a serious effect on her position. Coming as it did in the midst of the second Five-Year Plan, the threat produced a great increase in the tempo of Russian naval construction. According to Russian sources, the first two Five-Year Plans brought shipbuilding "to the level of the foremost branches of Soviet industry." In the third Five-Year Plan, Soviet Russia embarked upon "a colossal program of naval construction." Russia was to continue the building of submarines and to begin the construction of larger and heavier warships. Ports, wharves, and docks were to be modernized or built.

A purge of the Navy followed, to some extent as part of the general Russian purge of 1936–1938, but in part as a result of a change in Russian naval policy. Up to 1936, the concept of a defensive navy — one which could protect the shores of the Soviet Union in its own waters — had been the basis of Russian naval strategy and naval construction. It has been argued from the public declarations of Russian officials that at this time Russia adopted a policy of aggressive military and naval strategy based on the idea that the best defense is an offensive on the enemy's territory and the seas which wash its shores. Russian leaders pointed to the enormous naval construction on which the other Great Powers were engaged, noting that some 2,000,000 tons, chiefly of ships of the line, were built or were being constructed. And on January 15, 1938, at the first session of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., Commissar Molotov declared in a significant address that the "mighty Soviet Power must possess a sea and ocean navy adequate for its interests and worthy of our great cause." The words "ocean" and "cause" in this sentence immediately caught the attention of observers. A half-year later, President Mikhail Kalinin stated before a meeting of shipyard workers in Leningrad that Soviet Russia "must outdo" the strongest capitalist naval Powers, expressly naming England, the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Italy.

Whatever else may be read into these declarations of policy, it is certain that Russia found herself in an alarmingly exposed position in the midst of the greatest naval and military armament race in history. In 1938 both Nazi Germany and Japan were contemplating a war on the Soviet Union. The western democracies were unwilling or unable to organize collective action to stop aggression. That was the year of the Munich Conference. The Russian Navy of about 300,000 tons — for the most part old ships

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— was still the smallest of any of the Powers. The statements quoted may or may not indicate that Soviet Russia was embarking upon the policy of creating "a navy second to none" to compete for the command of the high seas. We may also properly remember that the use of such hortatory phrases is frequently resorted to in the U.S.S.R. to achieve greater production and to fire officials with the zeal to propagate a new program among the masses. Only subsequent events will prove one thesis or the other.

The purge liquidated, among others, the highest officers of the Red Navy, on charges that they were "hampering" naval development and preventing "the addition of new surface warships," in other words, that they were opposed to the building of a navy capable of taking the offensive. The personnel of the Red Navy was thoroughly reorganized. Officers and men whose party views were well-known were brought in to replace those liquidated. The purge was undoubtedly intensified by the hysteria of mistrust accompanying the development of the international crisis — in which the Soviet Union found itself isolated in a world on the way to war. Obviously a navy officered by men supposed to be willing to blow up their ships was an object of grave concern and therefore of resolute action. Regardless of whether this action was justified, it does not necessarily prove that the Soviet Union had started out to compete for command of the high seas.

The speeches of Molotov and Kalinin were magnified by other officials and by the party organs. Tevsoyan, the Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry, hinted in 1939 that Stalin passed on every detail of naval policy and construction, which was carried on with the utmost secrecy. It was reported that year that the Soviet Union had more submarines than Germany and Japan combined. From that time until the attack of the Germans in June 1941, it was evident that the Russians had greater success in building small units than in building large warships, although several of the latter were on the way to completion. Before their agreement with Nazi Germany in August 1939, the Russians began negotiations for the purchase of large warships through the Carp Corporation in the United States, but were unable to bring them to a successful conclusion.

A description of the Red Navy as of June 1941 must be based chiefly on guesswork. It probably consisted preponderantly of light warships totalling about 500,000 tons. Among the larger warships were included one aircraft carrier of 12,000 tons, three

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modernized Tsarist battleships of 23,000 tons each, two new battleships in construction, and about nine cruisers (two of them dating back to 1915–1916) ranging from 10,000 to about 7,000 tons. Six of the cruisers of the *Kirov* class displaced 8,800 tons each. Eighty destroyers and "over 200" larger submarines, as well as possibly 70 small submarines of the *Malutka* class of 200 tons, made up the bulk of the light vessels. In addition, there were at least 50 minesweepers and more than 130 motor torpedo boats, as well as an undisclosed number of icebreakers. In 1943, it is believed, there were two battleships and several cruisers of the *Kirov* class in the Baltic, and one battleship, several cruisers of the *Kirov* class, and other cruisers in the Black Sea. In the Far East, the Red Navy consisted chiefly of submarines of which the exact number is not known, but which was estimated as more than 70.

The rôle of the Red Navy in the Second World War was primarily a defensive one, fought in close coöperation with the Red Army. It played a part out of proportion to its size. The task of the Northern Fleet in the White and Barents Seas was to keep open the sea route to Britain and the United States. This fleet, which consisted chiefly of submarines, cutters and naval aircraft, rendered an important service in assisting convoys and in attacking German shipping; it claims that it sank 500,000 tons of German ships. The Baltic Fleet heroically defended Leningrad and dominated the region of Hangö in Finland; and it assisted the Red Army in the drive to the Baltic coast, especially at Tallinn and off the shores of East Prussia. The Black Sea Fleet distinguished itself before Odessa and Sevastopol and along the coast of the Caucasus region. In no instance did the Red Navy permit landings of hostile forces in the Black or Baltic Seas behind Russian lines. In the first three years of the war, the Red Navy is reported to have sunk one auxiliary cruiser, two armorclads of coastal defense, 37 destroyers, 50 submarines and numerous enemy light craft. The Red Naval Air Force brought down more than 6,000 enemy planes. In these critical operations considerable losses were incurred. Russia expects at least to make good these losses by sharing in the remnants of the Italian, German and Japanese fleets. The transfer during the war of the British battleship *Royal Sovereign* (renamed the *Archangelsk*) and of the American cruiser *Milwaukee* (renamed the *Murmansk*) was made in lieu of ships from the Italian Navy.

For Navy Day, July 22, 1945, Stalin issued an "Order to the

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Red Army and Navy" in which he praised the Red Navy as "the loyal helpmate of the Red Army in the war against Germany." It had, he said, effectively protected the flanks of the Army which rested on the sea, struck heavy blows at the enemy's merchant fleet, and assured uninterrupted functioning of Russia's communications. After indicating that the Red Navy in this war had written "new pages in the book of Russian naval glory," Stalin declared that "the Soviet peoples wish to see their Navy still stronger and mightier. Our people will create new fighting ships and new bases for the Navy. The task of the Navy is tirelessly to train and improve the cadres of seamen, to master fully the experience gained in the patriotic war, and to raise still higher the naval skill, discipline and organization."

In this statement Generalissimo Stalin indicates the main lines of future Russian naval policy. Russia is to have a "still stronger and mightier" Red Navy than she had when the war ended, which, as we have noted, may have been about 500,000 tons. It would be difficult to take this statement to mean a Soviet Navy "second to none." Stalin's description of the task of the Navy explains a note which had been creeping into the remarks of the Soviet leaders responsible for carrying out naval policy since December 31, 1937, when a special Navy Commissariat was established. Stress continued to be laid on the creation of a "large fleet," but, as Major-General Zvyagin declared last spring, "serious problems are facing the fleet" and there is need "of a more thorough study of contemporary naval science." Naval education is to be developed in the 11 naval colleges which have been founded. In short, a nation does not become a great sea power merely by building ships; and both shipbuilding and general education on naval matters will take much longer than was at first believed.

Russian naval power must function under certain serious disabilities, partly geographical and partly human. The Red Navy must operate in four widely separated seas: in the White and Barents Seas in the north, in the Baltic Sea, in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Japan. Its primary objective is to defend Russian national interests in these waters. To obtain command of the high seas — an objective which may be regarded as fantastic on the premises, and as representing an adventure beyond possibility of achievement in the immediate future — Russia would not only have to subjugate and organize Europe, Asia and Africa, and

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create immense strategic air forces, but also build her navy up to a point where it would be as large as, or larger than, the combined fleets of the United States and Britain. Without some such grandiose development, Russia could not link up her fleets for offensive purposes. To think in such terms is to think in terms of a world revolution and a Third World War.

The Red Navy must be distributed in the four seas in accordance with the importance of each to Russia's security and commercial interests. Under certain conditions, a Red fleet in the White and Barents Seas can be very important. The maintenance of communications with Britain and the United States in those areas was vital in the two world wars. In spite of the acquisition of Petsamo and the assured neutrality of Finland, it would be unwise for Russia to make Murmansk — the only ice-free port in the north — her chief naval base. Murmansk is too far from the center of Russian industrial power, its railroad connections are precarious, weather conditions there are forbidding and other sea Powers might impose limitations upon its usefulness. Iceland, Norway and Spitsbergen are important in this connection.

The greater part of Russian imports have passed through the Baltic in recent years; but the bulk of Russian exports have gone through the Black Sea. The Black Sea route is really Russia's lifeline, and it seems likely that the strongest Russian fleet in European waters will be based there.

Russia's acquisition in this war of the Finnish coast beyond Viborg and the lease of the Porkkala headland, her annexation of the three Baltic states, as well as of a strip of East Prussia which includes Koenigsberg, provide sufficient assurance that central Russia will have access to the Baltic. With Poland friendly and claiming a seacoast to and including Stettin, and with Germany eliminated as a sea power, Russia undoubtedly controls the Baltic. The Kiel Canal (which we have proposed to internationalize) and the Sound and the Belt lead to the North Sea. Here British and Russian naval power meet, and in this area agreement between them is essential. The vital interests of Britain will not permit Russian control of the gates of the Baltic.

The Black Sea, which will most likely contain the strongest Russian fleet, empties through the Turkish Straits into the Ægean and the Mediterranean. With Rumania and Bulgaria in her orbit, Russia controls the greater part of the shores of the Black Sea, Turkey the smaller part. The Russo-Turkish Treaty of

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1925 has expired and Russia has demanded a new treaty answering to the new conditions created by the war. As reported, this demand is linked with a demand for Russian bases which will control the Straits. This raises the question of the revision or abrogation of the Montreux Convention of 1936, which gave Turkey actual control of this vital waterway running through its territory. The United States has proposed a revision of the Convention of Montreux in the sense, first, that "the Straits should be open to the warships of the Black Sea Powers at all times," instead of allowing a neutral Turkey to bar the warships of any belligerent power; and second, that "except for limited tonnage in peacetime, warships of non-Black Sea Powers would be denied passage through the Straits unless the Black Sea Powers consented or the United Nations granted authority for passage." The present convention sets a limit of 45,000 tons as a maximum for the warships of non-Black Sea Powers in peacetime.

Was it to secure control of the Straits that Russia hinted at a desire for the Dodecanese Islands and suggested a Russian mandate in Italian North Africa? These hints, Foreign Secretary Bevin remarked, struck at the throat of the British lifeline through the Mediterranean. In two wars, Russia has been deprived of the use of the Straits. Lloyd George once declared that the closure of the Straits extended the First World War by two years and brought about the Russian Revolution. In this war, assistance to Russia had to go around via Iran or by the dangerous route to Murmansk. It would, therefore, not be a surprise if the Russians insisted on two fundamental conditions in any further attempts to internationalize the Straits. First, Russia will seek to have the decisive voice in preventing warships of non-Black Sea Powers from entering the Black Sea, which she is determined to control. Next, to make certain that the Straits are never closed to her, she will insist on a decisive share in whatever military, naval or air forces are designated to control them. Her predominance in Bulgaria and Jugoslavia assures her that the Straits will not fall into the hands of a hostile Power. British predominance in Greece and the Ægean assure Britain that her lifeline can be protected. The disputes about Trieste and Saloniki can be best understood in the light of this meeting of vital interests. Our increasing interest in the oil of the Middle East, and the important rôle which the British Empire plays in our own security, make it likely that we shall support the British here.

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Russia's naval position in the Far East has been considerably improved and its possible area of action extended as a result of this war. By her recent treaty with China she secures a joint lease for 30 years on the naval base at Port Arthur and joint open port privileges at Dairen (Dalny). In addition, she will reacquire the southern half of the Island of Sakhalin, obtain a share in the international tutelage of Korea, and gain the Kurile Islands, which in hostile hands would block the sea route from Siberian shores to the naval base of Petropavlovsk on the peninsula of Kamchatka. Russia will in all probability insist on the neutralization of the Korean Straits and will perhaps demand a naval base at the relatively ice-free port of Rashin in Korea.

Plainly, Russian and American naval interests meet in the triangle between the Aleutians, Kamchatka, and the Kuriles. They may also meet in the Yellow and East China Seas, if an American air and naval base is established on Okinawa or near it. Russia and China have a long common land frontier, the United States and China have a long common sea frontier. Each frontier is vital to the security of these two greatest Powers. Agreement between them in the problems of China and Japan is vital to the peace in Asia and in the Pacific. Just as no one of the Great Powers occupying Germany will allow a single Power to control that country, so in the Far East no one of the Great Powers concerned will allow another to control either Japan or China. Coöperation among the victorious Great Powers is the only road to future peace, in Europe or in the Far East.

What are the elements of a Russian naval policy which would fit into these requirements? They would include the defense of Russian shores, the control of the Baltic and of the Black Seas, coöperation with Britain at the gates of the Baltic and in the Ægean, and coöperation with the United States in the western Pacific. For these objectives Russia may need a "still stronger and mightier navy," as Generalissimo Stalin stated on Russian Navy Day last July. That the Russian Navy may have weight in diplomatic negotiations goes without saying. But it is also clear that for Russia to aim at the command of the high seas, with a "navy second to none," would mean that she had abandoned her policy in the Second World War of acting as a Great Power in line with her national and vital interests and in coöperation with the United States and Britain. If that were to take place, it would be a decisive turning point in the history of the world.

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN BELGIUM

By Henri Rolin

THE discussion of the Belgian constitutional crisis has somewhat subsided for the moment, at least outside Belgium; but the problem remains serious. In a letter to the Regent on July 18 last, King Leopold III made known that, for the time being, he wished neither to abdicate nor to reign; he had decided to wait, he said, until such time as public opinion had clearly manifested itself on the question of his return or abdication. For its part, the Belgian Government, with the approval of the Regent and no doubt of the King himself, obtained from Parliament a law providing that the Regency would be terminated only if and when Parliament had duly certified that Leopold's inability to exercise his functions had ceased. Official quarters were of the opinion that this vote, in effect, brought the debate to a close; but that was perhaps wishful thinking. For Leopold's supporters, and apparently he himself, nourish the fond hope that after the elections next spring Parliament will have a majority favorable to his restoration. With this end in view, certain circles, especially in the rural districts, continue to agitate and stage demonstrations. The indications are that a revival of the controversy is unavoidable as the election draws near.

This state of affairs in Belgium would suffice in itself to justify an attempt to give American observers an objective statement of the whole question. But it is of interest on wider and more lasting grounds also. The crisis of the Belgian monarchy has brought to light certain new facts about the monarchial institution as it functions at present in various European states.

II. THE RÔLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH IN BELGIUM

In contrast with many others, the Belgian monarchy is not the successor or heir to an ancient monarchy of absolute character, but was created by an act of the Congress summoned by the revolutionary government in November 1830 to draw up a Constitution. In Belgium, the Constitution does not represent a concession made by the King: it antedates him and is superior to him. It was presented in completed form to the first king, who

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had to accept it and swear to uphold it before he could ascend the throne.

The King's official title reflects the fact that the popular will is the source of the royal power as well as of the entire juridical order. For his title is not King of Belgium, that is, king of the land, and, by the same token, of its inhabitants, but King of the Belgians, that is, a king freely chosen by the people of Belgium, just as, a few months before Leopold I's accession, Louis-Philippe had been called King of the French and not King of France. This condition is formally recognized by Article 25 of the Constitution, which states that "all powers emanate from the nation." In fact, the Congress decided to adopt a constitutional monarchy only after a discussion lasting several days and for reasons of international expediency. Besides, the principles on which it was based were so liberal that, in the opinion of one member, they made the monarchy about the equivalent of a republic.

The powers granted to the King in Belgium are in many respects much less extensive than those of the President of the United States. To be sure, no law is binding without his sanction; he is the chief executive, he appoints and dismisses his ministers, appoints the judges, is inviolable. But his right of veto, the result of his privilege not to sanction a law, was not exercised for many years and is now considered null and void. The King's inviolability is qualified by the rule that no act of his can take effect unless it is countersigned by a minister, who thereby assumes responsibility for it; in practice, then, it is not the King who acts with the counsel of his ministers, but rather the ministers who act with the counsel of the King.

The Belgians owe this increasingly stringent limitation on the King's powers not merely to the general evolution of liberalism in nineteenth-century Europe, but also to the firm manner in which the Belgian Parliament and most Belgian governments defended democratic principles in their relations with Leopold I and Leopold II. Thoughtful observers must concede, however, that during the last thirty years democratic vigilance weakened and the public spirit deteriorated, and that this was largely responsible for the difficulties encountered in 1940 and the following years.

The development was quite unsuspected, and occurred for a rather paradoxical reason. The services rendered the country by the first two kings are unanimously recognized today; yet during their entire reigns they had to contend with the distrust or hos-

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tility of at least a part of the population. King Albert, on the contrary, never laid himself open to criticism, so scrupulous was his respect for constitutional principles. His conduct during the First World War won him not only world esteem but the profound affection and unreserved confidence of the entire Belgian population. After his premature death, this feeling naturally turned toward the heir to the throne. The latter's Swedish wife, Princess Astrid, quickly won real personal popularity by her simplicity and her grace. The national mourning caused by her tragic death drew still closer the bonds that united the people to their unhappy sovereign. Public opinion gradually put aside the remnants of former mistrust and became more and more inclined to receive with favor, and even with fervor, any counsels or admonitions that came from the crown. This attitude had an unfortunate effect upon King Leopold III.

Whereas King Albert always had succeeded in holding himself within the limits of his prerogatives, his successor did not. It would be unjust, however, to hold him solely responsible for this. While it is true that he became associated with a certain dangerous isolationist tendency, history will say that it was not on his own initiative, but on that of his ministers, that the speech which he delivered to them on October 14, 1936, outlining the new trends in Belgium's foreign policy, was made public. One wonders what reasons caused the government to place the person of the King at the very center of the controversy which was immediately stirred up both at home and abroad. Was it the desire to see him reap the glory for making a suggestion deemed apt and commendable? Or was it, perhaps, the hope of paralyzing opposition by giving the new foreign policy the benefit of his prestige? Or was it merely an unconsidered impulse to flatter the monarch?

Be that as it may, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs missed no opportunity during ensuing years to extol the statesmanlike qualities which had inspired Leopold III to change the orientation of Belgium's foreign policy. This developed in the young sovereign the tendency to obstinacy and the liking for personal power which he manifested in May 1940 and the years that followed.

Thus we are led to a first observation: the institution of hereditary monarchy is sometimes threatened by the very virtues of kings. When one of them discharges his duties so well as to win the gratitude and affection of the people, there develops gradually

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among various strata of the population an attitude of blind attachment, of personal allegiance, which rejects reminders that his acts are subject to review and tends to substitute for the democratic basis of royal power the notion of a divine right of kings.

During the years 1918–1940, neither the administration nor the members of the teaching profession in Belgium were alive to the necessity of checking this deterioration of the public spirit. Hence the confused and contradictory reactions of the Belgian people later on when they were told what had actually happened in the spring of 1940 and when they heard for the first time the general trend of the King's thinking during the war.

III. RELATIONS BETWEEN LEOPOLD III AND THE GOVERNMENT, MAY 10, 1940–JULY 28, 1945

The principal developments of the royal crisis fall naturally into three periods: First, the 18-day campaign, from May 10 to May 28, 1940; the King became separated from his ministers in this period, and remained a prisoner in Brussels. Second, the ensuing period, lasting until May 1945; during this time the King was unable to exercise his royal functions owing to the fact that he was *de facto* or *de jure* a prisoner of Germany. Third, the period following the King's liberation by the American Army.

From the day the war began, the King assumed actual command of the Army and maintained unbroken contact with the General Staff. In this he was conforming to Belgian tradition. Various Belgian sovereigns not only showed a particular interest in military problems and wore a lieutenant-general's uniform, but also exercised direct military command in wartime.

At most, one may deplore the fact that Leopold III did not think it proper to appear before Parliament on the day of the German aggression, as his father had done on August 4, 1914, in order to encourage the people's will to resist and to stimulate the morale of their elected representatives. The explanation is given that the rapidity of the German advance did not allow him to spare even an hour from his military responsibilities in a moment of vital decisions. If one accepts the premise that the King actually exercises supreme military command this explanation must be considered plausible.

We shall not discuss here the direction of the military operations. It seems clear, however, that the successive withdrawals ordered by the King were either requested by the Allied command

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or caused by the necessity of keeping the Belgian armies in alignment with Allied forces, themselves in full retreat. Nor is there any doubt that the piling up of 500,000 Belgian troops of all sorts, without any real offensive strength, in a territory crowded with refugees, rapidly produced an impossible situation.

Under these conditions, the King's capitulation was generally accepted by the Army as inevitable, and those living in the country resigned themselves to it. In many regions, people even manifested gratitude to the King for having taken responsibility for stopping useless bloodshed; and they reacted sharply to the criticisms voiced abroad. Even the King's refusal to leave Belgian soil and join his ministers in France, in order, so he said, that he might share the fate of his soldiers, was approved by the masses, in the superstitious hope that his presence would lighten the privations and sufferings of enemy occupation.

On the other hand, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 3 at Limoges gave the 140-odd members of Parliament who had followed them into exile a disturbing account of the conversations which they had had with the sovereign during the course of the 18-day campaign and, in particular, of the dramatic interview of May 25 at Wynendaele. They mentioned the difficulty they had had in obtaining information about the military situation, and described the King's pessimism from the very first days of the campaign and his resignation at the prospect of a German victory. The four ministers who at first had remained on Belgian soil, but had been compelled to leave by the rapidity of the enemy advance, had pressed the King on May 25 to accompany them to France, or to join them there, so that he might continue exercising his constitutional duties; they had pointed out that this would become legally impossible if he were under the enemy yoke. The King had refused. He had said he intended to return to Brussels and call upon other personalities to form a new government.

The members of Parliament present at Limoges were unanimous in approving the actions of the government, in deploring the King's attitude, and in confirming the fact of his "inability to reign," as already stated in a decree-law dated May 28, 1940, and signed by all the ministers present (only one, M. Delfosse, had been held in Belgium). This feeling was widely shared by the two million Belgian refugees in France. In Belgium, on the other hand, public opinion, stunned by the defeat, was drawing closer to the

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throne. So it was that both Belgian public opinion and the Belgian authorities came to be gravely divided.

The Ministers made prompt efforts to reconcile their views with their sovereign's. They were encouraged in this by the news that the King, to the disappointment of the Germans and of his counsellor, Henry de Man, had yielded to the advice of various judges and statesmen and had given up the idea of forming a government in occupied Belgium and of attempting to reign. In addition, the French capitulation and the resulting northward flow of great masses of returning refugees had left the government isolated and, for a brief time, uncertain of what course to adopt. On July 21, 1940, then, Prime Minister Pierlot issued a proclamation paying tribute to the King and calling upon the Belgians to gather around him.

The Pierlot Government maintained this official attitude during the four years of its stay in Great Britain. The fact that the Ministers never ceased to pay tribute to the "captive King" and to represent his liberation as one of the benefits to be derived from victory caused a certain amount of astonishment. Though the official propaganda made every effort to justify the capitulation of May 28, it was completely silent about the disagreement of May 25, 1940. Those who escaped from Belgium and expressed surprise at this change of tone were told briefly that to defend the King was to defend the country.

To what extent did Leopold III share this desire for a reconciliation? The country never found out. It was only in July last that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Spaak, revealed to the Chamber that the overtures made in 1942 had remained unanswered and that similar overtures made in 1943 had brought M. Pierlot an answer full of bitter reproaches.

Surprisingly enough, while the government, for reasons of state, was making efforts to reëstablish the King's prestige, public opinion in the country was moving in the opposite direction. This popular discontent was in large part caused by the announcement, toward the end of December 1942, of the royal marriage which had been celebrated three months earlier. Few abroad have realized what keen displeasure this event aroused among the vast majority of the Belgian population. No doubt the personality of the King's young wife and the circumstances under which the marriage took place had something to do with it. In certain circles it was considered regrettable that the young

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woman did not come from a reigning family, in fact, was not even of aristocratic birth. A greater number were indignant that the King should have married a daughter of a provincial governor whom he had removed from office in May 1940 for deserting his post. Others laid stress on Cardinal Van Rosy's irregular action, in violation of Belgian law, in consenting to celebrate the religious wedding before a civil wedding had been performed. But what really shocked people the most was the mere fact of the wedding: they had believed the legend of a captive king, shut up in his castle, voluntarily enduring the same fate as his soldiers.

Then popular discontent began to abate. One cannot say that it was replaced by a mood of approbation; but since the King took no part in public life, people ceased to speak of him and he was, as it were, forgotten. Conservative circles had in any case recovered quickly from the shock of his marriage. They considered the idea of order and national unity inseparable from the idea of the monarchy, and so minimized their disappointment.

This trend of public opinion was assisted by the Germans' action in removing the King and his family to Germany at the time of the Allied landing in Normandy. Such treatment of their sovereign indeed stirred a great number of Belgians deeply. There seems little doubt, therefore, that if the King had appeared in Brussels in May 1945, after his liberation by the United States Army, he would have aroused such enthusiastic demonstrations that the opposition would have been momentarily silenced.

The government was in favor of the King's return. Although they belong to the Socialist Party, which is working for the establishment of a republic, both the Prime Minister, M. Van Acker, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in Parliament that they personally considered a monarchy preferable for a country like Belgium. It was in this frame of mind that M. Van Acker went to Salzburg to see the King on May 10, 1945.

M. Van Acker believed, however, that if the King's return were to take place in an atmosphere of national unity and reconciliation, he ought to make certain token gestures. These would permit the rumors regarding the King's feelings during the occupation to be forgotten. Specifically, he felt that: 1, the members of the royal circle whose weakness during the occupation had compromised the crown should be dismissed; 2, a gesture of reconciliation should be made toward Parliament, whose members had not hesitated to meet before the total liberation of Belgium and

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several of whom had paid for their patriotism with their lives; 3, the Pierlot policy of keeping the country in the war at the side of the Allies should be approved. Although he did not commit himself definitely, the King seemed to agree. Acts to implement his half-promise came slowly, however.

The King decided upon the dismissal of the royal household only after new disclosures had appeared in the press regarding marks of approval bestowed upon a collaborationist journalist by the King's secretary. Moreover, this order affected all the former secretaries alike, none being singled out for special disavowal. The message to Parliament, which was not sent until June 22, came at a time when the King's break with the Van Acker Government was practically complete. It contained a laudatory reference to the Allies, but nothing about the acts of the Pierlot Government.

In this period the King had called various Belgian personalities into consultation. The country, however, was growing restless. Messrs. Van Acker and Spaak renewed their request. Nothing happened. Eventually, first the Socialist and the Communist Parties, later the Liberal Party, which between them command a majority in Parliament, officially signified their opposition to the King's return. The Catholic Party,[1] on the other hand, affirmed its loyalty to the King and cited the Constitution as authority for rejecting any discussion of his conduct. The government meanwhile learned certain facts that seemed to it to make abdication inevitable. The aim of the Ministers on their last two visits to the King was to obtain this abdication by impressing upon him that it would be in the dynasty's interest to avoid certain revelations and to forestall a debate upon them.

Being unable to bring Leopold around to their views, the Ministers made known, at the end of June, that in case His Majesty returned to the country they would resign. In such conditions, they said, they could not be responsible for the maintenance of order. The King reacted by indicating his intention of changing the government. From that moment, indeed, the main purpose of his consultations was to find someone who would accept the task of forming a new ministry. In this he failed, since the majority of Parliament was sure to be hostile to anyone he designated and

[1] The term Catholic Party is used to describe the group which has occupied the foremost position in Parliament for the last 60 years. Very recently, the old designation was changed to "Christian Social," in an attempt to dissociate the Party from any particular creed. The Party still includes the great majority of Catholic voters in Belgium and allows the clergy much political influence.

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since no one dared face the discontent which would have been caused among the working class by the dissolution of Parliament.

Even this setback was not enough to convince the King of the necessity of abdicating. In a letter to his brother Charles, the Regent, dated July 18, he said that "according to his information, Parliament no longer reflected the opinion of the country and that, under these conditions, he would postpone any decision until it had been possible to hold a national consultation."

In order to consolidate the somewhat precarious situation created by this communication, the government secured the passage of the law "aiming at the execution of Article 82 of the Constitution," referred to earlier. The inevitable debate ensued. The King's opponents and his supporters were equally impatient, the first to learn the reasons for the government's conduct, the latter to refute them. The debate, which consumed five sessions, ended with the adoption, 94 to 62, of a resolution expressing approval of and confidence in the government.

IV. FAULTS ATTRIBUTED TO LEOPOLD III

Probably it is too soon to try to form an objective, definitive and complete judgment on the King's conduct after May 10, 1940. This is the decisive reason the dossier has not so far been published. But certain essential points are established. The attitude of moderate members of the Catholic Party is indicated by a statement by Deputy de Kerchove d'Exaerde, who recognized that "certain high dignitaries of the court should be called upon to resign, that mistakes had been made." He added: "But who does not make mistakes?" The real question was what were the mistakes and how serious were they? Public discussion of them would have been such a grievous blow to the King's prestige that it would make his abdication almost inevitable. To ward off this, the royalist leaders made great efforts to prevent the question from coming up in Parliament. Their objections were based either on the assertion that it would be unconstitutional, or on the plea that to pass judgment on the conduct of the King when he was not in a position to defend himself would be improper.

We shall examine in a moment the legal validity of these two objections. But, first, what were the charges? The Prime Minister, who was the principal accuser, emphasized two particularly:

(1) The King's visit to Berchtesgaden in November 1940 was made neither at Hitler's orders nor under German pressure, but

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of his own volition and on his own initiative. While there, he not only discussed the fate of the Belgian prisoners and the question of supplies for Belgium, but touched upon political matters as well in an attempt to obtain certain guarantees for himself and for the country in the event of a German victory.

(2) The deportation of the King to Germany in June 1944, after the Allied landing in Normandy, was prearranged. It had been requested by the King, who was anxious not to come in contact with the Allied armies of liberation and face the internal disorders which he anticipated would occur in Belgium at that time.

The first point seems well established and has been only feebly denied.[2] The Prime Minister specified, without mentioning his source, that it was through the intervention of the King's sister, the Princess of Piedmont, that the meeting with Hitler was requested and prepared. He also read a statement by Viscount Davignon, former Belgian Ambassador to Berlin, who accompanied the King to Berchtesgaden. Viscount Davignon was not present at the conversation and was not informed by the King of what had been said, but he was permitted to glance at the brief notes taken by the German commander of the Palace guard, Colonel Kiewitz, who had witnessed the conversation. It appears from Viscount Davignon's memorandum that he did not question the accuracy of Colonel Kiewitz's information; and there seems no good reason today for rejecting it on the sole ground that the informant is a German.

On the second point, the demonstration was less convincing. It is true that M. Van Acker read a formal statement by M. Van Straelen, director of the Royal Museum of Natural History, an intimate of the royal household, regarding the King's alleged desire to avoid meeting the leaders of the Allied armies. The Right protested against this testimony, to which it opposed other testimony and documents showing the King's desire to remain in Belgium, his chagrin at being deported, and his indignation that his wife and children were to be deported also.

What conclusion does the evidence warrant? Certainly not that M. Van Straelen lied. No one dared suggest that he did, and the royalists themselves did no more than express indignation at what they called a betrayal of the royal confidence. It seems,

[2] It is significant that in the proclamation of September 30, 1945, the King lays stress on the motives which supposedly induced him to "agree" to go to Berchtesgaden. He does not deny that the interview bore upon other subjects.

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rather, that the government was too hasty in its conclusions. In my opinion, M. Van Straelen's testimony established definitely that at certain moments the King entertained the idea of going to Germany and even allowed certain negotiations to be conducted toward that end. But it seems equally certain that, at other times, he rejected such a move as undesirable, judging his presence indispensable at the hour of his country's liberation, and even going so far, in April 1944, as to allow certain members of the underground to study ways and means of enabling him to escape to England under the noses of the Germans.[3]

In my opinion, neither the King's restoration nor his abdication can be made to depend upon proof of his isolated acts or words during the occupation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs seems to me to have proven his case far more convincingly in the July 24 and 25 sessions of the Chamber when, reviewing the disagreement which arose on May 25, 1940, between the King and the government, he showed that the entire sequence of errors ascribed to the monarch were the natural consequence of his earlier mistaken conception of Belgium's international position.

According to the royal thesis expounded at the time, Belgium had obligated herself internationally only to defend her territory. She was justified, therefore, in taking back her freedom of action and in resuming her neutrality at the moment when, having exhausted all means of defense, she was forced to capitulate. The same idea is expressed in the memorandum which Count Capelle, secretary to the King, sent in August 1940 to Count d'Ursel, Belgian Minister at Berne, and in the memorandum forwarded in September 1940 to M. le Tellier, Belgian Ambassador to France. It is this conception of Belgium's international status which explains the Berchtesgaden negotiation in October 1940, the telegram of congratulations from the King to Hitler in 1941 on the occasion of the latter's birthday, and his telegram of condolence to the King of Italy on the death of the Duke of Aosta, Viceroy of Ethiopia. It explains also the King's marriage, his wedding trip in Germany and his sending the royal children to Italy; his surly refusal to give the slightest encouragement to Belgians fighting at the side of the Allies or to censure those collaborating with Germany; and his failure to protest to Hitler

[3] On this additional point, the royal proclamation of September 30 seems to corroborate my point of view. The King protests vehemently against the Prime Minister's accusation, but he does not deny the remarks attributed to him by M. Van Straelen.

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against innumerable violations of international law committed against the Belgian people. Finally, it is the same conception which accounts for the King's rebuff of the advances made by M. Pierlot and his colleagues in 1942 and 1943, and for his hesitation to be in Brussels when the Allies and the Resistance movement triumphed.

What does it matter now that in July 1940 most of the Belgian Ministers were hesitating themselves what course to follow, and even considered the necessity for a second capitulation? It is doubly to their credit that in due time they recovered their balance and brought the country back into the struggle. To find the true significance of the Belgian crisis, then, one must examine the divergent conceptions of Belgium's international position and international obligations which were held between 1940 and 1945. That is why the crisis is of truly historic importance and has a significance far transcending the national borders.

IV. THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

As pointed out before, the King's decision, instead of bringing the crisis nearer solution, has only delayed its final settlement. How long? According to the July message, until there has been an expression of public opinion. This makes one think that the present situation will not last indefinitely, but that it will be settled in one way or another immediately after the coming elections, that is, by Easter at the latest.

It assuredly is most desirable that this be the case, even from a purely dynastic point of view. For if Leopold III were to persist in his delaying tactics, the Regent would remain in power even after Prince Baudouin, heir to the throne, now in his fifteenth year, had come of age or had been freed from his father's control; whereas in the event of the King's abdication the Regency must necessarily come to an end.

Is it sure that the popular consultation demanded by the King will take the form of national elections? No doubt this is what Leopold had in mind, since he was appealing from the decision of a parliament whose mandate had lapsed to a parliament that would represent public opinion more faithfully. However, the leaders of the Catholic Party were quick to realize what a terrible danger this solution presented. For if the different political parties maintained their present attitude, the question of the King's return would be the main issue, and the Catholics alone would

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campaign for it. Should they win the elections, the King could not help appearing as the protégé or at least the candidate of a single party and, incidentally, of a single region, Flanders, from which the Catholic Party draws most of its adherents. Were this to happen, a great number of Belgians would henceforth consider that the King had forfeited his title of hereditary constitutional monarch.

If these objections were disregarded, then the entire institution of the monarchy would be placed in jeopardy. The Right understood this so well that it almost at once hit upon a different method for giving the King the information he wished. A bill introduced by the Catholic group proposed that the votes be counted without disclosing the political affiliations of the King's supporters and opponents.

The government indicated its opposition to this bill on two grounds. It pointed out, first, that the plan is only a device by which the Right hopes to find a way out of its present impasse — a manœuvre which threatens to destroy the very régime it seeks to save. Secondly, it made the grave constitutional objection that a popular consultation for or against the person of the King is the same thing as a plebiscite, a procedure irreconcilable with the principle of an hereditary constitutional monarchy.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the trend is toward an abdication. But meanwhile the country will inevitably remain stirred up and divided, with certain lasting effects on Belgian internal politics.

The first result has been the breakdown of the governmental coalition and the withdrawal of the Catholic Party from the government for the first time in sixty years. How long will this last? That will depend, no doubt, on the elections. But the outcome of these may be influenced in part by the fact that the Catholic Party no longer appears as the surest dispenser of governmental favors.

For one thing, the purge will be carried out more sternly by a government which has rid itself of its members who were most inclined to be lenient with collaborators. It so happens that the unpatriotic Belgians who will be deprived of the right to vote are mostly affiliated with the Catholic Party. Finally, many fervent Catholics who are against Leopold seem likely to forsake their old allegiance and join a new party called the Belgian Democratic Union; this party, although started by a single Catholic

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deputy, now occupies three seats in the new government. Conversely, the votes of pro-Leopold liberals will go to the candidates of the Catholic Party.

Even more important than the effects of the crisis on the party alignment is the ideological conflict which it has revealed and stimulated. Some will charge that since both the Communists and the Socialists advocate a republican form of government, they accept the monarchy only provisionally, for reasons of expediency. The charge scarcely holds as regards the Socialists, many of whom believe that the hereditary constitutional monarchy is the best régime for Belgium. It certainly offers no explanation of the attitude of the Liberals, whose monarchist convictions are no less fervent than those of the Catholics. What determines the position of the Catholics, and differentiates them from the Liberals in this question, is their belief that the authority of the head of the state should not be weakened by a discussion of his conduct.

In this respect, the Belgian royal crisis recalls the famous Dreyfus case, which exerted such a profound influence on the course of the Third Republic. As in France of *l'Affaire*, so in Belgium today, the Catholic clergy, preordained defender of venerable institutions, is using its influence to stimulate the loyalist zeal of the Catholic youth organizations. The Army acts with it, though not from the motives that influenced the French Army at the time of the Dreyfus case; it defends the King because he is its military chief. As the Catholic influence is strongest in Flanders, the demonstrations of attachment to Leopold occur most frequently in this region. The creation of a profound disagreement between the country's two ethnic regions over a political matter of such capital importance is not the least disturbing aspect of the present crisis.

VI. JURIDICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS

The Belgian crisis may suggest certain lessons relevant to the functioning not merely of the Belgian constitutional system and of hereditary constitutional monarchies in general.

(1) Belgium now bears witness, as have Great Britain and France on other occasions, that a democratic régime, even when it does not specifically provide for the right of Parliament to dismiss the Chief of State, nevertheless affords peaceful means of obliging him to abdicate when he is persistently in conflict with

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the majority of the country's representatives. The weapon at the disposal of the Belgian Parliament is Article 64 of the Constitution, already mentioned, which renders the acts of the King inoperative until they are countersigned by a minister, who thereby assumes responsibility for them. The King is powerless without his ministers and, since the ministers are powerless without the support of Parliament, the latter can practically paralyze the royal power.

One may reply that the converse is true, namely, that Parliament is powerless to act without the royal sanction; and it is a fact, of course, that each of the various organs of government can paralyze the machinery of the state. But the spirit of the Constitution requires that, in such an event, the representatives of the nation, "whence all power emanates," shall have the last word. In principle, the King can avoid abdication only by taking an appeal to the people, that is, dissolving the Chambers (Article 74 of the Constitution). This step involves holding an election within 40 days and convening the new Chambers within two months. But the present crisis makes clear that even this solution cannot be applied effectively when the conflict between the King and the government originates, not in a political problem, but in the necessity of evaluating acts committed by the King himself. For in that case the election is tantamount to an indictment of the King, a fact which, whether one likes it or not, strips the King of his essential constitutional privilege of inviolability and renders him unfit to keep his crown.

(2) We may also note that, during the crisis, it became necessary to apply the constitutional provisions relative to the Regency to cases other than those provided for by the authors of the Constitution. The fundamental Charter mentions only two contingencies which call for a Regency: the death of the King while the heir to the throne is still a minor, and his "inability to reign." A record of the constitutional debates proves that when the authors of the Constitution referred to the inability to reign, they had in mind the prolonged illness or madness of the King.

Events between 1940 and 1945 have revealed that inability to reign can arise from another material cause, to wit, the King's captivity in a foreign country; or, again, that the "inability" may be of a moral or a political nature. Indeed, the term "moral impossibility" was used officially in June 1940, though afterward omitted. But it is obviously this disqualification which, in the

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eyes of the present Belgian Government, stands today in the way of Leopold III's resumption of power.

(3) While the crisis has revealed certain hidden resources of the Belgian Constitution, it has also brought to light certain ambiguities and omissions. Notable among them is the absence of any provisions relating to the marriage of the King. Article 60 of the Constitution stipulates expressly that the King's consent is necessary for the marriage of a royal prince, that is, of a descendant by the male line of one of the Kings of Belgium.[4] The King's consent, which is required for the marriage of a royal prince, is a public not a private act, since he exercises this same power with reference to cousins, brothers and nephews of all ages, over whom private law gives him no authority. In the King's absence this consent is asked, not of his wife, nor of a guardian, nor of a family council, but of those who exercise power according to the terms of the Constitution. This consent must, therefore, be countersigned by a minister, for the obvious reason that great political importance is attached to the choice of a wife by a possible future sovereign. It would seem that the same rules should apply to the marriage of the King.[5]

In Belgium, a country of written law, scholars have hesitated to advance this interpretation of the Constitution, which is based on analogy. But the King seems to have recognized its validity by first marrying Marie Baels morganatically — that is, before the church only, an act which Belgian law considers null and void. Even after the civil ceremony, which followed three months later, the King deemed it proper to stipulate solemnly that the children born of this union (a son was, indeed, born shortly after) would not have the status of royal princes. In so doing, he only added a manifestly unconstitutional act to the dubiously constitutional act of his marriage. For the Constitution grants the status of royal children to all legitimate male heirs of the King and there is no provision to the effect that this status may be withheld from them.

(4) Still more serious, no doubt, is the discrepancy, which events have emphasized, between the constitutional provisions which make the ministers, not the King, legally responsible for military affairs, and the provision (Article 68) which confers the

[4] Actually, the son of Queen Astrid is the only "royal prince" in Belgium today. The status of the son of Marie Baels, the King's second wife, is still to be cleared up.

[5] English political writers are unanimous in thinking that the marriage of the King must also be approved by a minister, as Edward VIII found out to his distress.

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command of the army upon the King. Since Albert was a victorious general, the problems inherent in the situation were never apparent. But the 18-day campaign of 1940 ended in a military catastrophe, and the need of fixing responsibility for it has frequently been voiced in Parliament and elsewhere. But how can such an inquiry avoid passing judgment on the acts of the commander-in-chief? And if the King's acts are discussed, what is left of the royal inviolability? The upshot of the ambiguity is a widely-held view that Article 68 of the Constitution should be amended at the earliest opportunity, so that the King can no longer exercise actual military command in the field.

(5) There has been a further unhappy discovery. Article 84 of the Belgian Constitution reads: "No change can be made in the Constitution during a Regency." There had not been a Belgian Regency since the few months preceding the accession of the first king; in consequence, this apparently harmless provision was never applied during the 115 years of Belgium's existence as an independent state. But now, seemingly, it will delay for at least three years the introduction not only of the two or three proposed amendments examined above, but also of much more important reforms. No doubt the article will be interpreted in a very restricted sense, and will be held to apply only to the enforcement of possible reforms, not to the entire procedure of constitutional revision. Such an interpretation would reserve for the King (in this case, the future Baudouin I), the privilege of later approving the constitutional amendments which had been voted under the Regency, and would, in the meantime, allow the procedure of constitutional revision to be set in motion. Some will deplore the slowness of such a method. But perhaps it is as well that a task of this importance, undertaken when the world is experiencing such profound transformations, should be carefully and expertly prepared and carried to leisurely completion.

The writer has tried to point out the origins and course of the present Belgian crisis and to indicate some of the lessons that can be learned from it. He has not attempted to minimize its gravity. But the Belgians are a people of good judgment and moderation, and there is every reason to believe that they will overcome their present political problems just as they are overcoming their material difficulties. They will add the lessons of the crisis to the store of their national experience.

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UNNEUTRAL NEUTRAL EIRE

By R. M. Smyllie

DURING the war neutral Eire had a bad press in America, and indeed almost everywhere else. It was the only English-speaking country that held itself aloof, and the belligerent nations, preoccupied with their own battle for existence, could not reasonably have been expected to spare time or trouble to examine the basic causes of Eire's attitude. The late Arthur Griffith, father of the Sinn Fein movement, said that the British had built a paper wall around Ireland; on the inside they painted what they wanted the Irish to know about the rest of the world, on the outside what they wanted the rest of the world to know about Ireland. During the war this system operated in striking fashion, not, indeed, because the British were in any way malicious toward their neutral neighbors — actually the contrary was the case — but rather because, in the nature of things, it hardly could have been otherwise. Americans may not realize that Eire has no news agencies of her own. The Irish newspapers cannot afford to keep their own correspondents abroad, and every word of foreign news that appears in the Irish newspapers comes from British or American sources. The result had been that during the war Eire found herself virtually dumb, while she was being subject to widespread, and sometimes even vindictive, misrepresentation in all the Allied countries.

The roots of Irish neutrality lie deep in history. Long before the war, Mr. de Valera announced that if a world struggle should occur Eire would keep out of it. Neutrality, almost by definition, is something negative; but Mr. de Valera raised it to the dignity of a national principle, largely because he wanted to be able to prove to the world at large that, after more than seven hundred years of subjection to England, the 26 counties of Southern Ireland at last were really free. What better proof of national independence could there be than the fact that while Great Britain was fighting for her very life, Mr. de Valera and his three million Irish citizens could remain at peace on England's doorstep? The original treaty which in 1921 gave the Irish Free State such a large measure of political freedom provided for the retention by the British of certain Southern Irish ports, chosen with particular reference to the defense of the so-called "Western Approaches."

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It also was agreed that, in the event of a war in which the British would be involved, they would continue to exercise certain rights of transit and the like. That was an obvious precaution upon which the British General Staff, and particularly the Admiralty, insisted at a time when the chances of another war seemed to be exceedingly remote. In 1938, however, just a year before the outbreak of the second world conflict, Mr. de Valera made a bargain with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (of whom he retains a high opinion), whereby, as part of a general agreement putting an end to what was known as the economic war between Eire and Great Britain, the vital ports were taken over bag and baggage by the Irish Government.

From the standpoint of British security this sacrifice by Neville Chamberlain seemed to be almost suicidal; he justified it to his English critics — and they were many — as an act of faith, a gesture of British generosity to Ireland which would find a ready response in the Irish people's warm hearts. If the British Premier believed, or even hoped, that the return of the ports would make the slightest difference to the neutral policy of the Irish Government, he did not know the man he was dealing with. Eamon de Valera, who cared nothing about the British Admiralty's views, accepted Britain's concession not in any way as a favor but merely as her belated recognition of an indefeasible right. He did promise the British that no hostile power ever would be allowed to use Eire's ports as a springboard for an attack against them, and in this undertaking he was undoubtedly sincere.

Having got back the ports, and promulgated a new Constitution which banished the last symbols of British rule in Eire, Mr. de Valera was in a position to take a perfectly free decision as to the country's attitude towards the war. He decided to stick to his prewar declaration of neutrality, pointing out to his critics at home that, so long as the British kept a foothold on Irish soil — in other words so long as the six counties of Northern Ireland remained attached to the United Kingdom — Ireland would not be free, and therefore could not be expected to take an active part in a war on Britain's side. To the Irish Nationalist this attitude was perfectly logical and natural. He cared nothing about the moral issues involved in the declaration of war against Nazi Germany. Though he was devoutly Catholic, he did not even care much about the fate of Catholic Poland. Born and bred to distrust

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British motives, he only knew that a chance had come to dissociate the Irish people from the nation that had oppressed them for so long; and led by Mr. de Valera, he seized his chance if not with avidity, at least with a reasonably clear conscience.

So Eire became officially a neutral, although still associated "externally" with the British Commonwealth, every other member of which, including Dutch South Africa, immediately sprang to arms on the British side. Only Mr. de Valera with his rigidly logical mind could have carried through his policy as it was carried through right up to the last month of the war; for it involved Eire and Great Britain alike in all sorts of paradoxes and anomalies. For example, Eire had a legation in Berlin, just as the Germans had a legation in Dublin. At the height of the war the post of Minister to Germany became vacant, and Dr. T. J. Kiernan, head of the Dublin Broadcasting Station, was appointed by Mr. de Valera. The German Government, however, would not accept him without the usual letters of credence, which still must be signed by the British King. For obvious reasons, His Majesty hardly could be expected to accredit a Minister to a Power with which he was at war, so the project had to be dropped. Dr. Kiernan was sent to the Vatican instead, and the Berlin Legation was left in charge of a young official — a Protestant, by the way — who acted as Chargé d'Affaires. The Legation premises in the Drakestrasse were demolished by an R. A. F. bomb in 1943.

Of course, it must not be assumed that the people of Eire were unanimously in favor of neutrality — at the beginning, at any rate. All the Anglo-Irish population, for example, Catholic as well as Protestant, was and continues to be strongly pro-British; and even among the Gaels themselves, that is to say among those who for historical or political reasons always had made at least a show of anti-British feeling, there was a fairly strong dislike of the Nazi movement, particularly in Catholic circles, where Hitler, like Stalin, was regarded as a kind of anti-Christ.

The people as a whole were on the defensive from the start. It was the first European war in history in which Ireland was playing no part, and the Irish as a fighting race felt rather out in the cold. That, no doubt, is why so many of them rushed as volunteers to join one or other of the British services at the first available opportunity. The fact that they could do so gives a useful insight into Mr. de Valera's attitude, one to which far too little attention

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had been paid. When the war broke out and Eire declared her neutrality, it became obvious to those who knew anything about the Irish people that large numbers of young men would join the British forces. In these circumstances, Mr. de Valera easily might have followed the example of other neutral countries by passing a Foreign Enlistment Act, making it an offense, punishable by loss of all civil rights, to join the fighting services of any of the belligerent Powers. He did nothing of the kind. All through the war, Irishmen were completely free to join the British Forces; and the fact that they did so in comparatively large numbers provides almost a complete answer to those who have been holding Eire up as a hate-ridden nation, eager for Britain's humiliation and defeat.

It is impossible to say precisely how many citizens of Eire fought in the British forces, because no official figures are available. All sorts of guesses have been made, many of them grossly exaggerated. But it is fairly safe to say that between 150,000 and 180,000 young Irishmen served under the British flag, and it must not be forgotten that every one of them was a volunteer. Some measure of their fighting qualities is provided by the fact that no fewer than seven Victoria Crosses, the highest decoration — the King's gift — were awarded to citizens of Eire, as well as a whole host of other military distinctions. All that these young men had to do was to cross the border into Northern Ireland, where they were accepted gladly by the British recruiting authorities. They changed back into civilian clothes whenever they came home on leave. Actually, the volunteers from Eire were not only greater in number than from Northern Ireland, which, forming an integral part of the United Kingdom, was a belligerent state, but also were larger in proportion to population. It also is an interesting fact that the vehement protest of the Southern Irish Government was the decisive factor in Britain's refusal to extend conscription to the people of the Northern Province.

While this steady flow of volunteers to Great Britain was in progress, the Government of Eire was all the time building up its own defense forces. These consisted of the Regular Army of some 40,000 men, the Local Defense Force of more than twice that number, consisting of armed volunteers, after the style of Great Britain's Home Guard, and a Local Security Force, composed mostly of men over military age, who acted as auxiliary policemen. These officially neutral forces were armed entirely by

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the British, and it is more or less an open secret now that throughout the war extremely close relations existed between the heads of the Irish Army and the British General Staff. All Ireland's connections with the war had their humorous as well as their paradoxical aspects. Only a few weeks ago it was stated in Dail Eireann that about 4,000 members of the Irish Army, or almost exactly ten percent of the total force, had deserted during the war to join the British Army. These deserters, having received a fairly thorough training in Ireland, were particularly welcome in Great Britain, many of them becoming non-commissioned officers straight away and reaching commissioned rank in a very short time. When one of them was arrested and tried on a charge of desertion on his return to Dublin after V-E Day it was argued by his lawyer in open court that the man could not be guilty of desertion in the military sense of the word, because desertion meant running away from danger to a place of safety, whereas, in the case of the Irish soldiers who went to the British Forces, precisely the opposite procedure had been adopted! There were a couple of test cases to satisfy military regulations, but only suspensory sentences were pronounced; while he will not be given any government job, or allowed to share in government relief schemes, the Irish "deserter" now is quite free to come back to his home.

But it was not only by her contribution to the British fighting forces that Eire helped the Allied war effort. From the very beginning, big industrial firms in the United Kingdom began to recruit labor in the 26 counties of Southern Ireland. Officially the Government did not actually encourage this traffic; but it did nothing to stop it, beyond placing a ban on certain advertisements for workers in the Irish newspapers. In all, about 170,000 workers of all types left Eire for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. They earned good money in the factories, it is true, and had their fares paid home for a short holiday once a year; but the work was hard and exacting, and the workers exposed themselves to the dangers of the Blitz, with the result that substantial numbers of them lost their lives. Cynically-minded persons in Eire, of whom there are more than a few, suggested that the export of working manpower to Great Britain was encouraged by the Department of Industry and Commerce in order to reduce the official volume of unemployment at home, and it is quite possible that there was an element of truth in the suggestion. However that may have been at the

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time, the boot is likely to be on the other foot in the immediate future. Very many of the men who went to England during the war will stay there now, attracted by the lure of high wages under a Socialist Government which is contemplating a vast building program. Eire also has her building schemes, some of which are extremely urgent; but she lacks workers, skilled and unskilled alike, and will find it hard to persuade her wartime exiles to come back to a country where wages and social services are substantially behind those prevailing in the United Kingdom.

There was yet another way in which Eire did much to assist the Allied war effort, namely by the export of food to Great Britain. Every available ounce of foodstuffs, particularly in the shape of livestock, was sent across the Irish Sea. Good prices were paid in terms of paper money, but Eire got very little back in the form of imports, with the result that huge credits — approximately £300,000,000 to £400,000,000 ($1,200,000,000 to $1,600,000,000), a big sum for such a small country — were piled up in London, only to be "frozen" automatically by the British Government. Eire has no immediate hope of utilizing these swollen credits for the purchase of the capital goods, machinery and the like, of which she stands so badly in need; so she did not do so very well by her wartime sales to Great Britain after all.

While in actual fact Eire was helping the British, and eventually the Americans, in all sorts of ways, Mr. de Valera, with his passion for logic, was putting up a brave, and at times even an aggressive, show of neutrality. He took the view that it was the Government's duty to steer an even course between the Scylla of the old "Ascendancy" (the Anglo-Irish, who were rather effusively pro-British) and the Charybdis of the I. R. A. (the extreme Republicans who, because of their inveterate hatred of England and all things English, were inclined to be actively and ostentatiously pro-German). To that seemingly praiseworthy end, the famous censorship, administered for the greater part of the war by Mr. Frank Aiken, who bore the grandiloquent title of "Minister for Coördination of Defensive Measures" and was well known for his anti-British feelings, was employed with ruthless resolve.

In theory the censorship was entirely neutral; in practice it worked almost exclusively against the Allies. This one-sidedness, in a way, was quite inevitable, inasmuch as the Allies controlled all Eire's news services. But the lengths to which the Irish cen-

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sorship went to maintain a completely colorless neutrality often made its activities ludicrous, and reduced the staffs of the Dublin newspaper offices — of the official Government organ as well as the others — to a condition of nervous collapse. Everybody agreed that some form of censorship was necessary in order to preserve neutrality and the security of the state; but nobody except Mr. Aiken and his staff ever expected that such depths of absurdity would be plumbed.

There never was any secret about the enlistment of Irish citizens in the British forces. Everybody in England and elsewhere knew all about it; yet the censorship would not allow a word to be mentioned in the newspapers. Obituary notices of men who fell in the war could not be published. Even the fact that Montgomery and Alexander, as well as several other Allied leaders, happen to be Irishmen had to be kept dark; and when a young member of the staff of one of the Dublin dailies, who had joined the British Navy, went down with the *Prince of Wales*, and was rescued, the only way in which his editor could inform the public that he was safe was through an apparently innocent announcement in the Social and Personal column that the young man in question had completely recovered from the effect of his recent boating accident! The censorship never was accepted loyally by the newspapers in Eire, as it was accepted in so many other countries, simply because the Irish journalists believed it to be unfair and unjust in its operation. Also they felt that the censorship was bringing ridicule upon the whole newspaper profession by such futilities as its refusal to allow any mention of the fact that American troops had landed in Northern Ireland, although it was being barked by every dog in the streets of Dublin.

All through the war there was a tussle of wits between the censorship and the newspapers, and the censorship did not always come out on top, although, of course, it had unlimited powers. No paper dared to print a word in favor of the Allied cause. Even when America came in, and Mr. de Valera no longer had the excuse that it was mainly a British war, this rigid veto was maintained. Whether the Irish Government was trying to humbug the people of Eire, or was merely humbugging itself, nobody will ever know; but one thing is quite certain — it was not humbugging the Germans, who knew the real situation from A to Z. They knew all about the number of Eire's citizens who were fighting and working for the British. They knew that, with

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the insignificant exception of a small minority of irreconcilables, the people of Southern Ireland were wholeheartedly on the side of the Allies, as indeed were all the members of the Government, including Mr. de Valera, with one possible exception. They knew, with better reason than anybody else, that newspaper neutrality enforced by the censorship was an utter sham. It may not be generally known, by the way, that one Dublin newspaper, the *Irish Times*, which was notorious for its pro-Allied and particularly its pro-British sympathies, was compelled to submit every line of its "copy," advertisements and all, to the censor, who went through the proofs with a fine-tooth comb in search of anything that might even remotely look like Allied propaganda.

Eire was nonbelligerent — that is to say, she was not officially concerned in the war, although so many of her children served the Allied cause; but she was never neutral in the generally accepted sense of the term. Government and people alike realized from the start that the country's fate was linked up inextricably with that of Great Britain, and the number of Irishmen who would have acclaimed a German victory could have been counted on the fingers of a hand. Nobody in Eire ever stood in dread of a British or an American invasion, whereas, during the critical years between 1940 and 1942, there was constant anxiety lest the Germans might attempt a landing. Once only, in the late autumn of 1940, Mr. Churchill toyed for a while with the idea of forcibly seizing the ports which had been given back by his predecessor to Mr. de Valera; but largely owing to the strong representations made to him by Sir John Maffey, British representative in Dublin, the idea was abandoned and nothing further happened in the way of overt clashes between Eire and the Allies, until the Americans, backed by the British, in 1944 asked Mr. de Valera to get rid of the German Legation and the Japanese Consulate in Dublin. Both Washington and London must have known perfectly well that Mr. de Valera would refuse to do any such thing, being wholly confident that neither the United States nor Great Britain would raise more than an angry finger against the Irish. The incident merely gave the Irish leader — who is a highly accomplished politician — a God-given opportunity once more to demonstrate Eire's absolute independence of everybody, including on this occasion the United States, and to figure in the eyes of his own followers as one of the greatest statesmen since Abraham Lincoln.

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The reason for the Anglo-American *démarche*, which in fact was rather silly, was to prevent any information from leaking out of Eire before D-Day. There were big numbers of American and British troops in Northern Ireland, with virtually untrammeled communications between North and South, and it was not unnatural that the American and British military authorities should feel a certain amount of anxiety — although in reality they ought to have known better.

While the war was in progress, the German Minister and the Japanese Consul enjoyed full diplomatic privileges; but for practical purposes they might just as well have been in a concentration camp. The Irish Secret Service, with its invaluable experience gained during the Anglo-Irish struggle 25 years ago, is pretty efficient, and it kept the closest of close eyes on the activities of Dr. Eduard Hempel and Mr. Beppu San. The German Legation had a staff of only four Germans in addition to the Minister, while the Japanese Consulate had only two officials in all. Although there undoubtedly was a certain amount of espionage, particularly in the early years of war, when spies were dropped in Eire by parachute, it never got very far.

Socially, the Axis representatives were ostracized. They were entertained only at Government functions and by certain Government officials who had to follow the protocol; but, whereas the American and British Ministers, with their French and Belgian colleagues, as well as the Polish, Czechoslovak, Danish and Dutch consular representatives were generally fêted in Dublin, the Germans, Italians and Japanese were left severely to themselves. Beppu, the Japanese Consul, joined a golf club before Pearl Harbor. His name was accepted by the committee only after strong pressure had been brought to bear by the Department of External Affairs which dreaded an international "incident;" and even then some members of the committee resigned. Beppu, who is an indifferent but enthusiastic golfer could find nobody willing to play with him in the club; but he insisted on entering for nearly all the competitions, employing the local professional to mark his card.

Now that it is all over, Irish neutrality is beginning to appear in a new and not altogether unfavorable light. Indeed, it may be argued that Eire was of greater assistance to the Allies as an official neutral than she could have been as an active belligerent. For if Eire had been in the war, the Germans almost certainly

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would have tried to invade the island; indeed, in 1940 and thereabouts there was little to prevent them. If they had succeeded, not only would Britain have had an enemy on her western flank, but the Americans never would have been able to send their vast forces to Europe. This may seem at first sight to be a far-fetched argument; but the more one thinks of it, the less fantastic it appears. Of course, it also may be argued that Irish Partition saved the Allied cause, inasmuch as if Northern Ireland had not been in British hands, the Americans would not have been able to use it as possibly their most valuable base of operations.

Happily, the truth about Eire's neutrality is well-known by the British and American Governments; unhappily it is not so well-known by the British and American peoples, many of whom still regard the Southern Irish as the black sheep of the English-speaking world. The Irish are proud and hypersensitive, almost absurdly jealous of their lately-won independence and prone to believe that they are being slighted. They are more than anxious to take their place among the United Nations, but their present attitude was illustrated by Mr. de Valera's recent statement in the Dail that he would not go with his hat in his hand to anybody. There has been little realism in Irish politics in the past. Even today there still is a tendency to chase rainbows, and so long as Eamon de Valera is at the head of affairs it will persist. On the other hand, an opportunity has arisen now to improve relations between Eire and Great Britain to a degree that never has been possible before. Unfortunately, there is no sign of improvement in the relations between Dublin and Belfast, and while Partition's open sore continues to run, a certain amount of bad blood cannot be avoided.

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FRENCH DIFFICULTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Charles-André Julien

THE functioning of the Syria-Lebanon mandate was perverted from the very outset. Neither the English nor the French nor the Syrians believed in the value of the obligations it entailed, and none of them played entirely fair.

Various shrewd dealings during the First World War left the Arabs defiant and embittered. They had not foreseen that the liberation from the Turco-German yoke promised them by Sir Henry McMahon in exchange for their coöperation could result in another form of subjugation. With their territorial claims reduced to the boundaries of Arabia and the inaccessible peripheral lands, they felt that they had been the victims of a breach of trust. Nor were the British and the French better satisfied. From the day after the Sykes-Picot agreement, each party felt that he had been swindled by the other, and their mutual relations in that area were in a state of tension. Faced with the Emir Feisal's expulsion as a *fait accompli*, the English in the Near East never forgave France for the concessions their diplomats had agreed to make to her. Juridically obliged to recognize the mandate, they nullified it in practice and became the technical advisers of the Syrian nationalists in the latter's struggle to destroy it either by sapping operations or by open violence.

This coalition would have been less effective if France had herself pursued a fair and straightforward policy. But from the period of the war she had weakly supported the insurgents for fear of increasing the prestige of the Sherif Husein. After having opened the road to Damascus in July 1920 by artillery fire, and having crushed the ephemeral kingdom of Syria in a single battle, she aroused a spirit of hostility that did not subside until 1936. Holder of a double mandate, she refused to admit that if Lebanon had requested her protection, Syria, on the other hand, rejected it. To have made her rule bearable in Damascus she would have had to assert a sincere desire to prepare the way for eventual independence. But the French statesmen played a deceptive game as regards their obligations. Badly informed public opinion believed that France had acquired a new colony, and the high commissioners acted in that spirit. They made every effort to paralyze

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demands for nationhood instead of stimulating and at the same time canalizing them. The attitude of the minor officials aggravated the situation still further. Unlike England, France had no corps of specialists in Eastern affairs; and she was unable to constitute one since, legally, the mandate was to be of only a temporary character. Accordingly, she had recourse to a colonial personnel which imposed on the politically advanced Syrians an authoritative paternalism of a sort little likely to gain their support. The manner of applying this rule spoiled even the best intentions.

The officer in charge of the Jebel Druze district in 1925, honest and zealous for social improvement, engaged in a commendable struggle to protect the interests of the peasants against the influential classes; but at the same time he instituted requisitions, forced labor, collective fines and imprisonments that exasperated the masses and provoked a revolt which extended as far as Damascus and actually jeopardized the mandate. The French officials believed that community of creed guaranteed the loyalty of the Christians. They were blind to the evolution by which nationalism was gradually securing the ascendancy over religion. Indeed, their policies achieved the paradoxical result of creating a coalition between Mohammedans and Christians against the mandatory power! Though France succeeded in large measure in equipping the country and developing its cultural institutions, she nevertheless compromised these successes by her political incapacity.

Within the framework of her international obligations France ran afoul of exasperating covert resistances: ambiguous attitudes, promises immediately belied by contrary acts, intrigues with foreigners, agitations initiated in the Mohammedan countries of North Africa, chronic street brawling. By means of these Levantine tactics the nationalists signified their refusal to accept the delays foreseen by the League of Nations and their determination to obtain immediate independence. The mandated states, too, were evidently shunning their obligation to assist even the regular operation of the mandate.

Progressing from one crisis to the next, the situation had become tragic when Léon Blum's government came into power in 1936. His secretary of state for foreign affairs, Pierre Viénot, resolutely undertook to find a solution of the problem, and for the first time the Syrian and Lebanese delegates felt that France was

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not trying to deceive them, nor to impose a dictatorship. A proposal was made to them to liquidate the protectorate by a double treaty of independence. One granted Syrian independence after a probationary period of three years, in consideration of guarantees analogous to those accorded Great Britain by 'Iraq, while the other secured from Lebanon more important military advantages and an alliance renewable over an indefinite period. France retained substantial privileges in the regions where her traditional influence had been exercised effectively, and elsewhere established her position through freely accepted engagements. The signing of the protocol registering this agreement reversed the psychological situation. Achem bey Attasi, head of the delegation, declared that it marked "a great date in the history of Syria: the date on which the Syrian nation had rediscovered France." The tremendous enthusiasm of the Arab world was emphasized by the approbation of Chekib Arslan, the native Syrian who was the head of the Pan-Arab movement. In Syria the High Commissioner was acclaimed in cities which for several months had been in a state of chronic insurrection.

This amazing success was very soon compromised, however, by the opposition of the military. The French general staff in Lebanon regarded the concessions as proof of weakness. General Huntziger initiated a violent campaign against the treaty. Officers in Syria provoked revolts in Upper Djezireh to prove that the minorities did not consent to it. In Paris the influential press screamed abdication and even treason, while Henry Haye led the old Senatorial militia to the assault. Turkey's demands for Alexandretta favored the plot. A coalition of the military, the clericals, parliamentarians of the Right, and the newspapers backing them prevented ratification of the treaty. After the fall of the *Front Populaire*, Georges Bonnet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, felt he could not do less than promise the President of the Syrian Council that he would secure ratification by the Chambers before January 31, 1939. Furthermore, he consented to reduce the probationary period. But a month had not elapsed before, under pressure of the military and parties of the Right, he forswore his pledge and postponed examination of the treaties *sine die*.

This retraction sounded the death-knell of the mandate. France lost face throughout the Mohammedan world. Caught in the toils, she thenceforth was reduced to a policy of force in Syria and Lebanon: dissolution of the native parliaments, dismissal or

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arrest of the ministers, installation of appointees whom the native peoples did not trust. Because of the war and consequent necessities of national defense, France liquidated what remained of Syrian liberties.

Then came the débâcle of 1940. The blow it gave to the prestige of France was aggravated by the behavior of the Vichy Government. Marshal Pétain's entourage included the bitterest opponents of Syrian liberties, notably General Huntziger, who was Minister of War, and Henry Haye, who became Ambassador at Washington. In Syria, General Dentz inaugurated a police government against the patriots and to the profit of Germany. The Hotel Métropole at Damascus became the headquarters of German propaganda which from 1941 functioned actively in the cities and among the tribes under the direction of one of the best of the Wilhelmstrasse specialists, Minister Plenipotentiary von Hentig. Its object was in the main to depreciate the French and prove their incapacity to fulfill their tutorial rôle. France's withdrawal from the League of Nations was presented to the Syrians as an abandonment of the mandate. If Germany's propaganda proved, in the end, of no great profit to her, it nevertheless contributed to accentuate the discredit of France.

The 'Iraq affair in May 1941 revealed fully the dependent condition of the Vichy authorities. On instructions from General Huntziger, General Dentz authorized the utilization of three airdromes by 106 German planes, the fictitious sale of sequestered munitions and their transport to the frontier. The general staff even lent itself to fraudulent transactions to obtain transit authorizations across the Turkish zone. By the protocol of May 28, which Admiral Darlan signed after his return from Berchtesgaden, he agreed to furnish the German Government with all the information at the disposal of France "with regard to English war measures in the Near East," and to defend the Levant "against all attacks, with all means at his disposal." This submission to Hitler's exactions, revealed by the English radio and confirmed by the contradictory declarations of General Dentz, increased the demoralization of the French patriots and the audacity of the Syrian nationalists.

The intervention of Free France saved the honor, but did not restore the authority, of the mandatory power. It was General de Gaulle who took the initiative in the Syrian campaign and succeeded in obtaining British support. The entrance of troops into

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Syria was preceded on June 8, 1941, by a proclamation of General Catroux to the Syrian and Lebanese peoples recognizing their status as sovereign and independent states, with which Great Britain associated herself simultaneously by a separate declaration. In July, General de Gaulle and Captain O. Lyttelton, British Minister of State for the Middle East, signed at Beirut an accord which determined the respective prerogatives of the two allies. The strategic command was assigned to Britain, while to France fell the responsibility of maintaining order and general security. Mr. Churchill on September 9 confirmed in the Commons "that among all the nations of Europe the position of France in Syria is one of special privilege, and that in so far as any country will have special influence there, France will be preëminent."

On the one hand, France had guaranteed independence to the Levantine states; on the other, she had received the assurance that she enjoyed a privileged status in them. A delicate problem remained. A formula must be found satisfactory to the mandatory Power, which was anxious to liquidate rights recognized in international engagements still in force, and at the same time to the mandated states, which considered themselves endowed with a right to immediate independence. One solution would have been to go back to the Viénot treaty of 1936. Diplomats well versed in Near Eastern affairs claim that Syrian exiles who had returned from banishment proposed this, but that the Free French rejected it. When Mme. Viénot raised the question in the Consultative Assembly, General de Gaulle vehemently replied that his government had not had authority to sign such an accord, since its legitimacy was not officially recognized. He limited himself to confirming the independence of the Levantine states. This was done in two proclamations issued by General Catroux on September 27 and November 26, which also laid down how it was to be accomplished. Syria and Lebanon were immediately to enjoy the rights and prerogatives of sovereign states, with the power of (1) appointing diplomatic representatives; and (2) constituting national military forces. But their relations with France would be determined by treaties.

The drama of the Franco-British condominium was heralded by the entrance of the Allied troops. After the armistice of St. Jean d'Acre (July 14, 1941), the English, far from supporting the de Gaullist propaganda, showed partiality for the Vichy military and officials. A control commission sat at Beirut, consisting of

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three Britons and two Frenchmen. General Catroux assumed the prerogatives of the former high commissioners, but the government on which he depended was not recognized and he had very few effectives. Great Britain, on the contrary, disposed of the numerous and active diplomatic mission of Major General Sir Edward Spears and of the Ninth Army, whose political officers swarmed everywhere, even into the smallest villages. Collaboration would have been possible only if British power had supplemented the weakness of the French. Since it did not, General de Gaulle gained the impression that the British Government wished to oust France and become itself the arbiter of the Near East by creating a *fait accompli*. That is why de Gaulle fiercely maintained the principle of French rights against all encroachments. His stand resulted in four bitter conflicts between Britain and France. The first occurred on the morrow of the St. Jean d'Acre armistice, when General Spears asserted the policy which he was to pursue for three years — encouraging the local Levantine governments, giving advice that was humiliating to France, intervening in a way that was at times menacing, and evicting France from her least contestable rights, such as the utilization of her share of the Mosul oil, the exploitation of the Tripoli refineries and the Haifa-Tripoli railroad.

In August 1942 General de Gaulle, who had gone to Syria to secure first-hand information, had two interviews at Cairo with Mr. Churchill. The British Prime Minister attempted to reassure him without success. After rather bitter polemics, the situation became so tense that, on de Gaulle's return to London, but for the intervention of Mr. Eden, it would perhaps have ended in a rupture.

In the Levant it would have been good policy to make friends with the Syrians and Lebanese and bring the expected reforms to fruition. Official circles say this was impossible, since France no longer had either sufficient prestige or authority. It seems that the representatives of Free France had set their hearts on playing their worst cards. Against the English technicians they chose to oppose blasé old functionaires, foolhardy officers or arrogant and inexperienced young men. They did not seem to wish sincerely to keep the promises that had been made, and delighted in making subtle interpretations of General Catroux's proclamations which deprived them of their imperative character. Over a year passed in inaction. Not until March 1943 was constitutional life reëstab-

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lished. The elections which took place in the autumn fully revealed the rivalries and anarchy in the administration and ended in the triumph of the nationalists.

In Lebanon, Prime Minister Riyad es Solh profited by the absence of the Delegate General, M. Helleu, who had gone to Algiers for instructions, to "abrogate" by decree the League of Nations mandate. The Premier in this acted contrary to solemn promises he had made; and he did not deny that he did so. Upon his return, M. Helleu thought it incumbent on him to affirm his authority in a forceful way. He arrested the President of the Republic, the President of the Council, seven ministers and a deputy, declared the dissolution of the Chamber and installed in power a friend of France, Emile Eddé. The extent of the disturbances which at once broke out at Beirut was exaggerated in the Arab and Anglo-Saxon press. The Lebanese appealed to General Spears; and the Egyptians, through the intermediary of Nahas Pasha, solicited American intervention in an appeal to Ambassador Kirk.

At Algiers the blunder was soon realized and the responsibility was thrown upon M. Helleu, who, however, refused to accept it. Unquestionably the Delegate General believed he was acting according to the spirit of the instructions he had just received from General de Gaulle. General Catroux, hastily dispatched to the focal point of turmoil, had to yield to the threatening pressure of the British by reëstablishing the ejected government. He is said to have told his colleagues that it was a "second Fashoda." The failure of the French resort to force led the Levantine states to conclude that the mandate was definitely abrogated. Nevertheless, so long as Minister Yves Chataigneau guided French policy at Beirut, that is, from November 1943 until March 1944, there was no friction either with the Syro-Lebanese or with the British or the Americans. M. Chataigneau, former secretary of M. Léon Blum, did not consider as insoluble the problems of the mixed tribunals, the police, and even of the army; and the transfers of the services began without any clashes.

The appointment of General Beynet and the restoration of military primacy, however, threw the entire matter back again into the melting pot. More than a year later, the question which the Syro-Lebanese considered as essential, the transfer of the special troops, had still not been solved.

In the meanwhile several events modified the general situation in the Near East. The French Provisional Government, having

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been recognized by the Powers, judged it necessary for reasons of prestige to exact treaties which the Lebano-Syrians refused to grant, especially since they did not know whether the British, Americans or Russians favored them. The formation of the Arab League transformed the Syrian question into a problem of world politics. Finally, the scope of Britain's actions in Greece seemed to proclaim her determination not to permit any impairment of her position in the eastern Mediterranean. A kind of obsession grew up, especially among British officers in Cairo, that the protective crust would crack in Syria. This obsession harmonized with the general mistrust felt by the English in the Levant with regard to the French authorities. The municipal elections in France, which assured the success of a coalition of the Left, were represented in Egypt and the Levant as heralding the imminent installation of a French government devoted to Moscow, and this increased British anxieties to the highest degree.

Under such circumstances prudence should have been the order of the day. The French Government received plenty of advice to that effect, both from London, which twice advised against sending transports with reinforcements, and from diplomatic and political groups in Paris. On the spot, too, democratic organizations multiplied their appeals for moderation. On May 18, 1945, General Beynet informed the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs that the transfer of the special troops to the Levantine states would be subordinated to the establishment of a cultural treaty and economic agreements as well as to the concession of strategic bases. The delivery of this note was followed by a debarkation of troops. Actually these were of small strength but they assumed a symbolic value. The gesture was both useless and dangerous. On May 19 the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers jointly refused to continue the negotiations. The conflict, thought to have been appeased by the action of M. Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in favoring the admission of the Levantine states to the San Francisco Conference, was resumed and took on a sanguinary character. French officers, soldiers and even civilians were pursued not only by the mob but by the local gendarmerie. All Frenchmen in the Levant affirm that the British troops which were present made no attempt to defend them against these attacks, when they did not, in fact, aid the assailants.

The artillery and air attacks against Damascus, the second in 20 years, aroused the Syrians to a climax of hysteria. The French

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lost 28 killed, as well as 25 of their native troops. It is difficult to estimate the Syro-Lebanese losses, which probably amounted to about 600 killed and 300 wounded. On May 30 General Beynet asserted that he had the situation in hand. That same evening the French Government received from London an urgent request to give the order to cease fire and to allow the British command to take over the authority in Syria and Lebanon. The next day the British Commander in Chief in the Middle East notified French headquarters in Damascus that if their troops opened fire, even to defend themselves, their barracks would be bombarded. Everywhere the British Army off-handedly eliminated not only the military but the civil authorities.

The gravest consequences of the Syrian affair were on the international plane. Mr. Churchill's message to General de Gaulle was in the form of an ultimatum. This was bitterly resented by French public opinion, the more so since it emanated from the most popular Allied personality. Instead of attempting to appease the conflict, General de Gaulle and other generals who do not usually give press conferences carried their case to the public through newspapers and the radio. It was like the palmy days of Vichy; and this the upholders of old-style politics noted with satisfaction.

During the controversy the attitude of both sides fell distinctly short of moral grandeur. General de Gaulle's appeal to international arbitrage was nevertheless singularly powerful. It seemed difficult to deny that Syria was only one element in Near Eastern policy, about which the Arab League had just made a pronouncement, and that this policy was of interest to all the Great Powers. The refusal of Britain and the United States to recognize this, just after the end of the San Francisco Conference, was not founded on very convincing arguments. It does not seem that the United States has ever had a really autonomous policy in the Middle East. In Syria, Mr. Wadsworth constantly supported General Spears and the United States aligned its policy in general with Britain's. This attitude was explained in France as due to the American appetite for oil. Declarations made by Mr. Ickes in 1944 revealed the importance that the United States attaches to fuel reserves in the Middle East. Of the seven planned pipe-line routes from Arabia, two end at Tripoli or Beirut. The companies prefer to deal with independent states; and American diplomacy doubtless had to take account of such interests.

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But neither should one overlook the cultural factor. Instruction at the American University in Beirut, basically a Protestant institution, can make progress only to the detriment of Roman Catholic teaching by the French Jesuits. It is to be noted that one of the first Lebanese laws brought studies into line with American programs. The elimination of French as a study in the primary schools, and the growth of Anglo-Saxon political and economic prestige, may well result in English becoming the second language of the entire Near East. The prospect may please Americans as much as Englishmen.

It is difficult to isolate cultural interests from political attitudes. An educator in a foreign land cannot be an unconcerned spectator of events. American public opinion, moreover, sympathizes with Arab aspirations for independence; and the Arabs, on their side, look on Americans as a generous people and on the United States as free from imperialistic ambitions. In part, too, the American attitude in the Syrian affair was doubtless determined by the blunders or delays of the French authorities. More recently it has been reinforced by the opportunities which such disturbances offer to Soviet penetration.

The conflict in the Levant likewise had repercussions in French internal politics. It made the first dent in General de Gaulle's prestige and in informed circles it stimulated the demand for a regular régime under parliamentary control. The Government's defense of its policy was not received with enthusiasm by the Consultative Assembly, which gave strong evidence of its desire to clear up misunderstandings and reëstablish cordial relations with England. Despite General de Gaulle's acceptance of the transfer of the special troops, the Syrians and Lebanese, fearful now of an Anglo-French understanding, became more intransigent.

General de Gaulle persists in believing that the solution of the Syrian question should precede a general agreement. The British Labor Government, while realizing the mistakes of British policy, do not wish in any way to help reëstablish French authority. The staffs of the French Foreign Office and the British Colonial Office are far from showing a very conciliatory spirit. Indeed, it cannot be said that Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant has lost any of its sharpness. If any solution is to be found, the problem of the Middle East must be treated as a whole.

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THE FUEL CRISIS IN EUROPE

By Karl Brandt

EUROPE is experiencing the worst fuel crisis in its history — a catastrophe made doubly grave by the extreme shortage of food. The fuel crisis ranks in importance with the food shortage, for food and fuel together are the essential sources of energy, human and mechanical.

It is frequently said that we live in the age of electricity, and that now we are entering the age of atomic power. But coal remains the chief source of energy in all continents. In prewar years, Europe (excluding Russia) used the following amounts of solid and liquid fuels; 280,000,000 to 300,000,000 tons of hard (black) coal; 220,000,000 metric tons of brown coal or lignite; 40,000,000 to 50,000,000 tons of fuel wood; 8,000,000 tons of natural petroleum (including about 7,000,000 tons of Rumanian oil); 9,000,000 tons of oil imported from overseas; 1,800,000 tons of natural gasoline from European oil wells; 2,400,000 tons of gasoline from overseas; 600,000 tons of benzol for coke ovens. In addition, the Continent used in the neighborhood of 3,000,000 tons of synthetic gasoline. Since this synthetic motor fuel was processed from coal, the energy which it represents is included in the aforementioned volume. The same is true of the large amount of lighting gas, chiefly for kitchen use, which is processed from coal by dry distillation and thus is chiefly coal energy in a more convenient form. The Continent used some 125 billion kw-hrs of electric energy, but two-thirds were derived from coal.

These figures reveal the overwhelming importance of coal as the source of heat and mechanical energy on the Continent. Industries, workshops, offices, homes and kitchens all need coal, and since the brown coal goes chiefly to the electric power plants located on top of the mines, this means, essentially, that they need bituminous coal. Most railroad engines run on coal; inland ships use it; and many tractors and trucks operate on generator gas made from coal.

The Continent has two main hard-coal deposits of the first rank: the Silesian basin (the smaller of the two), and the large and fabulously rich though very deep basin of the Ruhr and the adjacent France-Belgian Brie-Longwy basin. The Ruhr coal, the location of which makes it the European equivalent of the Pittsburgh deposits in the United States, has been the determining factor in the heavy concentration of industries in the Rhenish-Westphalian triangle, and in the construction of the dense system of canals and rivers which feed into the nearby Dutch delta of the Rhine. For centuries the Ruhr coal has been exported by water to other European countries. Great Britain used her abundant coal for overseas exports and established a near monopoly in bunker coal for the world's merchant marine. The Germans, on the other hand, were the chief suppliers of coal to the Continent.

The five major coal-producing countries of Europe had a total annual output of from 255,000,000 to 317,000,000 metric tons of hard coal, of which 54 to 59 percent were mined in Germany. The 1935–1939 average annual production (in metric tons) was: Germany 140,000,000 to 186,000,000 tons; Belgium 27,000,000 to 30,000,000 tons; France 46,000,000 tons; Poland 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 tons; and Czechoslovakia 12,000,000 to 15,000,000 tons. Four-

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fifths of the German output came from western Germany, and three-fourths of it came from the Ruhr. In addition to her large hard-coal production, Germany mined another 160,000,000 to 200,000,000 tons of lignite or brown coal per annum. Some 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 tons of the German output was high-grade coking coal.

Some countries — Italy, Switzerland and Denmark, for example — depended upon German exports for almost their entire supply of coal. Other countries with a large domestic coal production, such as France, Belgium and Luxembourg, used German coal, and such coal as Great Britain could spare, as a substantial supplement to their own resources.

In 1938 the vast German armament program cut the export of coal and coke to a total of only about 30,000,000 tons, as compared to about 47,000,000 in 1937. The total was distributed among the importing countries as follows: Italy 7,400,000 tons, France 6,280,000 tons, Belgium-Luxembourg 5,100,000 tons, Netherlands 5,356,000 tons, Switzerland 1,500,000 tons, Denmark 1,270,000 tons, Czechoslovakia 670,000 tons, Jugoslavia 410,000 tons.

It is noteworthy that the supply of coal needed to keep Europe's industrial machine going and to supplement the supply of lighting gas and home fuel was fairly well maintained up to the final six months of the war. This was possible because under centralized Nazi administration the coal production of the Continent was either held at prewar levels or stepped up by the use of slave labor from the Ukraine. The dislocation of transport as a result of strategic bombing did lead to a shortage of coal in the winter of 1944–45; but the scarcity did not develop into a famine.

An analysis of the recent fuel situation illustrates the complexity of the modern economy. Changes in the political map have disarranged Europe's fuel supply. So far as we can now see, we must assume that for the next two or three years at least little or no fuel — solid, liquid or gaseous — will move across a line drawn north and south between Lubeck and Trieste. This means that no Silesian coal, no Rumanian, Polish or Austrian oil, and no Polish or East German wood can be counted on to be available for the countries outside the Russian sphere of influence. These will serve as reparations in kind for Russia or will be used by the countries which produce them.

It should be remembered that there has been a heavy influx of German population into the American, British and French zones. Now that the Saar has been annexed by France, the requirements of homes and industries of these zones must be supplied exclusively from the Ruhr and from the less important Aachen area. These must also supply the chief import needs of Italy, Switzerland, Belgium-Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark and Sweden.

Naturally, France and Belgium are anxious to restore full production in their mines. The main difficulties are the shortage of miners, disorganized rail and water transport and a scarcity of mining lumber. Both countries work their coal mines with a large number of German prisoners of war; Belgium received 45,000 German POW's, all of whom are in the mines, and France 800,000. The coal production in the Saar broke down in the late summer due to the insufficient food allotted to the miners, and the United States Army declared about 300,000 German prisoners of war unfit for work on account of emaciation. These difficulties seem to have been straightened out. By November 1945, it was reported that France had attained a monthly output of coal

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at the rate of 39,000,000 tons per annum. But in the best prewar years France used close to 70,000,000 tons, of which more than 50,000,000 were produced domestically. Belgium has improved her output, and in November her homes, industries and public utilities began to be fairly well supplied.

The capacity of the Ruhr is three times that of all French mines combined; and the "fat coal" produced there is of high coking quality. Thus the Ruhr coal basin can be said to hold the key to the solution of the European fuel crisis. No matter who has title to the Ruhr, or who operates the mines, the Ruhr is part of Europe as a whole, and the fuel shortage in Europe as a whole cannot be overcome unless the Ruhr swings into full production.

No area in Europe was more methodically bombed than the Ruhr, yet underground installations remain mostly intact. In June, pithead output was up to 11 percent of 1938–43 production; in July, it had reached 16 percent; but by November it still had not surpassed 20 percent. Even these figures are deceptive, since only one-half of production represents real output: the other half is needed to run the mine. The entire set of pumps, ventilators, elevators and other machines must operate, no matter how small the output. The mines cannot begin large-scale production, moreover, until the railroads and the canal and river navigation on which they depend have been restored to full service. Some mines of the Rhineland and Westphalia which began to operate immediately after the end of the war had to close down soon thereafter because output piled up at the shafts. By October 1, 1945, the Rhine was passable up to Strasbourg, but closed from there to Basel. Eighty percent of railroad trackage in the western occupied zones is in usable condition, but the freight carried is not more than a fraction of the prewar amount.

A shortage of skilled labor also hampers coal production in the Ruhr. Germany drafted the miners for the Army and replaced them by foreign workers. These have now left; many former German miners between the ages of 20 and 40 are dead; and many others have not returned.

The food situation also holds down production. In July the British began to issue emergency rations of imported wheat, and later established canteens for miners only. The rations of 3,000 calories for surface workers and 3,400 for underground workers are about the same as the rations of 2,915 and 3,665 calories prevailing under the Nazi régime in 1943–44. However, the families of the miners receive rations of only 1,300 to 1,400 calories — one-third below the subsistence level — and the miner will surely share his ration with them when he can. Even when he himself is well-fed he will not work well if he knows that his loved ones are starving.

The shortage of wooden pit-props is another bottleneck. The heavy faulting in the mines, the depth of many shafts — some go a mile and a third down — and the dense settlements on the surface combine to make heavy and frequent bracing necessary. Most of the timber used formerly came from the eastern provinces of the Reich, now inaccessible; and props must now be taken from the scanty timber stands in the American-occupied zone. By the end of August 1945, 2,000 tons of timber per day were being shipped to the Ruhr, but this amount permits no increase in the present output of coal.

Failure to get production going in the Ruhr has had repercussions in almost every country of Europe. Norway and Sweden will be cold this winter because they have to rely chiefly on cordwood. Denmark and Switzerland are in an

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even worse plight because they have scanty forest reserves. Holland's chief trouble is the impaired condition of water and rail communication with the Ruhr. In Switzerland, households receive a strictly rationed allowance of gas for cooking, and not a pound of coal; the cordwood ration for the entire winter is sufficient to heat only a single room for one month. Switzerland's plight is especially severe because the Rhine is not yet navigable up to Basel, and no French, Belgian or British coal can reach her. Italy's position is almost as bad. The extreme shortage has driven a good deal of household coal "underground"; indeed, in spite of its bulk, coal has become a popular means of barter. "Bootleg" coal buys almost anything.

Substitutes for bituminous coal offer little help. Production of brown coal has been restored in western Germany to a somewhat greater degree than production of hard coal, and such as there is goes to industrial plants; none is used for domestic heating. Gas and oil obtained from coal are, of course, as scarce as coal itself; the processing of synthetic oil from coal has ceased entirely. Wells in Hanover and Brunswick (in the British zone) now produce up to 55,000 tons of natural crude oil, but the motor fuel which this yields is only a drop in the bucket. Hydroelectricity is abundant in some mountain areas, but it cannot be used for heating purposes unless heavy wiring is installed; and insulated copper wire is scarce, and so are skilled electricians.

The European countries are already making intensive use of cordwood, and an increase is possible only within narrow limits. Europe used fuel wood as an equivalent of 41,800,000 metric tons of coal before the war. The war has drained timber resources heavily, and the demand for lumber for reconstruction will soon be extreme. Cordwood is very bulky and is wasteful as freight; to ship it to urban centers while the railroads are in such bad shape is almost impossible. The quest for substitutes simply leads back to the primary shortage — hard coal from the Ruhr, supplemented by lignite from various scattered deposits.

Lack of protection from winter weather is destroying Europe's human and capital assets. Bombing wrecked the roofs and walls of innumerable factories; though the machinery within often came through in relatively good shape, months of rain and snow will now reduce the great bulk of it to scrap. Homes are not only unheated but have broken windows and roofs. (Vienna and the province of Lower Austria, for instance, need 10,000,000 square yards of glass and 80,000,000 roof tiles.) The drastic shortage of woolen clothing and blankets further aggravates the effects of the fuel crisis. And the coal famine of course produces mass unemployment in industry.

Starvation, pestilence and violence are logical results of such a situation. This brief survey has not attempted to outline either short-term or long-term measures of relief. But it is clear that Europe must have the coal of the Ruhr. International management of the mines, in which Germany might share, but with the United Nations in control, seems the solution most likely to provide the desired physical safeguards against any renewal of German aggression as well as to supply the fuel which Europe needs if it is to be at peace.

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THE ITALO-JUGOSLAV FRONTIER

By Gaetano Salvemini

THE proposals regarding the Italo-Jugoslav boundaries made by the United States delegation at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers ran as follows:

> The frontier with Jugoslavia should be substantially adjusted in favor of Jugoslavia to follow roughly the ethnic factor, subject to necessary modification to preserve the essential economy of the local region. There is suggested the old Wilson Line in part, with modifications in favor of Jugoslavia in the north and in favor of Italy in the south. The modification in the north is primarily for ethnic reasons; the modification in the south is for both ethnic and economic reasons and would preserve for Italy coal and bauxite deposits which are important for her economic life. The foregoing will give Trieste to Italy. It is suggested, however, that a substantial part of the port of Trieste be made a free port, administered by a commission containing representatives of the nations which will use the port. . . .

The "ethnic factor" formula gives rise to a good deal of doubt. If it had been said that the frontier had to be readjusted roughly in accordance with the "national factor," no room would have been left for equivocation. "National" feeling is based on consciousness and will. When we say that, according to the Austrian census of 1910, so many Italians and so many Slavs were living in Trieste and its outskirts, we mean that so many people professed Italian national sentiment and so many professed Slav national sentiment. But if we speak of "ethnic factors," we put our finger into a wasps' nest. For two thousand years (not to mention prehistoric times, about which we know nothing) Venezia Giulia was the meeting place of nobody knows how many "ethnic" elements coming from everywhere by land and sea. Italian nationalists and Fascists used to maintain that most of the Slavs were "ethnically" Italians who had "betrayed" their Herrenvolk; while Slav nationalists and Fascists (and now Tito's Communists) term most of the Italians "renegades" of Slav origin. Both Italians and Slavs have swallowed the Nazi doctrine of "race" as a primitive and permanent factor in history, and draw from it absurd deductions.

Let us hope that the authors of the American memorandum thought "national" when they wrote "ethnic." If we start from the assumption that the "national" factor must control, we have to agree with their contention that the Wilson Line, proposed by the United States in 1919, provides the most suitable approach to a sensible solution, provided it is modified as required by the essential economy of given localities.[1] The Slav farmer who has to sell his milk and cabbages cannot be politically disassociated from the nearby town and forced to go with his donkey to market fifty miles away. But though he has to be respected and protected in his rights as a human being, he cannot claim the right of administering a town whose population is not Slav but Italian in its majority. A railway that links two important Italian cities like Trieste and Pola should not be handed over to Slav authorities solely because it passes

[1] For the historical background of the question, see Gaetano Salvemini, "The Frontiers of Italy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1944.

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

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through a stony territory sparsely inhabited by Slavs. On the other hand, cities like Fiume or Zara cannot be economically disassociated from the compactly and exclusively Slavic population which surrounds them, even though three-fifths or more of their own populations are Italian.

The United States proposals leave a dangerous gap: they do not indicate the ways and means for enforcing the personal, political and cultural rights of the Slav national minority under Italian jurisdiction and of the Italian minority under Slav jurisdiction. National minorities cannot be left to the mercy of the majorities, either here or in any other plurinational territory of Europe. One of the worst crimes of those who operated the League of Nations was to regard all pledges to respect minority rights as scraps of paper. If an efficient system of guarantees to protect minorities is applied in nationally mixed territories, even an imperfect boundary will not give rise to serious trouble; without it, even the best political frontier will be a permanent wound.

Perhaps President Truman and Secretary Byrnes think that the matter is covered by the Bill of Rights which Italy must undertake to maintain. But a Bill of Rights can contain only general principles, whereas detailed provisions and agencies for enforcement are required to protect national minorities. In the case in question, the provisions once agreed upon between Rome and Belgrade to protect the Italian national minority in Dalmatia would be sufficient. They should be revived to protect both Italians in Jugoslavia and Jugoslavs in Italy, and a permanent Arbitration Committee should be set up with the task of enforcing the rights and privileges of minorities against annulment or circumvention.

Pending a definite and let us hope a wise solution, the exigencies of the situation have produced one good development. In order to keep the peace in the Anglo-American zone, the AMG officials have been training a body of police. In any mixed territory an arbitrating authority will not be able to uphold the rights of national minorities without having a police force at its disposal. The numbers of such a force need not be large, in view of modern facilities of communication.

If the above solution is not adopted, there remains only the Hitler-Stalin method: to evict or murder minorities (or majorities) everywhere they interfere with nationalistic programs.

The formula adopted in the American memorandum in connection with the port of Trieste is good. "A substantial part of the port" should be made "free" and administered by "a commission containing representatives of the nations which will use the port." All the merchants and workers of Trieste, whatever their "national" sentiment, would be glad to see a substantial part of the port — nay, the whole of it — made "free" from customs duties and administered by a board of businessmen (not diplomats) belonging to the countries which have to use it, that is, Italians, Slavs, Austrians and Czechoslovaks.

Even so, the formula is not sufficient to cover all the issues involved. The port of Trieste depends for life only in small degree on local facilities and management; mostly it depends on the customs duties and railway tariffs of the hinterland, and on the absence in that respect of unfair discriminations between Trieste and other competing ports, particularly Fiume (which, strangely, is not

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mentioned in the American memorandum at all). This matter calls for careful thought, so that it may at least be settled in principle by the peace treaty, in the interest both of the hinterland and of Trieste.

II. THE ITALIAN MEMORANDUM

The memorandum laid before the London Conference by the Italian Foreign Minister, Signor De Gasperi, and published in the *New York Times* of October 6, had the great merit of being short; but it could have been even shorter.

First of all, it should have omitted the argument that the frontier accepted by the Jugoslavs in 1920 "follows the Alpine watershed and corresponds to the geographical border line between the Black Sea and Adriatic areas — namely, between the Italian region and the Balkans." Not only is the geographical border line in Venezia Giulia so uncertain that no two geographers can agree on it, but, more important, the doctrine itself of "natural" frontiers becomes absurd when transferred from the domain of physical geography to that of history and international relations.

Geographers, for the purpose of their studies, divide the surface of the earth into "natural regions," separated by "natural frontiers." Some take as their criterion the watersheds, others the rivers, with resultant variations in the form and contour of "natural" regions according to the different methods of different schools. If one takes the watershed as a criterion, historical Switzerland vanishes into thin air. If one takes the rivers, an Alpine natural region is formed, with Switzerland as its heart and with the Rhine, the Upper Danube, the Middle Danube, the Sava River and the Po River as natural limits; in that case, historical France, Germany, Austria, Jugoslavia and Italy are quartered. If one adopts the watershed in dividing the Italian from the Balkan peninsula, Venezia Giulia is split into an eastern section that goes to the Balkan and a western section that goes to the Italian peninsula (though nobody can locate the watershed in the Carso). If one prefers the rivers, the Isonzo River becomes the boundary between the two "natural" regions.

In actual fact, it is the people occupying a country that make history, and not the mountains, watersheds, rivers and nests of lizards. In settling here and there, groups of human beings have not been concerned with the needs of the geographers. "National" frontiers, far from being "natural," are "artificial." That is, they are the product of human will. They result from the struggles between neighboring groups, which pass over mountains, cross rivers, advance, recede. There is no "natural" boundary between the United States and Canada. Those who compiled the Italian memorandum would have done well to break away from the misconception of "natural" limits.

The strategic arguments should also have been ignored. In the day of airplanes, rockets and the atomic bomb, the transfer of the frontier in Venezia Giulia a few miles to the east or to the west would not assure "adequate possibilities" of protection, as the memorandum states, for the Venetian plains, the Po Valley or the northern Adriatic. There no longer are strategic frontiers, but geographical positions, economic resources, industrial organizations and alliances. The Italian Foreign Minister should have left strategic tomfooleries to those chiefs of the Italian General Staff who gave such shining evidence of their abilities in 1940 and following years.

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The economic arguments should have been left out, too. The people living in a given territory are duty-bound to make good use of their local natural resources and not to prevent access to them by other peoples. In the case of Venezia Giulia, if the Italian Foreign Minister says that he "needs" bauxite or coal, Tito too will say that he "needs" them. Everyone needs everything. When one puts "need" before "right," one forfeits the right to protest when the person holding the knife by the handle steps in and takes what he "needs."

The authors of the Italian memorandum might well have based their line of thought on a principle formulated on October 6 by John Foster Dulles, Adviser to Secretary Byrnes at the London Conference: "Territorial settlements should, as far as possible, conform to the wishes of the peoples concerned. Strategic and economic considerations ought to be subordinated to human considerations." Mountains and rivers, bauxite and coal, have no souls. A country belongs to the people who inhabit it in the same way that a house belongs to those who built it and not to the bricks which make it.

It is difficult to understand the statement in the Italian memorandum that "about a million inhabitants were left in 1940 in the region — more than 550,000 Italian-speaking and approximately 400,000 Slav-speaking." Even if we grant that Austrian officials hostile to the Italians gave undue advantage to the Slavs in the 1910 census, and if in consequence estimate the Italians at 390,000 or 400,000 in 1910, the number of them cannot have jumped to 500,000 by 1940. To be sure, the deliberate importation of Italians after the last war brought about an exceptional increase; but a figure like 100,000 can hardly be true.

The memorandum admits that a perfect solution of the national problem is unattainable, in view of the inextricable mingling of the two national groups, and proposes the Wilson Line as that which best divides Slav territory from that which is predominantly Italian. Furthermore, it admits as a "self-evident" fact that large-scale autonomies will have to be granted on both sides of the frontier and that adequate legislation will have to be enacted to insure to both groups the full enjoyment of personal, political, cultural and economic rights. This is fair-mindedness and common sense.

The Italian memorandum rightly distinguishes the *national* problem of Venezia Giulia from the *economic* problem of the port of Trieste. On the latter, it properly states that the prosperity not only of this port but of Fiume as well depends not on the local technical organization, but on economic adjustments between the near and distant hinterland and on an international agreement on the best method of utilizing the two ports.

The Italian memorandum ends by paying homage to the memory of President Wilson, who in 1919 "pleaded for a decision of equity and justice." This is not the way in which Italian nationalists and Fascists spoke in 1919. Father Time is an honest man.

If suitably clarified, the American and Italian proposals can be easily reconciled and would lead to a fair solution of the problem.

III. THE FAILURE TO REACH A DECISION AT LONDON

In the end, the London Conference decided on September 19 that the whole question of the Italo-Jugoslav frontier should be studied by "deputies and

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experts" of the Big Five. They have to work out the "ethnic" line to the best of their ability, after visiting the disputed area, and to report on the international régime and form of transit facilities which would be best suited to the port of Trieste.

It is disheartening to discover that on a matter which has already been worn threadbare by hundreds of scholars of all nationalities there still should be considered some need for experts to visit the disputed areas and work out an "ethnic" line. Were there no "experts" in England or in the United States capable of working out an opinion during the years of the war and so of preparing the decisions to be taken by the Foreign Ministers?

To take as a basis for decisions the present status of the populations on the spot would mean to reward crimes. During the years of Fascism, many Slavs were forced to emigrate to avoid prison or death, and many Italians were imported to alter the proportions of the two national groups. Then World War II came. How many Slavs were exterminated by Italian Fascists between 1941 and 1943, and how many Italians were made short work of by Tito's Partisans in 1945? Nobody knows, or perhaps will ever know. Neither the situation created by Mussolini before 1945, nor that created by Tito in 1945, affords a basis for estimating the real strength of Italians or Slavs in this unhappy territory. The only fair basis for estimates and decisions still remains the Austrian census of 1910. Though the Austrian political authorities were partial toward the Slavs, the 1910 figures represent a fairly correct picture of a situation that had spontaneously developed during the preceding century and that most likely, under normal conditions, would have undergone little or no change from 1910 to the present.

The State Department possesses the studies made in 1918 by a body of honest scholars for the Paris Conference. They chose precisely the Austrian census of 1910 as the basis for ascertaining the strength of the two national groups in the disputed territory. Factors which were neither "national" nor "ethnic," but simply criminal, made their work useless in 1919. Let us in 1945 come back to the right path. If the American conclusions of 1918 are likely to be improved upon in some details, let them be improved upon by a Committee of Arbitrators. Most likely such a committee would go to the Library of Congress and would make its decisions there quietly without wasting time and money in visiting the disputed area. If the Big Five want to do justice and at the same time avoid embarrassment, resort to the arbitration method would have two advantages: it would remove from their shoulders a dangerous responsibility; and it would force the interested parties to bow before the rule of reason or, at the worst, to dishonor themselves by revolting against it.

Perhaps the Ministers of the Big Five decided to send experts to Venezia Giulia in the thought of gaining time while they negotiated compromises on other matters which had nothing to do with the Italo-Jugoslav frontier. Let us hope that compromises in other fields are not bought at the price of injustices inflicted on Italian or Jugoslav skins.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE PRICE OF PEACE. By SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE. New York: Norton, 1945, 160 p. $2.00.

Sir William applies his philosophy to the problem of how to prevent war. His ideas are interesting, though hardly novel. Some of his proposals, notably in regard to an international security organization and the treatment of Germany, do not look in the direction indicated by the San Francisco Charter and the Potsdam Agreements, for Beveridge puts his hope in such devices as compulsory arbitration and a "soft peace" for the vanquished.

NATIONALISM AND AFTER. By EDWARD HALLETT CARR. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 76 p. $1.25.

An interesting, if rather theoretical, short essay on what has been happening to the doctrine of nationalism in recent years and what its future is to be in an increasingly international-minded world. Professor Carr fears the emergence of great regional blocs of power, neither national nor truly international.

BACKGROUNDS OF CONFLICT: IDEAS AND FORMS IN WORLD POLITICS. By KURT LONDON. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 487 p. $5.00.

Dr. London has here undertaken the formidable task of analyzing the political philosophies and systems of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, feudal and imperial Japan, Soviet Russia, the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States. Though he takes up each of these countries in turn, there is an underlying element of comparison and contrast between democracy and its enemies — the Soviet Union he classes as "the great transition." The author's method is a combination of the historical and the socio-political. Selective bibliographies accompany each section.

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER: NEW WORLDS FOR OLD. By JULIUS STONE. Sydney: Current Book Distributors, 1945, 96 p.

Essays dealing with the relation of the Atlantic Charter to peace planning in general, to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, and to the problems of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific areas.

UNITED WORLD: THE ROAD TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE. By SCOTT NEARING. New York: Island Press, 1945, 265 p. $1.50.

An American Leftist of long standing reviews the status of current world disorganization and comes up with his own suggestions for a more "scientific" — and socialistic — arrangement of economic and political power.

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE PEACE. By HENRY G. ALSBERG. New York: Hastings House, 1945, 324 p. $2.75.

This book is cast in the form of a series of hypothetical dialogues between an expert on international affairs and a G. I., after Dumbarton Oaks but before San Francisco. Mr. Alsberg finds much fault with the Dumbarton proposals and in general wants the nations to move faster and farther toward effective world government, preferably through regional federations.

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COMMONWEALTH OF TOMORROW. By H. Goetz. Allahabad: Indian Periodicals, 1944, 181 p. Rs. 3.

"An analysis and interpretation of present world trends in the light of historical experience." It is only natural that the author, viewing the scene from India, should stress colonial problems.

NOW OR NEVER. By Howard Williams. London: Alliance Press, 1944, 84 p. 3/6.

A British war correspondent recounts his experiences in the Mediterranean area and expresses the hope that we have learned our lessons about the importance of air power and the need for long-term coöperation among allies.

DUMBARTON OAKS. Compiled by Robert E. Summers. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1945, 267 p. $1.25.

Numerous articles and other pieces selected to typify varying points of view.

WEAPONS FOR PEACE. By Thomas P. Neill. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945, 234 p. $2.50.

A Catholic writer finds that real, enduring peace is a long way off, and will be attained only when men embrace peace in their hearts. He discusses, at some length, Catholic doctrine and action in this sense.

IT'S HAPPENING AGAIN. By Ernest R. Troughton. London: Gifford, 1944, 111 p. 7/6.

Mr. Troughton recites the unhappy record of how after 1918 Germany used the bickerings and jealousies among the Allies to her own advantage, and warns against setting forth once more on this path to disaster.

THE HOUSE OF EUROPE. By Paul Scott Mowrer. Boston: Houghton, 1945, 647 p. $3.75.

Paul Scott Mowrer represented the *Chicago Daily News* in and out of Paris from 1911 until 1935, when he returned as editor of that important newspaper. His lengthy recollections are partly personal and partly historical.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN EXPERIMENT. By P. de Azcárate. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945, 209 p. $2.00.

A former Director of the Minorities Questions Section of the League of Nations presents a systematic résumé of that "experiment." There are 50 pages of documents in the appendix.

CONTRO CORRENTE. By Paolo Vittorelli. Cairo: Giustizia e Libertà, 1944, 200 p.

A young anti-Fascist leader, editor of an Italian weekly in Egypt, suggests means for counteracting the appeal now being made to the masses by totalitarian doctrines of both the Right and the Left.

PRÉFACE À LA PAIX. By Noël-Pierre Lenoir. Montreal: Parizeau, 1944, 355 p. $1.75.

Against a broad sweep of European diplomatic history since the Treaty of Westphalia, the author examines the basic issues of political and economic reconstruction that confront Europe.

WORLD WAR: ITS CAUSE AND CURE. By Lionel Curtis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 274 p. $3.25.

Mr. Curtis returns to his long-nurtured argument that the anarchy among nations which inevitably breeds war can be solved only by at least a partial surrender of sovereignty by each nation.

EL CRIMEN DE LA GUERRA. By Juan B. Alberdi. La Plata: Editorial Calomino, 1944, 189 p. Peso 1.

An historical, legal and philosophical analysis of war in which the author's point of view is indicated by the title.

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ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. By Henry De Wolf Smyth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945, 264 p. $2.00.

This is a commercial edition of the official report concerning the development of the atomic bomb made originally at the time the two bombs were dropped on Japan. Though hardly written in a popular vein, this report should be comprehensible to those with a basic knowledge of physics and chemistry.

OCEAN POWER WINS. By Brian Tunstall. London: Secker and Warburg, 1944, 216 p. 9/6.

The author seeks, with only moderate success, to bring Mahan up to date. His facts, though not always beyond question, are more reliable than his interpretations.

AIR POWER FOR PEACE. By Eugene E. Wilson. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945, 184 p. $2.00.

Mr. Wilson, President of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America and a prominent airplane manufacturer, cites the experiences of the recent war to show that a nation's air power consists of a careful balance of military air force, civil air commerce, and the aircraft manufacturing industry.

THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW. By J. L. Brierly. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 142 p. $2.00.

Eight lectures by the Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford University.

AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. By H. Lauterpacht. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 230 p. $3.00.

The contents of this book were originally presented as lectures during 1942–43. Some of the problems for which the author proposes solutions have by now been taken care of, at least temporarily, by the United Nations Charter. Others of his suggestions would appear, however desirable in the abstract, to be politically unobtainable.

A GUIDE TO THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES. By Vladimir D. Pastuhov. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945, 275 p. $2.50.

A one-time member of the League Secretariat draws on his experience and his exhaustive research to present a systematic, documented analysis of procedure at international conferences.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT. By Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945, 500 p. $4.50.

In this monograph a former member of the League of Nations Secretariat describes in exact detail the organization and functioning of that "great experiment in international administration." Though he has in general eschewed political issues, these have inevitably obtruded themselves, particularly in his inner history of the Secretariat and in his evaluation of its successes and failures.

NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE. By John Bartlet Brebner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945, 385 p. $4.00.

A masterly historical analysis of the political and economic forces that have conditioned relations between Canada, Britain and the United States since before the American Revolution. This volume forms a fitting conclusion to the comprehensive series on Canadian-American affairs edited by Professor James T. Shotwell.

VOICES OF HISTORY: 1944–45. Edited by Nathan Ausübel. New York: Gramercy, 1945, 678 p. $3.50.

A collection of 180 state papers and addresses by the principal leaders and spokesmen (on both sides in the world conflict) published or delivered in 1944.

General: Economic and Social

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT. By Calvin B. Hoover. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945, 177 p. $1.75.

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A thoughtful analysis of postwar problems of commercial policy with particular attention to the connection between foreign economic policy and domestic prosperity. Dr. Hoover is on the whole optimistic as to the possibility of expanding international trade in a world of mixed economies.

THE BOGEY OF ECONOMIC MATURITY. By George Terborgh. Chicago: Machinery and Allied Products Institute, 1945, 263 p. $3.00.

This is a reasoned attempt to refute the school of economic thought, in Britain and America, which holds that our economy is mature, that stagnation will shortly (or has already) set in, and that the state must therefore actively intervene to keep the economic machine going.

ECONOMIC DESTINY. By Ralph George Hawtrey. New York: Longmans, 1944, 388 p. $7.50.

What is wrong with current economic institutions and practices, and what can be done to correct these faults? The author's underlying assumptions belong to the welfare school of thought.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. Edited by Seymour E. Harris. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945, 424 p. $3.75.

Essays on a wide variety of topics, by 23 experts. The chapters in Part V deal with international economic relations.

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DOMESTIC WELFARE. By Norman S. Buchanan. New York: Holt, 1945, 249 p. $2.75.

A solid and significant monograph on one of the most important aspects of international economic relations.

COOPERATIVE COMMUNITIES AT WORK. By Henrik F. Infield. New York: Dryden, 1945, 201 p. $3.00.

A common-sense description and analysis of rural coöperation as a system of production and of living, in various countries.

WORLD AIR CONTROL BOARD. By Sir Frank Clarke. Melbourne: Robertson, 1944, 97 p. 4/6.

The author proposes what would appear to be a rather impractical plan for a few great regional Air Control Boards — *e.g.* one for Europe — which would have charge of constructing and operating airplanes. His book bears the subtitle, "If nations may build commercial planes they can convert to warplanes."

RADIO: HEUTE UND MORGEN. By Arno Huth. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1944, 402 p. Sw. Fr. 15.

A comprehensive, largely non-technical survey of the political, economic and social rôle of radio throughout the world.

PACIFISM AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION. By G. C. Field. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1945, 122 p. $1.25.

A brief, cogent analysis of the problem as it involves both the individual and society.

THE CULT OF EQUALITY. By Stuart Omer Landry. New Orleans: Pelican, 1945, 359 p. $3.50.

A presentation of the case for holding that there are fundamental and inherent inequalities among the races, and that the White is superior to the Negro.

The Second World War

FROM PEARL HARBOR INTO TOKYO. New York: Columbia Broadcasting System, 1945, 312 p. 25 cents.

Excerpts from CBS news broadcasts selected to highlight the dramatic events in the Pacific war.

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FROM D-DAY THROUGH VICTORY IN EUROPE. New York: Columbia Broadcasting System, 1945, 314 p. 25 cents.

CBS broadcasts of the European campaign.

SPIES AND TRAITORS OF WORLD WAR II. By Kurt Singer. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945, 295 p. $2.75.

Exciting stories of German espionage all over the world.

JOURNEY INTO VICTORY. By Peter Stursberg. London: Harrap, 1944, 160 p. 8/6.

A Canadian radio correspondent describes the Alaska Highway and then moves on to follow the Dominion troops into Sicily.

THE R.C.A.F. OVERSEAS. Edited by the R.C.A.F. Historical Section. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 376 p. $3.00.

This official record carries the story up through the summer of 1943.

PŘES FRONTY A PŘES HRANICE. By Josef Falta. New York: New York Listy, 1943, 255 p. $1.50.

The experiences of a Czech who fled Hitler's occupation of his homeland by way of invaded Poland and Estonia.

CALL US TO WITNESS. By Hania and Gaither Warfield. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1945, 434 p. $3.00.

Mr. Warfield, an American, was pastor of the Methodist Church in Warsaw when the war broke out. The chronicle of what he and his Polish wife endured — at the hands of the Russians, in German-occupied Poland, in a Nazi concentration camp — is engrossing if not pleasant reading.

THE FAR SHORE. By Max Miller. New York: Whittlesey House, 1945, 173 p. $2.50.

D-Day in Normandy described in vivid human detail and illustrated with a number of photographs.

WITH THE RED DEVILS AT ARNHEM. By Marek Święcicki. London: Max-Love, 1945, 91 p. 6/6.

The dramatic, heart-rending story of the costly battle waged by the Allied glider forces at Arnhem in September 1944, told by a Polish journalist.

SECRET MISSION SUBMARINE. By Lieutenant N. L. A. Jewell. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1944, 159 p. $2.00.

The author commanded the British submarine *Seraph* on which General Mark Clark made his famous secret visit to Algeria and on which General Giraud was smuggled out of Vichy France to North Africa shortly after the Allied invasion late in 1942. Lieutenant Jewell recounts these and other adventures in the Mediterranean with rare good humor.

TRIUMPH OVER TUNISIA. By Wing Commander T. H. Wisdom. London: Allen and Unwin, 1944, 202 p. 8/6.

A thoroughly readable account of the part taken by the R.A.F. in the conquest of Tunisia in 1943.

DESERT JOURNEY. By George Rodger. London: Cresset, 1944, 151 p. 15/.

The author is an American newspaperman who — between September 1940 and December 1941 — went from London to Bengasi, visiting en route West Africa, General LeClerc's force in the Libyan Desert, Syria at the time of Wilson's campaign there, Trans-Jordan, Teheran at the moment when British and Russian troops met in Iran, and the Khyber Pass. Both his text and his photographic illustrations will be found most interesting.

MIDDLE EAST 1940–1942: A STUDY IN AIR POWER. By Philip Guedalla. London: Hodder, 1944, 236 p. 10/6.

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The late historian and biographer sought in these pages to recapture the spirit behind the men and the policy that saved the Middle East. As one would expect from Mr. Guedalla, his prose is exciting even if his narrative may not always stand the test of professional scrutiny.

THE GOLDEN CARPET. By Somerset de Chair. New York: Harcourt, 1945, 252 p. $3.50.

This delightfully written book was originally published as a very limited edition in London in 1943. The author served as Intelligence Officer in the incredibly small British force which, in the spring of 1941, was sent from Palestine to put down Rashid Ali's revolt in Iraq. This is the fascinating story of that expedition.

PERSIAN GULF COMMAND. By Joel Sayre. New York: Random House, 1945, 140 p. $2.00.

A breezy, informative record of the job accomplished by some 30,000 American troops in Iran.

WINGS OVER BURMA. By Kenneth Hemingway. London: Quality Press, 1944, 192 p. 15/.

An illustrated, first-person story of an R.A.F. officer's experiences during the reconquest of Burma.

THE CIVIL DEFENCE OF MALAYA. Compiled by a Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir George Maxwell. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 128 p. 7/6.

The evidence given here concerning the part taken in the defense of Malaya by the civil population of the country during the Japanese invasion seems to prove that on the whole the civilians behaved with exemplary loyalty and gallantry in that disastrous campaign.

POWER IN THE PACIFIC. Compiled by Captain Edward Steichen. New York: U. S. Camera, 1945, 144 p. $2.00.

A photographic record of the Navy's part in the Pacific War.

BETIO BEACHHEAD. By Captain Earl J. Wilson and Others. New York: Putnam, 1945, 160 p. $2.50.

A highly circumstantial account of the capture of Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll, by four Marine eyewitnesses. There are a number of photographs that leave little to be desired by "battle realists."

RENDEZVOUS BY SUBMARINE. By Travis Ingham. Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, 255 p. $2.50.

No small part of the credit for the reconquest of the Philippines goes to an American businessman turned Navy Commander — Mr. Charles Parsons — who organized guerrilla forces in a number of islands. This is the exciting narrative of how he did this job.

The United States

AMERICA: PARTNER IN WORLD RULE. By William Henry Chamberlin. New York: Vanguard, 1945, 318 p. $3.00.

Sometime ago Mr. Chamberlin joined up with the crusade against Soviet Russia, and in this volume, as in his other recent works, he pursues this theme with a consistency and bitterness worthy of Cato. Whether his advice is reliable and prudent is another question.

THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN. By Crane Brinton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945, 305 p. $2.50.

This is the first volume in a new series entitled "The American Foreign Policy Library," edited by Mr. Sumner Welles and Professor Donald C. McKay of Harvard University. In his customarily lucid style, Professor Brinton sketches a picture of

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modern Britain and of her relations with the United States — economic, political, cultural. In the appendix there are "some vital facts about Britain" and suggested readings.

THE SENATE AND THE VERSAILLES MANDATE SYSTEM. By Rayford W. Logan. Washington: Minorities Publishers, 1945, 112 p. $2.00.

The author has combed the *Congressional Record* and other relevant sources in order to reconstruct this careful record of the attitude of the United States Senate toward the mandate system set up under the League Covenant.

CONTEMPORARY AMERICA. By Harvey Wish. New York: Harper, 1945, 657 p. $4.00.

A systematic, readable, illustrated reconstruction of the flow of American history since 1900.

APPROACHES TO NATIONAL UNITY. Edited by Lyman Bryson and Others. New York: Harper, 1945, 1037 p. $5.00.

Over 60 authorities in widely varied intellectual pursuits contributed to this symposium, organized under the auspices of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. Though highly stimulating, this discussion cannot be said to have led to any universally accepted conclusions.

WHAT THE INFORMED CITIZEN NEEDS TO KNOW. Edited by Bruce Bliven and A. G. Mezerik. New York: Duell, 1945, 377 p. $3.00.

Essays on "America and the World" and "America at Home," by a score of figures in political, academic and other walks of life.

PEACETIME CONSCRIPTION. Compiled by Julia Emily Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1945, 327 p. $1.25.

Selected articles illustrating various points of view.

MEN AT WORK: SOME DEMOCRATIC METHODS FOR THE POWER AGE. By Stuart and Marian Tyler Chase. New York: Harcourt, 1945, 146 p. $2.00.

Eleven chapters, originally published elsewhere as articles, in which the authors describe how in typical cases the democratic process has been applied to the solution of economic problems.

PRICE AND RELATED CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Seymour E. Harris. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945, 392 p. $4.00.

A technical treatise by a onetime Director of the Office of Export-Import Control in the O.P.A.

LABOR AND TOMORROW'S WORLD. By Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945, 153 p. $1.50.

Lectures delivered at Southern Methodist University by a prominent bishop in that church.

INFORME SOBRE LA RECONVERSIÓN Y LA OCUPACIÓN PLENA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. By Gustavo Polit. Mexico: Banco de México, 1945, 114 p.

A statistical study of the American war economy and of the problems raised by a transition back to a peacetime basis, especially by those of foreign trade and full employment. The author is on the staff of the Department of Economic Studies in the Banco de México.

LABOR FACT BOOK 7. Prepared by Labor Research Association. New York: International Publishers, 1945, 208 p. $2.25.

This latest volume in a series appearing biennially stresses data concerning the effects of the war on the American economy.

THE MERCHANT MARINE AND WORLD FRONTIERS. By Robert Earle Anderson. New York: Cornell Maritime Press, 1945, 205 p. $3.00.

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The problem of what to do with our tremendous war-born Merchant Marine examined with candor and insight by the Director of Finance of the United States Maritime Commission.

OIL AND DEEP WATER. By Kaj Klitgaard. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945, 182 p. $2.50.

Keen observations by a sailor of the old school on wartime conditions in the United States Merchant Marine.

THE MAN FROM MISSOURI: A BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN. By Cyril Clemens. Webster Groves (Mo.): International Mark Twain Society, 1945, 184 p. $2.00.

The first, but hardly the definitive, biography of the President.

AN UNCOMMON MAN. By Frank Kingdon. New York: Readers Press, 1945, 98 p. $2.00.

Wholehearted, sometimes extravagant, praise for Secretary Wallace and his program for achieving permanent prosperity for all Americans.

MY BROTHER AMERICANS. By Carlos P. Romulo. Garden City: Doubleday, 1945, 212 p. $2.50.

Carlos Romulo, Philippine publisher become general, tells how he came to discover and admire the real America during a wartime lecture tour of some 89,000 miles into nearly 500 cities and towns in this country.

PATHWAYS TO DEMOCRACY. By Arnold Hamilton Maloney and Others. Boston: Meador, 1945, 589 p. $2.50.

Rather disparate essays on a number of political and social problems interpreted from the Negro point of view. There is an interesting chapter on "Americaribbea: Ripe for Nationhood."

THE VIRGIN ISLANDS: FROM NAVAL BASE TO NEW DEAL. By Luther Harris Evans. Ann Arbor: Edwards, 1945, 365 p. $3.50.

A scholarly history of the American islands, with chapters on their administration and public finance, by the new Librarian of Congress.

OPPORTUNITY IN ALASKA. By George Sundburg. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 302 p. $2.50.

This fascinating guide for prospective settlers tells much about the resources of, and conditions in, our northern Territory.

Western Europe

DE MUNICH À VICHY. By Pierre Lazareff. New York: Brentano, 1944, 353 p. $1.75.

In this sequel to his "Dernière Édition," a noted French newspaperman takes us again behind the scenes of French journalistic and political life from 1937 to the Fall of France in June 1940. He has much to say about the activities of the Nazi Fifth Column in France.

FRANCE: THE BIRTH OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. By Maurice Edelman. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1944, 122 p. 9d.

A circumstantial pro-Gaullist account of political events in Algiers between the American landings and the ouster of General Giraud. The author, a young British journalist, is critical of American policy in North Africa.

L'OEUVRE DE LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE. By Jean Benoit-Levy and Others. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1945, 318 p. $2.25.

Essays on the Republic's political, socio-economic and cultural achievements, by ten French writers who appear here under the auspices of the École Libre des Hautes Études in New York.

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PÉTAIN TRUE TO SCALE. By General Chadebec de Lavalade. London: The Continental Publishers, 1944, 130 p. 6/.

Though the author has devoted himself largely to Pétain's record in World War I, he has managed to paint a portrait of the utmost value for our understanding the *capitulard* of Vichy, particularly his innate pessimism and the narrowness of his political conceptions.

ANGLETERRE ET BELGIQUE. By Roger Motz. London: Drummond, 1944, 143 p. 4/.

Admiration for the British and a description of Belgium's part in the war, both at home and with the government-in-exile.

EVOLUTION OF THE DUTCH NATION. By Bernard H. M. Vlekke. New York: Roy, 1945, 377 p. $3.50.

A sound and readable summary of Dutch history from the earliest times to 1940.

NIEUW NEDERLAND: BIJDRAGEN VAN BUITEN BEZET GEBIED IN VERBAND MET DEN WEDEROPBOUW VAN ONS LAND. Edited by A. A. van Rhijn. New York: Querido, 1944, 344 p.

A collection of more than a dozen essays by various hands concerning the foreign and domestic problems that will confront Holland during the postwar reconstruction period.

DENMARK. Edited by John Eppstein. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1945, 88 p. $1.00.

Another of the useful little "British Survey Handbooks," describing very cursorily indeed the recent history and current affairs of Denmark.

NORWAY IN WORLD HISTORY. By Wilhelm Christian Keilhau. London: Macdonald, 1944, 206 p. 5/.

A readable and reliable summary of the full sweep of Norwegian history, forming part of the "Cross-Roads Series."

LA DOUBLE AVENTURE DE FRIDTJOF NANSEN. By René Ristelhueber. Montreal: Éditions Variétés, 1944, 317 p. $1.50.

A friendly portrait of Nansen as explorer and humanitarian, by a former French Minister in Oslo.

TYSKLAND UTAN KULISSER. By Fritz Deck. Stockholm: Wahlström, 1944, 261 p. Kr. 9.50.

Though supposed to be an unbiased description of affairs and conditions in Germany, based on a brief trip there in the winter of 1943–44, this book is in reality pro-Nazi propaganda. The author was a German nationalist who became a Swedish citizen after the First World War.

GERMANY IS OUR PROBLEM. By Henry Morgenthau, Jr. New York: Harper, 1945, 239 p. $2.00.

Here is a clear statement of the famous "Morgenthau Plan" about which so much discussion has raged. The reader's reaction to it will pretty much be conditioned by his own predilections. Advocates of a soft peace will not approve all that the former Secretary of the Treasury proposes in order thoroughly to disarm Germany, but they must admit that his approach is not motivated by revenge but by a desire to make this peace "stick."

BONES OF CONTENTION. By the Rt. Hon. Lord Vansittart. New York: Knopf, 1945, 157 p. $2.75.

By now practically every politically aware person reacts strongly, one way or the other, to "Vansittartism." In this successor to his "Black Record" and "Lessons of My Life," the author repeats much of what he has said before, generously interlarding his text with quotations. Those who think Vansittart is pathological in his anti-

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Germanism should examine his twelve-point program, which is devoid of the vindictiveness they may have expected.

THE GERMAN RECORD: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT. By William Ebenstein. New York: Farrar, 1945, 334 p. $3.00.

While the flood of books "explaining" Germany shows no sign of letting up, it is pleasant to note one that really gets at the core of things. Professor Ebenstein, who finds the political record of the German people almost as black as does Lord Vansittart, rests his case on a thorough knowledge of what that record is. That his analysis cuts deep is shown by his statement that "the only way to understand the Nazi Germans is to observe the anti-Nazi Germans [for] the key to an appreciation of the implicit and unstated premises of Nazism will be found less in Treitschke and Hitler than in the flood of anti-Nazi books published in the past five years in the United States and England."

THE GERMAN TALKS BACK. By Heinrich Hauser. New York: Holt, 1945, 215 p. $2.50.

This book has caused quite a furore, not without assistance from the publishers. Hauser is a German who took refuge in America several years ago but who has now chosen to take his family back to defeated and impoverished Germany. He has written this volume to explain why he made this decision. In the process he finds fault with us (much of it deserved) and reveals — one supposes quite unintentionally — what is intellectually twisted and morally wrong with so many of his countrymen.

THE JUNKER MENACE. By Frederick Martin. New York: R. R. Smith, 1945, 155 p. $2.00.

An attempt to trace the psychological roots of Germany's aggressive behavior. The Junker is the villain in the piece, and Mr. Martin is prepared to go to considerable lengths to uproot this class.

AFTER NAZISM — DEMOCRACY? Edited by Kurt Hiller. London: Drummond, 1945, 204 p. 10/6.

Four German "Freedom Socialists" set forth the specifications for a new democratic and federal Germany. The chapter on "A Democratic Foreign Policy" is by Eugen Brehm. As is the case with so much of this sort of writing, it is difficult to draw the line between wishful thinking and practical politics.

L'OCCIDENT ET LA PAIX DE DEMAIN. By Pierre Haegelsteen. Brussels: Goemaere, 1945, 91 p.

The author wants Germany dismembered, the left bank of the Rhine annexed by her western neighbors, a thorough program of reparations and other punitive measures imposed on the German people. An English translation is supplied by the O. W. I. Outpost Service Bureau in New York.

UNITED STATES OF GERMANY. By Kurt Doberer. London: Drummond, 1944, 167 p. 7/6.

How to rebuild Germany as a decentralized state which presumably would be less able and ready to engage in aggressive wars. The author, a Bavarian, has included a helpful bibliography.

IN THE WAKE OF THE GOOSE-STEP. By Filippo Bojano. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1945, 272 p. $2.50.

This purports to be the inside story of Axis affairs, by a correspondent for Mussolini's paper *Popolo d'Italia* in Berlin from 1929 to 1939.

GERMAN COMMUNISTS. By "Spartakus." London: Hutchinson, 1944, 88 p. 1/.

This account of the transformations through which the German Communist movement has gone stresses its national and anti-democratic tendencies.

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ITALY AND THE COMING WORLD. By Don Luigi Sturzo. New York: Roy, 1945, 316 p. $3.50.

The Italian and English editions of this book were mentioned in the April 1945 issue of Foreign Affairs. The present volume makes available for the American public the program of the liberal Catholic leader, founder of the *Partito Popolare*. Among other things Don Sturzo calls for a republic in Italy.

SMOULDERING FREEDOM. By Isabel de Palencia. New York: Longmans, 1945, 264 p. $3.00.

One of the Spanish Loyalist leaders recounts her experiences, and those of her many fellow exiles, in Europe and America since the end of the Civil War in 1939.

Eastern Europe

BUILDING LENIN'S RUSSIA. By Simon Liberman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, 228 p. $3.00.

Liberman, a Menshevik before the Russian Revolution, collaborated with Lenin's régime as a commercial expert. This personal account of his own experiences and of his acquaintance with the leaders of the Revolution casts many interesting sidelights on Lenin's methods for effecting the transition from capitalism to Communism, notably by the New Economic Policy.

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION. By Joseph Stalin. New York: International Publishers, 1945, 167 p. $1.75.

The texts of addresses, orders of the day and four letters to American journalists dating from the period July 1941–May 1945.

MAISKY. By George Bilainkin. London: Allen and Unwin, 1944, 400 p. 15/.

Though this purports to be a biography of the man who served as Soviet Ambassador in London during the all-important decade following 1934, in reality it deals largely with Anglo-Russian relations interpreted from a Soviet point of view.

BEFORE THE STORM. By I. M. Maisky. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 176 p. 15/.

These recollections of Maisky's childhood and youth are interesting for their picture of the author's early environment and its effect on his later career as a Soviet diplomat.

POLAND AND RUSSIA 1919–1945. By James T. Shotwell and Max N. Laserson. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1945, 114 p. $2.25.

This compact, factual résumé of Russo-Polish relations is published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

TEUTON AND SLAV ON THE POLISH FRONTIER. By G. R. Gayre. London: Eyre, 1944, 76 p. 8/6.

Though one may not altogether share the author's views concerning racial matters, his analysis of the economic, geographic and strategic considerations which should govern the drawing of the German-Polish frontier will command attention. Some of his suggestions are in the direction taken by the Potsdam Conference last July. There are a number of maps, diagrams and photos.

THE POLISH WORKER: A STUDY OF A SOCIAL STRATUM. By Feliks Gross. New York: Roy, 1945, 274 p. $3.00.

A history of the Polish worker's legal status and his organizations in recent years, both before and during the Nazi occupation.

BALTIC STATES: ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA. By F. W. Pick. London: Boreas, 1945, 172 p. 7/6.

A compact history of the three countries that comes down through the opening phases of World War II. The author overstresses the democratic tendencies in the Baltic States during the inter-war period.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Ján Papánek. New York: International Universities Press, 1945, 136 p. $2.00.

Czechoslovakia's democratic traditions viewed as an augury for a democratic future.

HUNGARY. Edited by John Eppstein. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1945, 88 p. $1.00.

A companion volume to the work on Denmark, mentioned above.

IN DARKEST HUNGARY. By G. Pálóczy-Horváth. London: Gollancz, 1945, 158 p. 5/.

This book is about the great depressed class of the rural proletariat in Hungary, concerning which little has been written in the western languages. The author is a liberal journalist who fled before the German invasion of Hungary and from abroad helped lead the underground movement in that country.

YUGOSLAVIA. By Robert Daniel Hogg. London: Macdonald, 1944, 176 p. 5/.

The author succeeds fairly well in presenting a comprehensible description of the course of events in Yugoslavia, notably since the end of World War I. There is a useful preface by Milan Grol, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party.

CAITIFF BULGARIA. By P. Pipinĕlis. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 61 p. 6/.

In this volume, published by authority of the Greek Ministry of Information, the author arraigns the Bulgarians, including the leaders of the Democratic and Peasant Parties, for their consistent policy of imperialist and unneighborly behavior in recent decades.

WAS CHURCHILL RIGHT IN GREECE? Compiled by Chris J. Agrafiotis. Manchester (N. H.): The Author, 1945, 152 p. $2.00.

An admirer of Churchill has selected a number of articles and editorials from British and American journals to illustrate the diverse points of view on this highly controversial subject.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Sir Edward Grigg. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 192 p. 7/6.

This is an eminently sane analysis of the problems that will confront Britain, primarily in Europe, during the period of reconstruction just beginning. Sir Edward has no use for those who let sentiment, prejudice or fear determine their attitude toward Britain's allies and enemies in the recent conflict. He is for a hard, but just, peace for the Germans — *all* Germans — and a continuing policy of accommodation toward Russia, without sacrificing British interests or honor.

DIPLOMACY IN FETTERS. By Sir Victor Wellesley. London: Hutchinson, 1944, 224 p. 16/.

A former Deputy Under Secretary at the Foreign Office discusses the forces which he believes hamper British diplomatic officials in their task of forwarding the Commonwealth's long-term interests. Among these are the lack of coördination between political and economic policies and the failure of the Government to give a firm lead to public opinion on foreign affairs.

PEACE OR CHAOS? By George Soloveytchik. London: Macdonald, 1944, 251 p. 10/6.

In this forthright book the author, a Russian-born British citizen, points out some of the pitfalls which England must avoid if she wants peace to return on the Continent. He proposes a division of Germany into northern and southern parts and warns his countrymen that they must give up the irrational habit of being so pro-German, and so anti-French and anti-Russian, that they endanger their own national interests.

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MUNICH: BEFORE AND AFTER. By W. W. Hadley. London: Cassell, 1944, 184 p. 7/6.

A defense of the Chamberlain appeasement policy.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1689–1943. By Sir J. A. R. Marriott. London: Methuen, 1944, 277 p. 8/6.

This seems a rather unreliable piece of patchwork, in which inadequate interpretations are accompanied by serious omissions and not infrequent errors.

ENGLAND'S DECADENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. By William F. Hauhart. Appleton (Wis.): C. C. Nelson, 1945, 86 p. $2.00.

Why the United States should not tie itself up with Britain's declining economy.

A PLANNED ECONOMY OR FREE ENTERPRISE: THE LESSONS OF HISTORY. By E. Lipson. London: Black, 1945, 326 p. 15/.

Dr. Lipson, an outstanding economic historian, has in this worthwhile work reviewed England's history in terms of the conflict and interplay of the two basic philosophies suggested in his title. His chapter on the inter-war period and his proposals for reconstruction today are to be recommended.

KING GEORGE VI AND HIS PEOPLE: A TRIBUTE TO BRITAIN. By Philip Paneth. London: Alliance Press, 1945, 91 p. 3/6.

A pleasant, chatty little book that manages to convey quite a bit of the flavor of Britain and her royal family.

LAW AND ORDERS. By Carleton Kemp Allen. London: Stevens, 1945, 385 p. 15/.

In this scholarly study Dr. Allen, who holds to the Liberal view of the state, wrestles with the problem of how a proper balance between the legislative and executive powers in Britain's government can be restored and maintained.

NOS ÎLES. Teddington: The Channel Islands Study Group, 1944, 106 p. 3/6.

A symposium on the economic, social and political problems of the Channel Islands, by a group of Islanders in England.

REMEMBERING MY GOOD FRIENDS. By Mary Agnes Hamilton. London: Cape, 1945, 320 p. 12/6.

Memoirs and impressions from the pen of an Englishwoman notable in public life.

CANADA: NEW WORLD POWER. By Louisa W. Peat. New York: McBride, 1945, 293 p. $3.00.

A popular introduction to the Dominion in its many facets.

CANADIAN RESTORATION. By E. Newton-White. Toronto: Ryerson, 1944, 227 p. $2.50.

A plea for an integrated and balanced economy in Canada. The author is particularly anxious that the rôle of agriculture be not exaggerated at the expense of a sound exploitation of Canada's other resources.

GÉOGRAPHIE ÉCONOMIQUE DU CANADA. By Raymond Tanghe. Montreal: Fides, 1944, 271 p. $1.50.

This systematic survey of the Dominion's economic geography is organized by industry rather than by region.

ADVANCE AUSTRALIA — WHERE? By Brian Con Penton. London: Cassell, 1943, 234 p. 8/6.

Mr. Penton is sharply critical of many of the notions about the Empire and the Commonwealth's place in the world, harbored by a goodly number of his fellow Australians. Above all, he wants them to recognize that they live in a Pacific world and that, for better or worse, Asia and America are their great neighbors with whom they must learn to live and trade.

PAKISTAN: A PLAN FOR INDIA. By The Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah. London: Quality Press, 1944, 44 p. 2/6.

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A noted Moslem writer explains the reasons for the demand by his coreligionists that India be divided into two parts — Hindustan and Pakistan.

THE MAN INDIA LOVED. By John S. Hoyland. London: Lutterworth Press, 1944, 126 p. 4/6.

Not so much a biography of the Reverend Charles F. Andrews as an appreciation of the work he did toward improving the life of the Indian people.

The Near East

PEACE FOR THE JEWS. By Joseph Tenenbaum. New York: American Federation for Polish Jews, 1945, 182 p. $2.00.

Another statement of the case for a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine.

JEWISH YOUTH COMES HOME. By Norman Bentwich. London: Gollancz, 1944, 159 p. 7/6.

The story of the Youth Aliyah during the years 1933–43, when many young Jews were rescued from the Nazis and transplanted to a new life in Palestine.

LETTERS FROM THE DESERT. By Moshe Mosenson. New York: Sharon Books, 1945, 222 p. $2.00.

These letters from a member of the Jewish Brigade throw light on the motives, training and fighting record of this force, which participated in the Desert Campaign.

Africa

JAPAN'S BID FOR AFRICA. By Eric Rosenthal. Johannesburg (U. of S. A.): Central News Agency, 1944, 172 p. 3/6.

From numerous sources the author has gathered material for this exposé of Japan's machinations to gain control of the Indian Ocean. He gives particular attention to Vichy activities and to the Madagascar campaign.

The Far East

THE CHALLENGE OF RED CHINA. By Gunther Stein. New York: Whittlesey House, 1945, 490 p. $3.50.

Mr. Stein understands the political importance of economic and social considerations and he writes the readable language of the journalist. This book is primarily about the Communist forces in northwestern China, among whom he passed several months.

CHINA'S POSTWAR MARKETS. By Chih Tsang. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 239 p. $3.50.

A careful, statistical analysis of China's prospects as both exporter and importer, prepared by a Chinese economist for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

TELL THE PEOPLE. By Pearl S. Buck. New York: Day, 1945, 84 p. $1.50.

From these conversations which the noted American novelist had with James Yen we learn about the excellent work accomplished among the Chinese masses by his Mass Education Movement.

A CHINESE VILLAGE. By Martin C. Yang. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 275 p. $3.00.

A socio-economic case study of a village in Shantung.

KOREA. By M. Frederick Nelson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945, 326 p. $3.75.

A scholarly diplomatic history of Korea up to the time of Japanese annexation.

SOVIET AND TSARIST SIBERIA. By George Borodin. London: Rich, 1944, 168 p. 15/.

An enthusiastic and readable account of Soviet accomplishments in Siberia, for which region the author sees a very rosy future.

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RUSSIA — THE COMING POWER IN THE PACIFIC. By Harold Winston Rhodes. Wellington (N. Z.): Progressive Publishing Society, 1944, 91 p. 4/6.

The Soviet Union's rapid development of its Asiatic domain, and its future rôle in the Far East, sympathetically viewed from Down Under.

THE FUTURE OF JAPAN. By William C. Johnstone. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 162 p. $2.00.

The author of this timely and thoughtful book is Dean of the School of Government at George Washington University and a leading American authority on Far Eastern affairs. He explains what he believes to be the steps which must be taken to effect the reforms in Japan's political, economic and cultural structure necessary for her readmission to polite society. He has tried to keep his proposed program within the limits of minimum requirements rather than risk failure by trying to do too much.

DILEMMA IN JAPAN. By Andrew Roth. Boston: Little, Brown, 1945, 302 p. $2.50.

Mr. Roth upholds the case for abolishing the imperial office and destroying the economic magnates — the *Zaibatsu* — as an indispensable condition for the creation of a democratic Japan. That the latter objective is possible he seeks to show by offering little-known facts about the various liberal elements on whom he feels we can rely for a gradual reform of Japan's political climate and institutions.

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One isn't quite sure, after perusing this volume, what the South Americans *who count* actually think of us, but at least we learn something about what five North Americans well acquainted with our southern neighbors think about them.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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